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This thesis introduces the notion of dehumanisation, elucidates its relationship with 
detachment and distance, and demonstrates how technology, in particular drone warfare, 
has contributed to detachment and dehumanisation in armed conflict. Drone warfare is 
transforming war from defined periods of high-intensity conflict in concentrated 
geographical locations to continuous and indefinite periods of low-intensity operations 
without boundaries. This blurs the line between war and peace, creating greater human 
insecurity towards life. The thesis assesses the legal response to this rapid development 
of technology and changing landscape of armed conflict. The thesis scrutinises 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), and 
UK domestic governance. The research concludes that through physical and 
psychological distancing, drones anonymise the enemy, leading to a partial 
dehumanisation whereby the humanity of a person is masked, blurred, or faded. This in 
turn leads to a reduced resistance to killing and a greater willingness to engage in low-
intensity operations involving armed attack.		
	
The thesis further concludes that there are weaknesses in laws that may be exploited by 
the technological advancements of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and that 
incremental adjustments must be made to ensure the proper regulation of UAVs in armed 
conflict. States enjoy the ability to deploy independent drone operations without the 
responsibility of committing to an official armed conflict. IHL cannot be applied in times 
of peace, and IHRL faces problems of enforceability. The normative applicability of law 
is therefore limited and undermined. This thesis proposes that use of military drones 
should be limited to official and legally recognised armed conflicts, while calling for 
further clarification and unification on the relationship between IHL and IHRL. 
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1.1 Thesis statement  
The rapid development of technology in recent times has impacted on the nature and 
evolution of armed conflict. This thesis posits that the proliferation of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs), more commonly referred to as drones, has led to a more permissive 
approach to armed aggression. Physical distance between weapon and target is linked to 
psychological detachment, resulting in the dehumanisation of the enemy. This thesis 
further argues that the laws regulating armed conflict are not sufficiently equipped to deal 
with the abovementioned implications. Rather than seeking to develop new principles or 
values, the existing legal framework can be updated to reflect the changing landscape of 
armed conflict. 
 
1.2 Research objectives 
The research objectives of this study are threefold. The first objective is to examine 
whether the use of UAVs in armed conflict is leading to psychological detachment from 
the enemy resulting in their dehumanisation. The development of smart weapons has 
reduced human presence on the active battlefield, at least on one side. The thesis seeks to 
ascertain whether the detached nature of drone warfare has anonymised and dehumanised 
the enemy, diminishing the necessary innate psychological barriers towards killing. 
 
The second objective is to assess whether the drone phenomenon has significantly 
changed the nature of contemporary armed conflict. The ease with which drone 
operations can be deployed, and the ability of drones to transcend borders with such 
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efficiency, is unprecedented. This development has led to an increasingly unilateral mode 
of conflict. The thesis examines the argument that drone warfare has blurred the lines 
between war and peace by transforming armed attack – traditionally viewed as the last 
resort – into the first resort.  
 
The third objective is to assess whether contemporary armed conflict is in line with 
existing legal principles and the values that lie behind them. The thesis also seeks to 
determine whether the laws pertaining to armed conflict are adequate to sufficiently 
regulate the changing landscape of drone warfare. The research covers International 
Humanitarian law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), and UK national 
governance. This research is conducted on the basis that jus in bello is premised on 




Armed conflict has existed for as long as human beings have. Rules surrounding armed 
conflict have existed for just as long. The Sanskrit Mahābhārata outlined the rules of 
warfare in ancient India over 400 years before the birth of Christ.2 The Old Testament 
and the Qur’ān have mention of the laws of war.3 Human attempts to regulate warfare 
throughout human history are a clear sign of humanity’s resistance towards conflict, or at 
least its consequences. While war may be accepted as a necessary product of human co-
existence, its destructive consequences have led human beings to curb its existence, and 
	
1 Christof Heyns, ‘Coming to Terms with Drones’ in David Cortright, Rachel Fairhurst, and 
Kristen Wall (eds.), Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict: Ethical, Legal, and Strategic 
Implications (University of Chicago Press, London, 2015) viii 
2 Bagish Chandra Nirmal, ‘International Humanitarian Law in Ancient India’ in Venkateshwara 
Mani (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law in South Asia (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2007) 37-38 
3 Qur’an 2:190; Deuteronomy 20 
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it has thus been treated throughout history as a last resort. Dave Grossman notes, “…[the] 
singular lack of enthusiasm for killing one’s fellow man has existed throughout military 
history.”4 The compulsion not to kill is indeed internalised in most human beings as an 
innate inhibition.5 Military historian S.L.A. Marshall describes the average and healthy 
individual as an “conscientious objector, unknowing” when faced with the task of killing 
another person, adding that said individual “has such an inner and usually unrealized 
resistance toward killing a fellow man that the will not of his own volition take life if it 
is possible to turn away from that responsibility.”6 In World War Two, no more than 15-
25% of personnel who had the opportunity to engage ever fired their weapon against the 
enemy,7 demonstrating humanity’s hesitance towards killing.  
 
1.3.1 The Law of Armed Conflict 
The origin of modern International Humanitarian Law is most commonly attributed to 
the Lieber Code, created by Francis Lieber in 1863 in response to the first industrial war.8 
Lieber invoked the idea of humanity in warfare alongside justice and honour. The 
humanitarian aspect of The Law of Armed Conflict officially began with Henri Dunant’s 
efforts. The Swiss businessman, upon witnessing the appalling state of the dead and 
wounded in the battlefield of Solferino (1859), rallied the people to create an organisation 
that would tend to the wounded and sick in battle. As a result, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) was established in 1863. The 1864 Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field9 was indeed the 
	
4 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society 
(Time Warner Book Group, New York, 1995) 16 
5 ibid 
6 Samuel Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (University of 
Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2000) 79 
7 ibid 54 
8 US War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, vol.3, no.3 (1899) 148-164 
9 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 
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first instance that international law protected human values in warfare.10 It has since been 
enriched by a number of treaties in the form of Geneva Conventions (1949) and 
Additional Protocols (1977).11  
 
IHL does not seek to end war, but rather seeks to balance military necessity with 
maintaining an element of humanity. It is premised on a number of underlying principles 
such as the protection of civilian life, the principle of distinction, and the principle of 
proportionality, all of which are explained and analysed in great detail in Chapter 3.12 
IHL is central to this research as the thesis seeks to ascertain whether drone warfare is in 
line with the abovementioned principles. Having been drafted largely in the 19th century, 
is IHL sufficiently equipped to regulate rapidly developing technology, and if not, what 
changes are needed to ensure its adequacy? 
 
1.3.2 International Human Rights Law 
International Human Rights Law was created to preserve the inalienable rights of 
individuals in peacetime, primarily against potential transgressions by their own state. 
However, it is of growing relevance to this research in light of the ever-increasing 
acceptance regarding its application in armed conflicts.13 IHRL is widely understood to 
	
10 Daniel Thürer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, 2011) 197-198 
11 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 85; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 135; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I),	8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 
12 Subchapter 3.4: ‘Jus in bello: principles of IHL’ 
13 Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, American Journal of 
International Law, vol.94, no.2 (2000) 239-287 
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be potentially applicable in a wide variety of situations.14 That being said, prior to the 
1990s, there was no expectation for IHRL to be implemented in armed conflicts. More 
recently, it has been described as a “gap-filler” to reinforce the humanitarian aspects of 
IHL, adding specificity to the broader overarching ideals of IHL. 15  IHRL provides 
individuals with ‘rights’ whereas IHL imposes ‘obligations’ on states. Regardless of 
which stance is more dominant or prevailing, which will be discussed in Chapter 4, IHRL 
creates an additional avenue of potential recourse and is thus worth researching in full.  
 
1.3.3 National governance 
Domestic law serves the purpose of safeguarding a state’s own citizens. The proliferation 
of drone warfare has implications for a number of domestic issues such as the use of lethal 
force, the arms trade, and counter-terrorism. In line with the researcher’s UK background 
and heritage, the focus will be on UK domestic law. Parallels will be made to US domestic 
law considering US dominance in drone activity. Analysing domestic governance 
alongside international law also adds to the originality of the research.  
 
1.3.4 Dehumanisation 
This study is centred on the concept of the dehumanisation of armed conflict. To 
humanise someone is to “perceive him as an individual, independent and distinguishable 
from others, capable of making choices…”16 To dehumanise is therefore to remove this 
human element from a person – to view them as less than human. Dehumanisation is used 
as a tool to remove the aforementioned innate inhibitions against violence or conflict. 
	
14 Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) 
22-23 
15 Yuval Shany, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Competing Legal Paradigms for 
Fighting Terror’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 25-26 
16 Herbert Kelman, ‘Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of 
Victims and Victimizers’, Journal of Social Issues, vol.29, no.4 (1973) 48 
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Hannah Arendt notes, “It is quite conceivable that one fine day a highly organized and 
mechanized humanity will as a whole conclude quite democratically – namely, by 
majority decision – that for humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate certain 
parts thereof.”17 This can only be done when the “certain parts” of the human population 
in question are no longer deemed sufficiently human. For example, the Nazis labelled 
Jews as Untermenschen (“subhumans”) because they were convinced that, although Jews 
looked every bit as human as the average Aryan, it “was a façade and that, concealed 
behind it, Jews were really filthy, parasitic vermin.”18 The Nazis conceded that killing 
humans was indeed wrong, but exterminating rats, on the other hand, was of course 
permissible.19 In the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese were referred to as “gooks”, which 
literally means “prostitute”, but became synonymous with “foreigner” and was attributed 
to Vietnamese citizens.20  
 
Herbert Kelman adds that, “The [human] inhibitions against murdering fellow human 
beings are generally so strong that the victims must be deprived of their human status if 
systematic killing is to proceed in a smooth and orderly fashion.”21 As a result, “the extent 
[by which] the victims are dehumanised, principles of morality no longer apply to them 
and moral restrains against killing are more readily overcome.”22 Central to this thesis, 
Gregory H. Stanton, the founder and president of the human rights organisation Genocide 
Watch, states that dehumanisation overcomes the normal human revulsion against 
murder.23 
	
17 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harvest Books, San Diego, 1979) 299 
18 David Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others (St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 2011) 5 
19 ibid 15 
20 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (Printer & Martin Ltd., London, 2013) 181 
21 David Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others (St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 2011) 15 
22 ibid 
23 Gregory Stanton quoted in David Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and 
Exterminate Others (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2011) 142 
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As with the foregoing examples, dehumanisation is often discussed in the wake of 
genocides or ethnic cleansing. When Franz Stangl, former SS Officer and commandant 
of the Solibor and Treblinka concentration camps, was asked why the humiliation and 
cruelties within Nazi concentration camps were carried out even though the victims were 
destined for death regardless, he replied, “To make it possible for them to do what they 
were doing.”24 Primo Levi adds: “Before dying, the victim must be degraded so that the 
murderer will be less burdened by guilt.”25 Dehumanisation is the process by which 
human beings are rendered so radically “other” that it becomes possible for their 
persecutors to kill or harm them without condemnation or remorse.26  
 
1.3.5 Drone warfare 
Though dehumanisation is most often discussed in times of genocide, it is not limited to 
murder on a mass scale. As will be discussed in great detail in Chapter 2, dehumanisation 
can also occur through more limited applications of diminished empathy. Simon Baron-
Cohen attributes a lack of empathy as the underlying reason behind our ability to cause 
harm to others.27  
 
Drone technology enables a state to wage armed attacks from the confines of its own 
territory without the commitment of forces on the ground. Lt. Col. David Branham of the 
U.S. Air Force notes, “It’s possible that in our lifetime we will be able to run a conflict 
	
24 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved (Abacus, London, 1989) 100-101 
25 ibid 
26 Sophie Oliver, ‘Dehumanization: Perceiving the Body as (In) Human’ in Paulus Kaufman and 
others (eds.), Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated (Springer, 
New York, 2010) 89 
27 Simon Baron-Cohen, Zero Degrees of Empathy: A Theory of Human Cruelty and Kindness 
(Penguin Books, London, 2011) 
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without ever leaving the United States.”28 While armed conflict is growing in autonomy 
and human presence is diminishing significantly, this study researches the link between 
physical distance, psychological detachment, dehumanisation, and conflict. Drone 
warfare is analysed as a mechanism by which physical distance and diminished human 
presence can lead to reduced inhibitions towards violence and armed aggression. 
 
1.4 Originality 
Each subtopic within this study has been previously researched, but this thesis is unique 
in its combination of these topics and the perspectives it presents. Dehumanisation has 
been previously researched as a psychological phenomenon, usually in the context of 
genocides. The capability of drones has been researched and analysed, usually from a 
technological perspective. The relationship between IHL and IHRL has been frequently 
discussed, and the relevance or applicability of international law is questioned at regular 
intervals. This research, however, combines the aforementioned subjects to pose the 
questions: is drone technology being used as a tool to dehumanise? And is the current 
legal framework sufficient to acknowledge and regulate these technological 
developments and their implications? 
 
1.4.1 Dehumanisation 
The topic of dehumanisation is usually researched from a psychological perspective. 
David Smith reflects on the history of dehumanisation and its possible origins29 and 
Simon Baron-Cohen links dehumanisation to empathy, or a lack thereof.30 Both works 
have been utilised to comprehend the psychology behind dehumanisation as well as its 
	
28 Matthew Brzezinski, ‘The Unmanned Army’, (New York Times, 2003) available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/20/magazine/the-unmanned-army.html> on 8 January 2020 
29 David Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others (St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 2011) 
30 Simon Baron-Cohen, Zero Degrees of Empathy: A Theory of Human Cruelty and Kindness 
(Penguin Books, London, 2011) 
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possible origins and causes. Dave Grossman provides an insight into the psychological 
cost of killing in warfare.31 This thesis uses those insights and juxtaposes the effects of 
killing in traditional battle to that in drone warfare. Nick Haslam provides a unique and 
useful distinction between “animalistic dehumanisation” and “mechanistic 
dehumanisation”, the former being the type of dehumanisation associated with genocides, 
usually entailing the degrading of human beings to the level of animals or worse.32 The 
latter is related to dehumanisation stemming as a result of physical and emotional 
distance. 33  Contributing to the literature, this thesis proposes a third category of 
dehumanisation: “partial dehumanisation” where the humanity of the person is masked, 
blurred, or faded.34  
 
1.4.2 Drone warfare 
There is an abundance of research on the technological capabilities of UAVs and there is 
increasing commentary on the changing landscape of armed conflict. Michael Horowitz 
and Matthew Fuhrmann discuss the causes and implications of the proliferation of 
UAVs, 35  and Micah Zenko and Sarah Kreps argue the case for limiting said 
proliferation.36 This thesis contributes to the commentary around drone warfare changing 
the landscape of armed conflict, while providing original research on the detachment of 
drones leading to the dehumanisation of the enemy. 
 
	
31 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society 
(Time Warner Book Group, New York, 1995) 
32 Nick Haslam, ‘Dehumanization: An Integrative Review’, Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, (2006), Vol. 10, No.3, 262 
33 ibid 
34 Subchapter 2.2.2 
35 Michael Horowitz and Matthew Fuhrmann, ‘Droning On: Explaining the Proliferation of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’, International Organization, vol.71, no.2, 397-418 
36 Michael Zenko and Sarah Kreps, Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation (Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, 2014) 
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Grégoire Chamayou’s Drone Theory37 provides invaluable insight into the way drones 
and unmanned systems have transformed warfare. He discusses at length the 
psychological effect of conducting a war from such long distances, from the perspective 
of both sides of the conflict. This thesis combines Grossman’s research regarding the 
psychological cost of killing with Chamayou’s analysis of the psychology of warring 
from a distance. Grossman devised a graph (Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2) that compares 
physical distance from the target with resistance to killing, demonstrating an inverse 
correlation. In other words, the further one is from the enemy, the less resistance one has 
towards killing them. Chamayou considers the placement of UAVs on such a graph, 
discussing their highly unique nature and their ability to be simultaneously nearby and 
far away. 
 
This thesis makes specific and detailed mention of Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to 
Authority.38 Milgram devised an experiment using unsuspecting volunteers and tested 
their willingness to inflict pain on others. Milgram’s primary objective was to study the 
relationship between evil crimes and the concept of obedience. While he discovered a 
strong correlation between the subjects’ willingness to inflict pain on others and their 
perceived duty to obey an authority figure, this thesis extrapolates from the same data an 
equally strong correlation between acts of violence and detachment. It also shows a 
relationship between physical distance and psychological distance, which correlates to 
Grossman’s analysis of the psychology of killing as well as Chamayou’s application to 
drone warfare. 
1.4.3 Legal analysis 
	
37 Grégoire Chamayou (trans. Janet Lloyd), Drone Theory (Penguin Books, London, 2015) 
38 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (Printer & Martin Ltd., London, 2013) 
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The rapid advancement of drone technology has led to the emergence of literature on 
drone warfare. Previous attempts to analyse the use of drones as a military strategy have 
tended to concentrate on the legality of the use of drones. Research conducted by 
academics such as O’Connell,39 Blum and Heyman,40 and Murphy and Radsan41 have 
analysed the lawfulness of drone warfare by concentrating on the use of drones as 
opposed to questioning whether international standards can control the use of drones. The 
approach in this thesis is to adopt the premise that the use of drone technology as a 
military tactic is a technological development like any many others and should be 
regulated within current international legal standards.  
 
The Tallinn Manual is consulted as a framework to approach the innovation of 
technological weapons.42 The Tallinn Manual is an academic, non-binding study on how 
international law can be applied to cyber warfare. Cyber warfare and drone warfare share 
similarities in that they are both unconventional and, if unchecked, have the potential to 
bypass current international regulations. This issue is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 3. 
  
Some attempts at governance have emerged. The European Parliament passed a 
resolution on the use of armed drones in 2014,43 and in 2017 there were attempts to create 
	
39 Mary O’Connell, ‘Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan 2004-
2009’ in Simon Bronitt, Miriam Gani and Saskia Hufnagel (eds.) Shooting to Kill, Socio-Legal 
Perspectives on the use of Lethal Force (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 143-144 
40 Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann, ‘Law and Policy of Targeted Killing’, Harvard 
National Security Journalvol.1, no.146 (2010) 149-151 
41 Richard Murphy and Afsheen Radsan, ‘Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists’, 
Cardozo Law Review, vol.31, no.405 (2009) 409-411 
42 Michael Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) 421 
43 European Parliament Resolution of 27 February 2014 on the Use of Armed Drones 
(2014/2567(RSP)) OJ C 285 
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a common position from the EU.44 The US army has outlined its policy on the law of war 
with regards to targeting,45 as has the UK government,46 but many have challenged the 
legitimacy of such asymmetrical warfare and the permissibility of such use of force.47 
Arguments have also been made in support of drone warfare48 and this thesis shall 
compare the many different stances and analyse their arguments in light of the added 
dimension of dehumanising the enemy. Research into the dehumanising effect of this 
method of warfare is a valuable addition to the literature. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
This research relies on an integrated mixed-methods methodology, which utilises and 
adopts the approaches of non-law disciplines in conjunction with its legal approach.49 
Among the different subjects involved in this study are political science, international 
relations, and psychology. The primary aim of this research is to assess whether the 
proliferation of UAVs has fostered dehumanisation in armed conflict, and whether the 
law is equipped to deal with these technological advancements. This aim necessitates 
research into the psychology of dehumanisation, the impact of distance and detachment, 
	
44 Jessica Dorsey and Giulia Bonacquisti, ‘Towards an EU common position on the use of 
armed drones’, Directorate-General for External Policies: Policy Department (European 
Parliament, 2017) 
45 Department of the US Army, Targeting and the Law of War: Administrative Investigations 
and Criminal Law Supplement, (2017) 
46 House of Commons and House of Lords, ‘The Government’s Policy on the use of Drones for 
Targeted Killing: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015–
16’, Joint Committee on Human Rights, HL 49, HC 747 (2016-2017) 
47 Alejandro Chehtman, ‘The ad bellum Challenges of Drones: Recalibrating Permissible Use of 
Force’, European Journal of International Law, vol.28, no.1.1, (2017) 173-197; Vivek 
Sehrawat, ‘Legal Status of Drones under LOAC and International Law’, Penn State Journal of 
Law and International Affairs, vol.5, no.1, (2017) 166-205; Vivek Sehrawat, ‘Autonomous 
Weapon System: Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Other Legal Challenges’, Computer Law 
and Security Review, vol.33, no.1, (2017) 38-56; Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-
Cawthorne, and Thompson Chengeta, ‘The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of 
Armed Drones’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.65, no.4 (2016) 791-827 
48 John Yoo, ‘Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies’, 
California Law Review, vol.105, no.2 (2017) 444-499 
49 Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) 
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and the political relationships between the nations that are affected by technological 
advancements in armed conflict. 
 
1.5.1 Doctrinal methodology 
One methodology used in the study is doctrinal. ‘Doctrine’ is defined as “a synthesis of 
various rules, principles, norms, interpretive guidelines and values. It explains, makes 
coherent, or justifies a segment of the law as part of a larger system of law.”50 The 
doctrine in question is primarily legal and so is comprised of cases, statutes, treaties, and 
rules. Doctrinal methodology first involves locating the sources of law, and then 
interpreting and analysing said source.51 In this case, international treaties such as the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Conventions of 1907, largely regarded as the 
two major “streams”52 or “currents”53 of International Humanitarian Law, are the primary 
sources of international law. In addition, human rights laws are drawn from the European 
Convention on Human Rights, affecting not just the use of force but also the issue of 
jurisdiction. Domestic sources include the Human Rights Act 1998 and the laws 
governing the authorisation and application of lethal force. 
 
These sources are primarily located on paper and in online databases, such as Westlaw 
and LexisNexis, as well as online browsers such as Google Scholar. The Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies in London was utilised for its special collections in international 
law, as was the Peace Palace Library. The libraries of the University of Leeds and 
	
50 Trischa Mann (ed.), Australian Law Dictionary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 197 
51 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’, Deakin Law Review, vol.17, no.1 (2012) 110 
52 Mark Reisman and Chris Antoniou (eds.), The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of 
Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflict (Villard, New York, 
1994) xxi 
53 Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to 
International Humanitarian Law 3rd ed. (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 
2001) 19 
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University of Manchester were visited regularly due to their easy access to relevant data. 
Electronic resources such as the International Criminal Court and International 
Committee of the Red Cross websites were also utilised. 
 
The legal researcher analyses and interprets these sources, “demystifying”54 them for 
others. However, the task is not only to locate and explain the laws, but also to apply them 
in relevant situations; “The lawyer researcher examines the legislative provision, 
examines the situation and then decides if the situation comes within the rule.”55 The 
technological advances in warfare are both rapid and constant, and so the researcher must 
consider the advancements in light of the legal provisions.  
 
Doctrinal methodology provides structure, rigour, and discipline to research, which is 
essential in legal research.56 McKerchar argues that one of the primary virtues of doctrinal 
methodology is for the research to “follow accepted conventions, using clear rationales, 
and for the research to be systematic and purposive with a robust framework.” 57 
Simmonds goes on to explain that, “Legal doctrine, the corpus of rules, principles, 
doctrines, and concepts used as a basis for legal reasoning and justification, represents 
the heart of a legal system.”58 A strict doctrinal method focuses on the primacy of critical 
reasoning based around authoritative texts,59 taking the perspective of an “insider”.60 
 
	
54 Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Can Legal Research Be Demystified’, Legal Studies, vol.29, no.2, (2009) 
181 
55 John Farrar, Legal Reasoning (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2010) 92 
56 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’, Deakin Law Review, vol. 17, no.1 (2012) 112 
57 Margaret McKerchar, Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law, and Accounting 
(Lawbook Co., Pyrmont, 2010) 116 
58 Nigel Simmonds, The Decline of Juridical Reason: Doctrine and Theory in the Legal Order 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984) 1 
59 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’, Law Quarterly Review, 
vol. 632 (2016) 633 
60 ibid 
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In an interdisciplinary project such as this, such grounding is necessary to maintain 
consistency in legal analysis. However, taking account of the perspectives and 
methodologies of international relations, political science, and psychology, an 
exclusively doctrinal approach would not be suitable. Hutchinson and Duncan argue that 
the majority of contemporary legal researchers acknowledge that it is important to build 
on doctrinal research conclusions by using sociological or other “outsider” perspectives,61 
and so the project reflects this advice.  
 
This thesis, while acknowledging the virtues of a doctrinal methodology, adopts a socio-
legal approach. While legal research has historically been directed solely towards the 
legal experts, interdisciplinary research in the area of international law is often directed 
towards those outside a narrow legally trained discipline.62 
 
1.5.2 Socio-legal methodology 
The overall approach of the study may be better defined as a socio-legal study. One of 
the defining characteristics of socio-legal studies is to locate law in a non-legal context.63 
The study aims to assess the law in the current context of its emergent practice. Law does 
not exist in a vacuum; it is developed through the society in which it arises and indeed, 
in this case, in the wider environment beyond any single society.64 Both domestic politics 
and international relations play vital roles in shaping the direction of the law of warfare. 
Therefore, a socio-legal approach, which concerns itself with law in action rather than 
simply a theoretical perspective, seems appropriate.65 Feenan notes that studies in law 
	
61 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’, Deakin Law Review, vol. 17, no.1, 115 
62 ibid 118-119 
63 Dermot Feenan, ‘Socio-Legal Studies and the Humanities’, International Journal of Law in 
Context, vol.5, no.3 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 235 
64 Robert Cryer, Tamara Hervey, and Bal Sokhi-Bulley, Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (Hart Publishing, London, 2011) 86 
65 ibid 
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connected to the humanities are based on the view that the texts and laws at hand must 
have “humanistic” relevance to law.66  
 
This thesis is socio-legal in its emphasis on practice. A key debate regarding international 
law and human rights law is its applicability and practice, and so the thesis places 
considerable emphasis on considering the relationship between theory and practice in the 
development of laws. It is also inter-disciplinary in theory, as mentioned above, 
discussing at length the subjects of political science, international relations, and 
psychology. The research, under this socio-legal methodology, is focused on secondary 
data, such as articles, journals, and reviews from non-law disciplines. This aspect of the 
study will seek to capture the contemporary and constantly changing nature of 
technology.  
 
1.5.3 Other methodologies  
This research is not quantitative, as quantitative research is concerned with numerical 
values, choosing subjects, and constructing statistical models.67 The law, on the other 
hand, “is not a datum; it is in constant evolution, developing in ways that are sometimes 
startling and endlessly inventive.”68 In addition, a quantitative approach would be less 
original since published data gathered by dedicated bodies such as Human Rights Watch69 
and Amnesty International 70  can be used as secondary sources. As for qualitative 
methodologies, this thesis is concerned with embedded internal values such as humanity 
	
66 Dermot Feenan, ‘Socio-Legal Studies and the Humanities’, International Journal of Law in 
Context, vol. 5, no.3 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 237 
67 Parmjit Singh, Chan Fook, and Gurnam Sidhu, A Comprehensive Guide to Writing A 
Research Proposal (Venton Publishing, 2006) 107 
68 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’, Law Quarterly Review, 
vol.632 (2016) 38 
69 Human Rights Watch, ‘Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda’: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted 
Killings in Yemen (Human Rights Watch, 2013) 
70 Amnesty International, ‘Will I Be Next?’ US Drone Strikes in Pakistan (Amnesty 
International Publications, London, 2013) 
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rather than the external counting of frequencies. However, the exploration of such values 
through techniques such as fieldwork interviews were not undertaken for a number of 
reasons, most of which surround security and clearance.  
 
As the thesis pertains to armed conflict, relevant interviewees are predominantly in 
dangerous locations, which would pose a health and safety issue, both for interviewer and 
interviewee. Government officials that may be interviewed may not always be authorised 
to provide all the relevant details due to the sensitive nature of the topic. The research 
therefore focuses on literature already published by the abovementioned organisations 
and thus favours a desk-research methodology based on doctrinal and socio-legal 
methods. This research is also not a comparative study. The focus of the study is IHL, 
IHRL, and UK domestic law, all of which are analysed in conjunction to address the 
regulation of UAVs in armed conflict. Parallels are made to US regulations due to the 
extent of US involvement in drone warfare globally, but the thesis does not 
comprehensively compare legislation.  
 
1.6 Chapter outlines 
1.6.1 Chapter 2: dehumanisation 
Chapter 2 focuses on the underlying principles that underpin the thesis. It sets out the 
notions and relationship between dehumanisation, psychological detachment, technology 
in warfare, and the changing landscapes of armed conflict. It begins by introducing the 
notion of dehumanisation. The chapter then highlights the role of detachment in 
dehumanisation, and Stanley Milgram’s experiments are discussed and analysed in detail. 
The chapter progresses and highlights the role of distance in dehumanisation. The 
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concepts of “animalistic dehumanisation” and “mechanistic dehumanisation” are fleshed 
out and contrasted,71 and a new third category – “partial dehumanisation” – is proposed. 
 
The role of language is then considered as a method of dehumanisation. Overt attempts 
to degrade one’s humanity through language 72  are compared to more implicit and 
anonymised language.73  The chapter proceeds to examine the role of technology in 
dehumanisation. A relationship is made between physical distance from the enemy and 
resistance to killing. The ability of drone technology to be physically distant while 
experiencing some aspects of closeness – such as being able to view and track the 
enemy’s movements with relative precision – leads to a detailed discussion on the 
concepts of space, presence, and access, and how these contribute to emotional 
detachment. The chapter progresses to discuss the nature of unilateral armed conflicts. 
The drone’s ability to engage in armed attacks without the commitment of forces on the 
ground changes the landscape of conflict and introduces the notion of transcending 
borders, which blur the lines between war and peace. The chapter also discusses the 
implications of being constantly monitored, and the anxiety, dread, and psychological 
trauma of living in areas where drones are employed.  
 
The chapter concludes by acknowledging the reality of drone warfare and the increasing 
number of UAVs being manufactured and deployed. It also concludes that drones are not 
per se illegal or reprehensible, but rather that the nature of their use must be monitored 
and regulated. Their potentially dehumanising effects must be considered when 
	
71 Nick Haslam, ‘Dehumanization: An Integrative Review’, Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, vol.10, no.3 (2006) 262 
72 David Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others (St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 2011) 15 
73 Jeffrey Bachman and Jack Holland, ‘Lethal Sterility: Innovative Dehumanisation in Legal 
Justifications of Obama’s Drone Policy’, International Journal of Human Rights, vol.23, no.6 
(2019) 1032 
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regulating their deployment and production. The chapters that follow discuss the relevant 
legal frameworks and whether they are currently sufficient to regulate these emerging 
technologies that are fostering dehumanisation and changing the landscape of armed 
conflict. 
 
1.6.2 Chapter 3: The Law of Armed Conflict 
Chapter 3 assesses whether IHL is sufficiently equipped to deal with and regulate drone 
warfare and whether drone warfare is in line with IHL’s underlying values, namely, that 
of humanity, the protection of life, and the containment of the use of force. Although the 
chapter is primarily pertaining to jus in bello (the principles of international law), the 
chapter begins with a discussion on jus ad bellum (the criteria of entering into an armed 
conflict). This is because the uniquely flexible nature of drones leads some to conflate the 
two principles. Discussing IHL’s ability to regulate drones as a military tool is different 
to assessing the use of drones in the first instance. IHL indeed prohibits the threat or use 
of force. The chapter identifies two exceptions to this prohibition: self-defence74 and 
consent. 75  The definition of ‘imminence’ is debated and the chapter outlines the 
arguments surrounding its scope. The Caroline Case is cited as an authority alongside 
Article 51, which is contrasted to US reliance on its own domestic law such as the 
Authorisation for the Use of Military Force 2001 (AUMF).76 The controversy around 
drone warfare is brought to light, as their ability to attack and retreat with relative 
immediacy obscures the notions of jus in bello and jus ad bellum, requiring further 
discussion on the topic.  
 
	
74 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI  
75 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries (2001), General Assembly Official Records 56th session, supplement no.10 
(A/56/10), art.20, para 5 
76 Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res 23, 107th Cong. (2001) 
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In order to better appreciate the implications of drone technology, the chapter briefly 
outlines the evolution of military warfare. The chapter then turns to jus in bello – the 
principles of IHL – focusing on the protection of life, due process, the principle of 
distinction, and the principle of proportionality. These principles are all made relevant to 
drone warfare, such as ascertaining whether there is jurisdiction for drone strikes when 
assessing the proportionality of an attack, or categorising drone attack subjects when 
assessing whether there is sufficient distinction between combatants and civilians. The 
chapter presents the Guantanamo Bay detention camp as a case study, highlighting the 
consequences of failing to implement the protections conferred by IHL, with particular 
emphasis on the issue of categorising different types of combatants. The chapter then 
takes a closer look at the principle of proportionality, discussing it in light of autonomous 
warfare. The discussion then turns to issues of targeting arising from drone strikes and 
the ability to identify direct participants in hostilities. The lack of clarity as to what 
constitutes direct participation has led to much confusion as to what constitutes a valid 
target. This leads to further discussion on IHL’s ability to regulate non-human weapons.  
 
The chapter concludes by reiterating the fact that current IHL was not written with the 
expectation of the increasingly fast-paced military operations experienced today. 
Prolonged periods of low-intensity conflict, and the rise and significance of non-state 
actors, are the two primary developments in international armed conflict that are not 
sufficiently addressed. The options as to how IHL can better regulate the use of UAVs 
are discussed alongside the merits and flaws of each option. The chapter concludes by 
proposing that the most pragmatic solution is for IHL to update and evolve in a similar 
method to the Tallinn Manual,77 which deals with cyber-security and also faces similar 
	
77 Michael Schmidt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on The International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(CUP, 2017) 421 
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issues pertaining to non-state actors. It did not immediately change the law, but served as 
a stepping-stone to apply updates.78 Adjustments in IHL in this regard should consider 
the detachment and dehumanisation outlined in Chapter 2 as a reference point.  
 
1.6.3 Chapter 4: International Human Rights Law 
Chapter 4 assesses whether IHRL has scope to provide an outlet in cases where IHL may 
not, and whether it is sufficient to deal with and regulate drone warfare. The chapter 
begins by outlining two general issues related to IHRL in armed conflict: jurisdiction and 
responsibility.79 The chapter discusses in detail what constitutes sufficient jurisdiction. It 
also introduces the notion of “jurisdiction in waiting”, where a state may extraterritorially 
apply the public powers of another state instantaneously. Following this, the chapter 
revisits the debate of whether IHRL is applicable to armed conflicts. The discussion then 
turns to the applicability of IHRL to the use of drones, and whether applicability is shared 
with IHL or not. The first half of the chapter concludes by confirming the applicability of 
positive obligations on states to actively take steps to preserve life as per Article 2, as 
well as the applicability of IHRL to armed conflicts.  
 
The second half of the chapter discusses specific rights under IHRL, with emphasis on 
the right to life and due process. The focus of the chapter is assessing how these rights 
are applied to drone warfare. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,80 the ICCPR,81 and the European Convention on Human Rights82 are all engaged 
with in this discussion. The notions of positive and negative rights and obligations are 
	
78 ibid 
79 Eleni Kannis, ‘Pulling (Apart) the Triggers of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, University of 
Western Australia Law Review, vol.40 (2015) 221-243 
80 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 
13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) 71 
81 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 
82 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5 
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examined, especially with regards to the right to life and drone strikes’ unique ability to 
personalise and target while simultaneously dehumanise. The discussion turns to the 
extraterritorial application of the right to life and whether states can be held accountable 
for drone use when they are deployed outside of the state’s territorial jurisdiction.83 This 
question also brings up the issue of complicity; a state may have knowledge or indirect 
participation in an act even if not directly involved. Discussion ensues as to the 
responsibility of said state to uphold the law and attempt to prevent the act.  
 
The chapter then discusses the right to life in the context of targeted killings. Specific 
mention is made of the implications of completely autonomous weaponry capable of 
independent decision-making. The nuanced moral, ethical, and practical reality 
underpinning armed conflict may not be considered by autonomous robotics, even if 
capable of independent thinking. The discussion then turns to the topic of due process, a 
bulwark against arbitrary state power. The different models of due process are outlined 
alongside their practical implications. Finally, the notion of jus cogens (peremptory norm) 
is introduced, a principle that seeks to protect fundamental values of the international 
community. The chapter concludes by arguing for the applicability of IHRL in armed 
conflict, citing its flexibility in application in the form of margins of appreciation and the 
permissible derogations.  
 
1.6.4 Chapter 5: national governance 
Chapter 5 is the final substantive chapter in the thesis, continuing on from Chapters 3 and 
4 in assessing whether contemporary armed conflict and technology pertaining to war are 
in line with existing legal principles and the values that lie behind them. This chapter 
	
83 Robert Frau, ‘Unmanned Military Systems and Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Law’, Groningen Journal of International Law, vol.1, no.1 (2013) 1-18; Christof Heyns and 
others, ‘The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Drones’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.64, no.4 (2016) 791-827 
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analyses national governance and topics that may impact the use of UAVs in armed 
conflict, such as lethal force, the arms trade, and counter-terrorism. It focuses on UK law 
while making parallels to US law. The chapter begins by discussing state responsibility. 
UK compliance in drone operations is scrutinised, especially as British intelligence may 
have been used in targeted killings carried out in countries that the UK is not at war with, 
such as Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. The targeted killings of Reyaad Khan and Ruhul 
Amin in 2015 are highlighted as demonstrating the difficulty in holding governments to 
account due to secrecy laws allowing the state to conceal information on the grounds of 
national security.  
 
The chapter then turns to domestic legal powers to use lethal force, examining the 
provisions governing the use of force for both individuals and states. It discusses self-
defence as a defence for the use of force, noting the potential significance of automation 
being used a defence in future development of UAVs. Necessity is also explored as a 
defence, which is compared to duress, such as in the case of the Baha Mousa killing. As 
for the use of force by a state, the most common defence is imminence, and discussion 
ensues as to whether the requirements for imminence must be updated to reflect the fact-
paced nature of autonomous weaponry. The chapter then proceeds to outline the relevant 
national mechanisms of government. It discusses accountability to Parliament, including 
through the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and accountability to the judiciary. It then 
discusses the issue of counterterrorism, and the relationship between barring the return of 
British citizens accused of terrorism and the use of UAVs as an alternative to deal with 
their perceived threat. The chapter proceeds to discuss the arms trade, outlining the 
legislation controlling arms exports, both international and domestic. UK, US, EU, and 
international regulations are compared and discussed, as well as their impact on the 
development and use of UAVs.  
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Analysis is also made of the Wassenaar Arrangement, aimed to ensure transparency and 
responsibility in the export and transfer of arms and dual-purpose equipment and 
technology.84 The chapter then highlights UK oversight of the arms trade and equipment 
usage, as well as parliamentary oversight and accountability. The chapter notes the 
dichotomy between liberty, security, and finances, concluding that the UK is prioritising 
security over liberty. It also highlights the consequences of using counter-terrorism as a 
near-permanent mode of governance, stressing the need to ensure security whilst 
maintaining sufficient accountability. 
 
1.6.5 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, outlining and elucidating the research findings. The 
chapter highlights the foremost findings of the entire thesis before breaking down the 
conclusions of each chapter. The chapter then puts forward a case for originality, 
outlining the contribution this thesis presents to the existing literature. Finally, the chapter 
ends with concluding remarks, balancing a pragmatic view of the current landscape with 








84 The Wassenaar Agreement, What is the Wassenaar Agreement? (2018) available at 
<https://www.wassenaar.org/the-wassenaar-arrangement/> on 25 June 2019 
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Dehumanisation 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces the notion of dehumanisation, elucidating its relationship with 
detachment and distance. It demonstrates how technology, in particular drone warfare, 
has contributed to detachment and dehumanisation. The chapter outlines the premise on 
which this research based, namely that drone warfare, through dehumanisation and 
detachment, is transforming war from defined periods of high-intensity conflict in 
concentrated geographical locations to continuous and indefinite periods of low-intensity 
operations without boundaries, effectively blurring the line between war and peace. It sets 
the framework for the remaining chapters to analyse the law. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will 
explore IHL, IHRL, and domestic law respectively in light of the notion of 
dehumanisation elucidated throughout this chapter.  
 
This chapter addresses the first research objective: to examine whether the use of UAVs 
in armed conflict is leading to psychological detachment from the enemy resulting in their 
dehumanisation. As mentioned, the detached nature of drone warfare has anonymised and 
dehumanised the enemy, greatly diminishing the necessary psychological barriers of 
killing. It also addresses the second research objective: the examination of whether the 
drone phenomenon has significantly changed the nature of contemporary armed conflict 
to the extent of blurring the lines of war and peace. The ability of drones to transcend 
borders with such efficiency has reduced the consequences of war, namely, the risk of 
human death on one side of the conflict. Armed attack, traditionally the last resort, is 
becoming the first resort, and the increasingly unilateral nature of such aggression, where 
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only one side attacks, may lead to a greater frequency of such operations. Effectively, 
drone systems and targeted killing policies have lowered the bar for armed attack.85  
 
The chapter begins by explaining the concept of dehumanisation and its role in armed 
conflict. A distinction is made between ‘animalistic dehumanisation’, which is the very 
explicit form of dehumanisation fuelled by contempt and disgust, and ‘mechanistic 
dehumanisation’, which is developed as a result of indifference as well as physical and 
psychological detachment.86  This research primarily concerns the latter. The chapter 
analyses the role of detachment in the process of dehumanisation, using Stanley 
Milgram’s famous Obedience to Authority tests as a basis to compare levels of 
detachment and their impact; the more detached a person is psychologically, the easier it 
is for them to commit acts of violence or cruelty. Following this, a link is made between 
physical distance and psychological distance; the further one is from their enemy, the 
easier it is to dehumanise them. David Grossman’s On Killing is used to explain the 
significance and impact of killing from a distance.87 Soldiers who have killed from close 
distances give personal accounts, and these narrations are juxtaposed to those of drone 
operators killing from great distances.  
 
The chapter discusses the role of technology and its relevance to dehumanisation, which 
is again linked to armed conflict, and different forms of weaponry are compared. A 
negative correlation is formed between the physical distance to a target and the resistance 
to killing. Drones are discussed in this context; their unique and breakthrough design 
warranted in-depth analysis of how they would compare to previous forms of combat. 
	
85 Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the 
Earth (Penguin Press, New York, 2013) 100 
86 Nick Haslam, ‘Dehumanization: An Integrative Review’, Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, vol.10, no.3 (2006) 262 
87 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society 
(Time Warner Book Group, New York, 1995) 
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Drones are often perceived as being ‘closer’ to the battlefield due to their ability to 
observe the actions of the enemy from afar. However, Grégoire Chamayou’s Drone 
Theory provides a detailed explanation as to why drones’ ‘access’ into enemy territory is 
not enough to consider them as ‘close’ per se.88 In short, their access is not reciprocal, 
and so they cannot be considered as sufficiently ‘present’.89 These concepts are explained 
and elaborated upon in further detail in Subchapter 2.2.4.  
 
The chapter then progresses to demonstrate the implications of detachment. Drone 
operators are quoted as comparing their work to video gaming, and the post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) they suffer is more akin to that which occurs from boredom than 
the typical PTSD found in soldiers returning from traditional battle. The role of language 
to dehumanise is highlighted, and an example is made of the Obama administration’s 
drone campaign, which utilised non-descriptive language to anonymise the enemy.90 The 
chapter ends by discussing the consequences of drone warfare on the culture and 
development of armed conflict, which has grown increasingly unilateral. The nature of 
such unilateral conflict is discussed in detail in Subchapter 2.3 below. Preventative 
surgical strikes resemble manhunting, and the willingness to frequently resort to drone 
strike operations presents dubious moral and legal implications. The last resort of armed 
conflict becomes the first resort, and killing becomes much easier and preferred than 
capturing. The culture of armed conflict is rapidly changing, and borders are now easily 
transcended. This has led to a permissive approach to armed conflict, taking us from 
clearly defined periods of war and peace to the ability to create a constant and perpetual 
period of potential armed conflict. 
	
88 Grégoire Chamayou (trans. Janet Lloyd), Drone Theory (Penguin Books, London, 2015) 116 
89 ibid 248 
90 Jeffrey Bachman and Jack Holland, ‘Lethal Sterility: Innovative Dehumanisation in Legal 




2.2 The theory of dehumanisation 
One method to strip someone of their inalienable rights as a human being is to deny their 
human status – to dehumanise them91 and negate their identity as a human being.92 
Yoshio Tshuchiya, a Japanese war veteran, describes how he was ordered to bayonet 
unarmed Chinese civilians in the Nanking massacre of 1937, and what it was that enabled 
him to comply with this order: “If I’d thought of them as human beings I couldn’t have 
done it. But…I thought of them as animals or below human beings.”93 Similarly, Elie 
Ngarambe, who took part in the Rwandan genocide, admitted that the génocidaires “did 
not know that the [Tutsi] were human beings, because if they had thought about that they 
wouldn’t have killed them. Let me include myself as someone who accepted it; I wouldn’t 
have accepted that they [the Tutsi] are human beings.”94 The US soldier and ex-drone 
operator Steven Green raped a 14-year old Iraqi girl and killed her alongside her family 
because “he didn’t view Iraqis as human.”95 
 
Simon Baron-Cohen, a psychopathologist and neuroscientist, asserts that while a lack of 
empathy is not the sole pathway to cruelty, it is the final pathway. At that point, one 
becomes capable of dehumanising other people, of turning the other person into an 
object.96 Baron-Cohen concludes that treating others as objects is one of the worst things 
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one can do to another human being; to ignore their subjectivity, their thoughts and 
feelings.97  
 
 2.2.1 Dehumanisation and the role of detachment 
“Even Eichmann was sickened when he toured the concentration camps, but to participate 
in mass murder he had only to sit at a desk and shuffle papers.”98 As evidenced by the 
innumerable wars, genocides, and killings throughout history, humans are capable of the 
most grotesque actions. Many of these actions were indeed carried out by people who 
consider themselves good and decent. During the Third Reich, Speer “talked himself into 
believing that his work was strictly that of an architect and administrator, and that it was 
not his role to agonize over ‘political’ matters.”99 The question then arises as to how 
people who would ordinarily be considered good are willing to commit acts of cruelty of 
their own free will. Stanley Milgram, a psychologist at Yale University, conducted an 
experiment to find the answer.100 In light of the atrocities of the Second World War, 
Milgram conducted a series of experiments in 1961 following the start of the trial of 
German Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann. The question was being asked: were 
Eichmann and the Nazis merely following orders? Milgram sought to study the 
relationship between committing evil crimes and the concept of obedience, producing 
conclusive results. A strong link could also be made between acts of cruelty and the 
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Milgram devised an experiment comprised of three people: a ‘teacher’, a ‘learner’, and 
an ‘experimenter’.101 The unsuspecting candidates were designated the teacher role and 
were the subject of the experiment, while the learner and experimenter were both actors. 
The learner is strapped to a chair and is connected to a shock generator. The learner is 
asked to answer some multiple-choice questions, and every time a question is answered 
incorrectly, an electric shock is administered. After every question, the intensity of the 
shock increases. The first shock is 15 volts (minor discomfort) and the final shock is 450 
volts (excruciating pain), and the shocks in between increase in intensity accordingly. The 
results found that all participants continued until 300 volts, and 65% of the participants 
continued until the very end, administering 450 volts.102  
 
Milgram repeated the experiment, but with the learner being placed in varying proximities 
in order to observe the role of detachment in the ability to carry out acts of cruelty and 
the willingness to inflict pain. In the original experiment, Experiment 1, the learner was 
in another room, and the victim’s complaints and moans were transcribed onto a screen 
for the subject to read. At 75 volts, the victim would start to grunt and show signs of 
discomfort. At 150 volts, the victim would cry out “Experimenter, get me out of here! I 
won’t be in the experiment any more! I refuse to go on!”103 At 300 volts, the victim would 
simply scream in agonising pain. The subject would read the responses on the transcript, 
but from 300 volts onwards, he would also hear muffled banging from the adjacent room. 
As mentioned, 65% of the subjects continued until the very end. 
 
In Experiment 2, voice feedback was introduced. The experiment was identical to 
Experiment 1, except that the victim’s complaints were clearly heard through 
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microphones. In Experiment 3, the victim was placed in the same room as the subject, 
and so the subject had visual proximity as well as audio. In Experiment 4, touch proximity 
was introduced. This was identical to Experiment 3, except that from 150 volts onwards, 
the victim would refuse to answer a question, and so the subject was ordered to force the 
victim’s hand onto the plate himself. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the dramatic decrease in 

























In Experiment 1 (remote), 65% of the subjects completed the course until the end; 62.5% 
completed it in Experiment 2 (voice feedback); 40% completed it in Experiment 3 
(proximity); and 30% completed it in Experiment 4 (touch proximity). As can be seen in 
the figure, the most dramatic decrease in co-operation was when spatial closeness 
(physical proximity) was introduced. A link could be made to drone warfare and killing 
the enemy from extreme distances. In drone warfare, not only is there an absence of touch 
proximity or spatial-proximity, there is no audio proximity either. The drone operator is 
as detached as one can possibly be.  
 
One of the subjects in Milgram’s experiment, referring to the remote condition in 
Experiment 1, recalled: “It’s funny how you really begin to forget that there’s a guy out 
there, even though you can hear him. For a long time I just concentrated on pressing the 
switches and reading the words.”104 This is referred to as narrowing the cognitive field; 
the victim is put out of mind in order to diminish the severity of the act. When the victim 
is close, Milgram notes, “He necessarily intrudes on the subject’s awareness, since he is 
continuously visible.” 105  These visible cues prompt empathetic responses, whereas 
without the cues, the victim’s suffering is more abstract and remote.106 
 
When the victim is remote, the subject is more likely to compartmentalise his actions. In 
other words, it is more difficult for the subject to see a connection between his actions 
and their consequences for the victim because there is a physical separation of the act and 
its effects.107 The lever is depressed in one room and cries are heard in another. There is 
correlation, but it is not complete. When the victim is brought much closer, the correlation 
increases greatly, and when touch proximity is introduced, there is total correlation. When 
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the subject is no longer detached from the reality and consequences of his actions, he 
considers their implications much more.  
 
Since Milgram’s experiment gained worldwide notoriety, it has been studied relentlessly 
over the last half century. Milgram famously deduced from his experiments that ordinary 
people could commit grotesque acts when commanded to do so by an authority, using the 
Holocaust as his primary example. But a number of academics have attempted to bring 
into question the accuracy of Milgram’s extrapolations, arguing that there is a notable 
difference between someone being in authority, and someone being an authority on a 
particular matter.108 Therefore, the authority wielded by the likes of Hitler cannot be 
compared to the authority of a doctor. The former, as explained by Stephen S.C. Patten, 
is called “simple-command authority”109 and is where the authority is a legal one, or one 
based on power. The latter is an “expert-command authority” and is obeyed due to a 
presumed expertise on a matter. The subject is given assurances from the experimenter’s 
statements, supposedly backed with credible scientific studies, that despite the painful 
nature of the shocks, they are not dangerous.110 
 
Evidence is cited from Milgram’s own experiment. In one of the cases, the ‘experimenter’ 
urged the subject to continue by assuring him that there was no permanent tissue damage. 
The subject replied, “Yes, but I know what shocks do to you. I’m an electrical engineer, 
and I have had shocks…and you get real shook up by them – especially if you know the 
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next one is coming. I’m sorry.”111 Here, the subject uses his own authority as an expert 
in electrical engineering to override the experimenter’s authority and as a result resist his 
commands. Milgram accepted such a distinction in the types of authority, but maintained 
that his conclusions were still justified: “As frequently happens, real life is more complex 
than textbooks: Both components co-exist in one person. The experimenter is both the 
person ‘in charge’ and is presumed by subjects to possess expert knowledge.”112 
 
Another criticism of Milgram’s studies is conveyed by Alexander Haslam and Stephen 
Reicher, who argue that Milgram’s results are less about people following orders blindly, 
but more about people being convinced that what they are doing is the right thing to do. 
Examples were given from some of the subjects who were thanked at the end of the 
experiment and replied buoyantly, claiming that they were happy to help.113 Prior to his 
trial, Eichmann himself was reported to have said that his only regret was that he did not 
kill more Jews.114 This admittance would contradict Milgram’s claim that Eichmann was, 
at least initially, an ordinary man who was not inherently bloodthirsty or cruel. This 
criticism is perhaps weaker, because some of the subjects that were reluctant and 
uncomfortable still continued when ordered by the experimenter.  
 
While the above criticisms must be taken into consideration with regards to Milgram’s 
theory of obedience, they do not detract from the theory of detachment. Whether or not 
the subjects went ahead with the shocks because they were obeying the person who was 
in authority or whether it was because they were an authority does not change the fact 
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that the more detached the subject was to the victim, the greater the likelihood of them 
administering shocks until the very end. 
 
2.2.2 Dehumanisation and the role of distance 
Ben Shalit notes that increasing the distance between the combatants allows for an 
increase in the degree of human aggression.115 Psychological and physical distancing are 
often both interlinked, and one may lead to the other. Modern technology has developed 
numerous mechanisms such as automated missiles, drones, long-range rockets, and so on. 
Each advance increases the kill-range. In his book On Killing, retired Lieutenant Colonel 
David Grossman discussed in depth the effect of killing from a distance, as well as the 
trauma of killing in close proximity and the relative ease of killing from afar. He compiled 
numerous accounts of surviving soldiers and their experiences. Grossman quotes Glenn 
Gray: 
 
“Unless he is caught up in murderous ecstasy, destroying is easier 
when done from a little remove. With every foot of distance there 
is a corresponding decrease in reality. Imagination flags and fails 
altogether when distances become too great. So it is that much of 
the mindless cruelty of recent wars has been perpetrated by 
warriors at a distance, who could not guess what havoc their 
powerful weapons were occasioning.”116 
 
A clear link is made between the distance of the kill, and the subsequent trauma, or lack 
thereof, to the attacker. When killing in the vicinity of your enemy, you hear the screams, 
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and see the blood, remembering your foe’s last utterance. This intense connection makes 
it that much more difficult to kill. In many cases, it becomes an obstacle to kill – perhaps 
a necessary obstacle, as elaborated upon further in Subchapter 2.2.4. Colonel Barry 
Bridger of the US Air Force described the difference between air combat and ground 
battle: “You see an aircraft; you see a target on the ground – you’re not eyeball to eyeball 
with the sweat and the emotions of combat, and so it doesn’t become so emotional for 
you and so personalised. And I think it is easier to do in that sense – you’re not 
affected.”117  
 
As the distance between combatants increases, both physically and psychologically, a 
direct correlation arises between the distance and the emotions exhibited as a result. An 
RAF aircrew member described the scenes 20,000 feet above ground level immediately 
after firebombing the city of Hamburg in 1943: “I saw no streets, no outlines of buildings, 
only brighter fires which flared like yellow torches against a background of bright red 
ash. Above the city was a misty red haze. I looked down, fascinated but aghast, satisfied 
yet horrified.” 118  The wording of the last sentence is particularly noteworthy; the 
juxtaposition of “fascinated” and “aghast”, of “satisfied” and “horrified”. The RAF crew 
were not close enough to see the individual deaths of each human, but were close enough 
to imagine the consequence of their actions. Close enough to be “horrified”, but far 
enough to “enjoy” a level of satisfaction.  
 
The detachment developed as a result of physical and/or psychological distance differs 
from the dehumanisation described in horrific massacres and genocides. Nick Haslam 
differentiates varying forms of dehumanisation. ‘Animalistic dehumanisation’ involves 
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the denial of ‘Uniquely Human’ attributes, which is typically accompanied by emotions 
of contempt and disgust. Uniquely Human attributes are characteristics that define the 
boundary that separates humans from the related category of animals, and this is the type 
of dehumanisation associated with the Holocaust and other genocides.119  
 
‘Mechanistic dehumanisation’, on the other hand, involves the objectifying denial of 
‘Essentially Human’ attributes, which are characteristics that are typically or essentially 
human but may not be the same ones that distinguish us from other species.120 It is usually 
directed towards people whom the person feels psychologically distant and socially 
unrelated.121 It is often accompanied by indifference, a lack of empathy, and an abstract 
and de-individualised view of others. This form of dehumanisation is more akin to the 
detachment developed by killing from a distance. That being said, it is possible for the 
latter type to develop into the former, as in the abovementioned case of Steven Green. A 
third type of dehumanisation may perhaps be added: a ‘partial dehumanisation’, where 
the humanity of the enemy is masked, blurred, or faded; their humanity is recognised, but 
it is not enough to stop the perpetrator from killing them. Drone operators may perhaps 
fit into this category.  
 
Opotow coins the term ‘moral exclusion’, where people are placed outside the boundary 
in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. 122  The main 
consequence of moral exclusion is the feeling of disconnectedness and indifference. 
These feelings are what facilitate the ability to commit acts that one may not necessarily 
be able to commit otherwise, such as kill. As Richard Evans famously said, “The road to 
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Auschwitz was built by hate, but paved with indifference.”123 In Milgram’s experiment 
analysed in Subchapter 2.2.1, one of the subjects continued to administer painful shocks 
because he was told that “the experiment requires that you continue” and that “it’s got to 
go on”.124 He did not ask why it must continue, or more importantly who decided that it 
must continue. For him, the human element had faded and it was the experiment that 
needed to be followed. Upon analysing the transcripts of war crime trials, such as that of 
Eichmann, Milgram outlined a recurring theme: when such acts occur, they are conducted 
with an administrative outlook rather than a moral one.125 
   
Dehumanisation is just one form of moral exclusion. Opotow described a milder but 
equally significant form of exclusion, which is psychological distancing – perceiving 
others as objects or as non-existent.126 The more psychologically distant one is, “the more 
likely they are to involve ‘cold’ cognition-based judgements” 127  rather than make 
decisions based on emotion and empathy – the very same empathy cited as a requirement 
for overcoming dehumanisation. 128  Drone operators are said to demonstrate the 
actualisation of this distancing, feeling “no emotional attachment to the enemy”. One 
operator stated, “I have a duty, and I execute the duty.”129 This soldier compartmentalises; 
his emotions are compartmentalised from his actions; his life is compartmentalised from 
his job. Stanley Milgram concluded from his abovementioned study that perhaps the most 
fundamental lesson learned from his experiments is that ordinary people, simply doing 
	
123 Richard Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow, (I.B. Tauris, London, 1989) 
124 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (Printer & Martin Ltd., London, 2013) 10 
125 ibid 186 
126 Richard Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow, (I.B. Tauris, London, 1989) 
127Nick Haslam, ‘Dehumanization: An Integrative Review’, Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, vol.10, no.3 (2006) 262 
128 Jodi Halpern and Harvey Weinstein, ‘Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and 
Reconciliation’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol.26, no.3 (2004) 561-583 
129 Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘A Day Job Waiting for a Kill Shot a World Away’, (New York Times, 
2012) available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/us/drone-pilots-waiting-for-a-kill-
shot-7000-miles-away.html> on 12 December 2019 
	 39	
their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, “can become agents in a 
terrible destructive process”. 130 Grossman compartmentalises the different types of 
distancing into cultural, moral, social, and mechanical distancing. All these forms of 
distancing occur, one way or another, during warfare. However, modern technology has 
led to the proliferation of mechanical distancing. Grossman describes it as “the sterile 
Nintendo-game unreality of killing through a TV screen, a thermal sight, a sniper sight, 
or some other kind of mechanical bugger that permits the killer to deny the humanity of 
his victim.”131  
 
2.2.3 Dehumanisation and the role of language 
Language is perhaps the foremost tool used to dehumanise. It was reported that as the 
Iraq war commenced, a computer programme was devised called the ‘Bugsplat Program’, 
which approximated how many civilians would die in a particular bombing raid. On the 
opening day, it was estimated that 22 of the planned bombing attacks on Iraq would produce 
a ‘heavy bugsplat’, which is defined as more than 30 civilian deaths per raid. General Tommy 
Franks said: "Go ahead, we're doing all 22."132 Robert Koehler labels the term ‘bugsplat’ 
itself as “ultimate disrespect and indifference”, arguing that “it begins with a state of mind”.133 
In the infamous Rwandan genocide, the Tutsis were called inyenzi, cockroaches. A secret 
military operation began against the Tutsis, called “operation insecticide”.134 While the 
latter example demonstrates outward and explicit dehumanisation, one cannot help but 
notice the similarity in the names of the operations. In both cases, the deceased were 
referred to as insects.  
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The use of language to dehumanise the enemy is not always overt or aggressive. Research 
into the Obama administration’s drone campaign found increasing use of non-descriptive 
accounts in order to anonymise the enemy.135 Individuals are transformed into objects so 
that the act of killing is perceived as an abstract concept as opposed to a recorded event. 
While already established in military vernacular, acts of killing were more frequently 
referred to as “operations”,136 which imply a corrective procedure. Use of the popular 
term “targeted killing” was dramatically reduced137 and was replaced with variations of 
“target”, ‘targeting”, and ‘targeted”.138 While “targets” are often only suspects, being 
called a “target” legitimises lethal force by assigning guilt. 139  An act that may be 
described by some as murder can be politically labelled an assassination, which has 
become out-dated and is frequently referred to as a targeted killing, more recently 
replaced with targeted operation.  
 
This development of vernacular is a carefully crafted, deliberate attempt to pacify the 
audience. Bachman and Holland analysed the Obama administration’s literature, 
concluding, “The administration employed innovative techniques of dehumanisation, 
moving away from Bush’s efforts to animalise enemies, instead adopting a sanguine, 
bureaucratic language to veil the act of killing.”140 In order words, a conscious effort was 
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made to transition from ‘animalistic dehumanisation’ to ‘mechanistic dehumanisation’, 
as described in Subchapter 2.2.2. Bachman and Holland continue: “…[the] legal case for 
drones amounted to a particularly lethal sterility; murder through the mundane, with 
assassination enabled through the bureaucratically banal.” 141  The Obama 
administration’s language used to detach and distance its actions from its consequences 
mirrors its decision to opt for drones as its weapon of choice, as will be explained below. 
 
2.2.4 Dehumanisation and the role of technology 
Richard Holmes describes how the development of new weapon systems that enables 
soldiers to fire more lethal weapons more accurately and to longer ranges has resulted in 
the enemy becoming a mere anonymous figure glowing on a thermal imager. Figure 2.2 
aptly illustrates the varying degrees of distance and the correlation between physical 
distance and resistance to killing.  
 
	






One may place drone operations furthest to the right on the x-axis, past aerial bombing 
and artillery. It can be argued, though, that drone operators have a closer proximity than 
traditional bomber pilots; they can see the exact people they are shooting. Military 
psychologist Hugo Ortega concedes that the drone operators can see the battle taking 
place in extraordinary detail, causing “a sort of guilt.”142 However, Grégoire Chamayou 
provides a detailed and sophisticated explanation as to why the visual access available to 
the drone operators does not translate to a greater sense of empathy to their victims.  
 
The problem with what we call ‘distance’ is that technology now has the ability to 
exercise different forms of access without others. For example, by looking at something 
thousands of miles away through a camera, you are now simultaneously both close and 
distant depending on your understanding of the word. You can see the other person, and 
if there is a microphone, you can hear them too, but you cannot touch them. Do you share 
a presence with the other person? Physical distance no longer necessarily implies 
perceptual distance.143 A distinction should therefore be made between presence and 
access. 
 
To be ‘co-present’, two living entities must be accessible to one another; they must have 
the ability to affect one another.144 Looking at someone through a camera thousands of 
miles away does not meet the conditions of co-presence. They cannot see, hear, or touch 
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you. Not only is the accessibility limited, it is also one way. The more senses present, the 
more multidimensional and intense the presence is. If two armies are physically present, 
they are co-existent, but they are only co-present when they are within reach of one 
another on the battlefield. 
 
The breakthrough technology of drone warfare has created a situation where one side has 
access to the other, but the access is not reciprocal. The drone operator has reach of his 
enemy, and can attack him in a matter of seconds. His enemy, on the other hand, cannot 
reach him at all, and in most cases, does not even know of his existence. Does this 
constitute presence? Partial proximity, through sight or hearing, is not necessarily enough 
to instil the same sense of empathy. One side having visual access to the other is not 
enough to claim that they are in their presence; they can have co-existence, but not co-
presence. In the case of drone strikes, co-presence is not reciprocal.145 The distinction 
between drone strikes and previous aerial warfare, such as fighter jets and missiles, is that 
drones allow presence on one side. The attacker can see exactly where his enemy is with 
extreme precision, whereas his enemy is not aware of his existence at all. Efforts to make 
oneself out of sight through camouflage or distancing oneself from the enemy have 
always existed, but this complete revolution of presence has resulted in completely 
unilateral armed attack. The consequence of unilateral armed attack shall be expanded 
upon further in Subchapter 2.3. 
 
Distance measured by numerical values is not sufficient to measure degrees of empathy 
or co-presence. A drone operator may be thousands of miles away, but can view his 
enemy as if they were right next to each other. That being said, the proximity remains 
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partial. A drone operator concedes, “There’s no flesh on your monitor, just 
coordinates.”146 Chamayou summarises: 
 
 “One is never spattered by the adversary’s blood. No doubt the 
absence of any physical soiling corresponds to less of a sense of 
moral soiling…it shows just enough to make it possible to take 
aim, but not enough to get a clear view. Above all, it ensures that 
the operator will never see his victim seeing him doing what he 
does to him.”147 
 
Milgram’s experiments prove that it is easier to harm a person when the victim is unable 
to observe our actions than when the aggressor is visible. This is because when the person 
is under the victim’s scrutiny, it gives rise to shame and guilt. When the access is not 
reciprocal, it is easier.148 Grossman observed that the critical factor in the incidence of 
psychiatric casualties among soldiers was the experience of “close-up, inescapable, 
interpersonal hatred and aggression”. 149  Milgram notes, “The manifest function of 
allowing the victim of a firing squad to be blindfolded is to make the occasion less 
stressful for him, but it may also serve a latent function of reducing the stress of the 
executioner.”150 The subjects in his experiment indeed showed a reluctance to look at the 
victim when administering the shocks.151  
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An Israeli tank gunner recalls, “You see it all as if it were happening on a TV screen…I 
don’t see people, that’s one good thing about it.”152 Vicki Divoll, a former CIA lawyer, 
extended this mentality to the public, conceding, “People are a lot more comfortable with 
a Predator strike that kills many people than with a throat-killing that kills one.”153 
Traditionally, soldiers carry the “moral weight of war”,154 exempting civilians from such 
responsibility. Drone operators, working from the safe confines of their office in their 
home country and surrounded by civilians, perhaps do not bear the same level of guilt as 
combatants who are in the physical presence of their enemies.  
 
Considering the various dimensions of proximity and their relationship to each other, it 
can be concluded that despite the visual exposure of the drone operators, their ‘proximity’ 
is nevertheless much further than the RAF pilot quoted above who was torn between awe 
and disgust upon witnessing the consequences of his actions. This claim is supported by 
evidence of drone operators’ reactions to the consequences of their actions. When asked 
how it feels to kill an enemy through a TV screen, some operators replied, “Oh, it’s a 
gamer’s delight”155 and that it is “almost like playing the computer game ‘Civilisation’ in 
which you direct units an armies in battle.”156 Some even showed active enjoyment: “It’s 
like a video game. It can get a little bloodthirsty. But it’s fucking cool.”157  
 
Thereafter, soldiers refrained from making these types of statements. Instead, reports 
began to circulate that drone operators would often suffer from PTSD due to their 
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emotional attachment.158 However, empirical data does not support such a claim. Hugo 
Ortega conducted a substantial investigation, testing drone operators with various 
psychological tests. Ortega concluded that no such diagnoses were needed: “We haven’t 
diagnosed any pilots with PTSD…The major findings of the work so far have been that 
the popularized idea of watching the combat was really not what was producing the most 
day-to-day stress for these guys.” 159  Instead, Ortega categorised any stress or 
psychological problems the operators suffer from as normal day-to-day stress. Long 
hours, as opposed to killing men, women, and children, cause their anxiety: 
 
“Shift work, schedule changes – those are the top number one 
issue for stress. And then they have long hours, low manning. It’s 
really kind of a boring job to be vigilant on the same thing for 
days and days and days. It’s really boring. It’s kind of terrible…if 
you look through the stuff, they don’t say, “Because I was in 
combat.” They don’t say, “Because we had to blow up a 
building.” They don’t say, “Because we saw people getting blown 
up.” That’s not what causes their stress – at least not subjectively 
to them. It’s all the other quality of life things (that they complain 
about) that everyone else would complain about too.”160 
 
Ortega clearly demonstrates in detail how the stress of the drone operators is not likened 
to the PTSD of traditional soldiers. Drone operators may be stressed, for whatever reason, 
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yet the trauma is missing. In reality, the primary cause of stress amongst drone operators 
is in fact boredom.  
 
“The work here is extremely boring. Men pass whole nights 
watching a screen on which, for the most part, appear unchanging 
images of another desert on the other side of the planet. Eating 
Doritos and M&Ms, they wait for something to happen: months 
of monotony and milliseconds of mayhem.”161  
 
The result is an eagerness for action; any activity is sought to kill their boredom. Situated 
in a base 45 minutes from Las Vegas, watching a village in Afghanistan, one pilot remarks 
disappointingly, “I was hoping we could make a rifle out, never mind.” The sensor 
operator replies, “That truck would make a beautiful target.”162 Two hours later, someone 
enters the room, asking, “What’s the master plan, fellas?” To which the pilot responds, 
assumingly more agitated, “I don’t know, hope we get to shoot the truck with all the dudes 
in it.”163 Such quotes are a stark contrast to the horrors of war described by foot soldiers 
on the ground. William Manchester, a US soldier turned author recalls: “…I shot him 
with a .45 and I felt remorse and shame. I can remember whispering foolishly, ‘I’m sorry’ 
and then just throwing up…I threw up all over myself. It was a betrayal of what I’d been 
taught since a child.”164  
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The drone operator, on the other hand, relished the kill – a clear indication of emotional 
detachment from his victim. An Israeli paratrooper and a Jordanian soldier met in 
Jerusalem in 1967. The Israeli paratrooper narrated:  
 
“We looked at each other for half a second and I knew it was up 
to me, personally, to kill him, there was no one else there. The 
whole thing must have lasted less than a second, but it’s printed 
on my mind like a slow motion movie. I fired from the hip and I 
can still see the bullets splashed against the wall about a meter to 
his left…there was so much blood…I vomited, until the rest of 
the boys came.”165  
 
In addition to the great distress caused by killing another man, it is worth noting the 
hesitation – “we looked at each other for half a second” – coupled with reluctance to 
accept responsibility – “I knew it was up to me”. The soldier waited until the last moment, 
until it was certain that there was no other option but to kill. The drone operators quoted 
above, on the other hand, were eager to look for any opportunity to kill. 
 
The ironic element is that these technological advances were designed to allow us to kill 
more accurately and thus more humanely, yet the development of these weapons is 
arguably making us behave less humanely. Unmanned systems have accelerated the 
depersonalisation of the use of force.166 Such technology allows us to take risks that we 
would not take with less sophisticated technology. With such a gulf in access, the very 
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same features that make these advanced mechanisms more humane serve to dehumanise 
the enemy and thus contribute to inhumane behaviour. The practice of targeted killing, 
and thus killing in general – which is normally the exception requiring justification – is 
becoming the norm as well as a ready option.  
 
The detachment and depersonalisation of drone operators described throughout this 
chapter is acknowledged and even cited as a defence by drone advocates. It is argued that 
making calculated and rational decisions is better than allowing emotion and adrenaline 
to cloud a soldier’s judgement.167 While this point is acknowledged, this thesis aims to 
highlight the broader consequences of such a depersonalised mode of warfare. As 
explained in Chapter 1, the compulsion not to kill is internalised in most human beings 
as an innate inhibition.168 This resistance, while viewed as an obstacle, should be viewed 
as a good and necessary thing. Armed conflict is indeed a last resort, and the laws of 
armed conflict are in place to regulate and thus mitigate the dire consequences of an 
inherently unfortunate circumstance. Laws, treaties, and agreements are all tools 
developed to resist physical conflict. Our innate disposition to avoid conflict is perhaps 
the most vital tool to this end. Developing technology to bypass these inhibitions goes 
against the underlying principles of humanitarian law, even if not technically 
contravening its rules and regulations. 
 
This thesis acknowledges the improved accuracy of drones when compared to more 
primitive forms of weaponry. Therefore, drones cannot be said to be more immoral or 
evil per se. They are designed to be quicker, more decisive, and with less risk to 
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civilians.169 As a result, they have even been described as “the most humane form of 
warfare.” 170  Paradoxically, this accuracy of drones is transforming warfare into an 
exercise of reduced humanity. Daniel Brunstetter argues that officials may begin to act as 
if the threshold of last resort no longer applies to drones.171 The reality on the ground 
reflects this fear: in an April 2013 hearing before the US Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, Yemeni 
democracy activist Farea al-Muslimi testified that a recent drone strike in his home village 
of Wessab killed a suspect everyone knew who “could have easily been arrested.”172 
Yemeni officials complain that they are not given sufficient opportunities to allow their 
US-trained counterterrorism squad to pursue Al-Qaeda operatives.173  
 
Brunstetter and Braun develop the argument further, explaining how drones forestall the 
threshold of last resort for larger military deployment, without applying the same criteria 
to drones themselves. As a result, “The use of drones as a means to enhance a state’s 
capacity to act on just cause proportionately and discriminately may lead to the propensity 
to do the opposite.”174 Martin Cook asks: is there a point at which war is so genuinely 
antiseptic that the barrier to engaging in it in the first place is virtually erased?175 
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2.3 Unilateral armed attacks 
As a result of a drone’s ability to facilitate armed attacks without the commitment of 
forces on the ground, efforts are not made to immobilise the enemy, but rather to locate 
and eradicate; traditional interactive battle evolves into manhunting. “The strategy of 
militarized manhunting is essentially preventative. It is not so much a matter of 
responding to actual attacks but rather of preventing the development of emerging threats 
by the early elimination of their potential agents – ‘to detect, deter, detain, or destroy 
networks before they can harm’176 – and to do this in the absence of any direct imminent 
threat.”177  
 
US President Bill Clinton’s Defence Secretary, William Cohen, affirmed that: “The 
paramount lesson learned from Operation Allied Force [in the NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia] is that the well-being of our people must remain our first priority.”178 The 
data attests to the claim, with NATO forces suffering 0 casualties in the 38,004 raids 
carried out over 78 days.179 As it becomes clear that “our” combatants are more valuable 
and worthy of protection than “their” civilians, the next plan of action is to take every 
step to avoid any home casualty. The introduction of unmanned and automated drones is 
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By practically eradicating the possibility of death on one side, the lives of the enemy 
become increasingly dispensable. Michael Walzer argues that it “introduces a radical 
inequality in the value of lives, and thus breaks with the inviolable principle of the equal 
dignity of all human lives.” 180  Chamayou adds, “Warfare, from being possibly 
asymmetrical, becomes absolutely unilateral. What could still claim to be combat is 
converted into a campaign of what is, quite simply, slaughter.”181 The enemy “can be 
eliminated from afar as one watches on a screen, softly enclosed within a climatized ‘safe 
zone’. Asymmetrical warfare becomes radicalized, unilateral. Of course people would 
still die, but only on one side.”182 Drone warfare does not eliminate risk, but simply 
transfers it from one society to another183 – from the country deploying the drones to the 
country where the enemy is located, including civilians situated in the same location. 
 
Inequality has always existed in warfare; two armies are almost never completely equal. 
However, the complete invulnerability of drone warfare is both radical and 
unprecedented. While completely unilateral and overwhelming forms of weaponry have 
previously existed, such as the atomic bomb, the key difference is that the likes of the 
atomic bomb are truly viewed as the last resort. Their use is extremely rare due to their 
sheer destructiveness. The use of nuclear weapons was also constrained by the principle 
of mutually assured destruction. Drone operations, however, are very quickly becoming 
the first resort. Overwhelming invulnerability is no longer a deterrent, but is now an 
adopted and relished advantage.  
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The fact that one may engage in warfare with no possibility of being harmed changes the 
nature of armed aggression, as well as the mentality of those conducting it. Such 
weaponry is described as “God-like” not only by critics, but also weapons manufacturers 
themselves, who use monikers derived from ancient mythology. The US military research 
agency DARPA is building a drone with 92 cameras called “Argus” – an omniscient 
figure in Greek mythology with 100 eyes.184 The Sierra Nevada Corporation has created 
a video-capture technology, a spherical array of nine cameras attached to an aerial drone. 
It is called “Gorgon Stare,” named after a figure in Greek mythology that turns any 
onlookers into stone. Aimed at surveilling whole cities, its motto is “motto oculus semper 
vigilans (an always watchful eye).”185 The promoters of drones boast that these machines 
have “revolutionised our ability to provide a constant stare against our enemy”.186   
 
US Colonel Theodore Osowski describes the overwhelming power as “Kind of like 
having God overhead. And lightning comes down in the form of a Hellfire.”187 A drone 
operator admitted that he felt “like a God hurling thunderbolts from afar”.188 David 
Rhode, the famous American journalist kidnapped by the Taliban in 2008 described his 
experience in Waziristan: “The drones were terrifying. From the ground, it is impossible 
to determine who or what they are tracking as they circle overhead. The buzz of a distant 
propeller is a constant reminder of imminent death.” Rhode summarised the civilians’ 
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condition as “hell on earth.”189 The Stanford Study, Living Under Drones, notes that the 
mere presence of drones, whether engaged in direct attack or not, induces both fear and 
hatred in the hearts of the population.190 
 
This condition of dread, which does not differentiate between civilians and combatants, 
is a form of dehumanisation itself. Humans are reduced to enemy targets, regardless of 
age, sex, or innocence. Entire civilian populations are under permanent surveillance and 
are in constant fear of imminent death. Safety is an inherently human concern, and so if 
a population are in constant fear of their own safety, it is reasonable to question whether 
their humanity is being disregarded. The near-constant surveillance generates a certain 
level of stress in such populations knowing that death can be delivered from an unseen 
source overhead. It is telling within the context of dehumanisation that much of the 
research in the United States on the psychological harm caused by drone warfare has been 
conducted on drone operators rather than civilian subjects in countries such as Pakistan, 
Syria, or Yemen. Instead, emphasis is placed on the needs of operators, which perpetuates 
the process mentioned in Subchapter 2.2.2 of ‘partial dehumanisation’ whereby the 
humanity of the enemy is masked. 
 
Drone operators learn and actualise the art of psychological distancing, whereby those in 
distant lands can be morally excluded or at least diminished from considerations of 
fairness or human rights or the right to life. For example, Nemar highlights the prevalence 
of PTSD among Yemeni civilians and states: 
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“For a large swathe of population in Yemen, living under a sky 
that has become a constant source of trauma is an everyday 
reality. The sky in the Yemeni countryside, or the United States 
(US) drones’ playground, regularly inflicts violence without any 
warning or reason on people that are already vulnerable to both 
poverty and conflict.”191  
 
This sense of psychological harm is enhanced when children are indiscriminately killed 
and mutilated in supposedly accurate targeted attacks. Similarly, Ahmed outlines the 
widespread incidence of stress and post traumatic disorder in regions of Pakistan regularly 
targeted by drones. In these areas, “PTSD, however, is a seemingly never-ending 
aftershock to trauma in the form of anxiety, depression, paranoia, or all of the above, with 
40 percent of people living in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas having suffered 
from PTSD at some point.”192 
 
The implication of UAVs representing ancient Greek gods extends beyond creative 
rhetoric and rather is a reflection of a cultural trend in international armed aggression. 
Legal commentators note a “decrease” in warfare in modern times, citing that the Great 
Powers have not fought each other directly for 70 years and that armed conflict, subject 
to exceptions, is contained and limited to certain regions, such as in the Middle East.193 
This belittlement of conflict in non-European countries directly correlates to European 
domination over the region. While the financial costs and political consequences of war 
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are carefully calculated, the disastrous effects on the regions targeted, as well as the 
inhabitants therein, are not. The added importance given to some lives over others, while 
already implicit in the actions of Western governments, is occasionally vocalised, as 
explicitly mentioned by US General Myers: “Though we are concerned about any number 
of unintended civilian casualties, to be honest, the one number, the one horrific number 
that stands foremost in my mind, is the over 5,000 men, women and children that were 
killed on 11 September.”194 
 
Precision-strike technology is said to shorten wars with the ability to target specific 
individuals, notably leaders and generals. The “lightning quick invasion of Iraq in 
2003”195 is used as an example of such technology. The fact that the 42 days between 20 
March 2003 and 1 May 2003 of formal invasion are cited as a triumph without 
considering the hundreds of thousands of deaths and perpetual warfare in the following 
decade is the direct result of the abovementioned compartmentalisation of war. It is also 
a reflection of Western nations’ exaggerated perception of their own ability to intervene 
in global issues, most often through military means, despite the likelihood of exacerbating 
other problems through the use of force.196 As the US had the ability to strike from afar 
and with little physical consequence to its own people, the destructive impact on the 
civilian opposition was not considered to the same extent. Senator John McCain 
downplayed the non-combatant casualties in Afghanistan, stating, “Issues such as 
Ramadan or civilian casualties, however regrettable and however tragic…have to be 
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secondary to the primary goal of eliminating the enemy.”197 The deaths of civilians, 
labelled “collateral damage” is becoming increasingly acceptable in the name of the 
greater good, namely, the obliteration of terrorists in pursuit of freedom and security.  
 
2.4 Transcending borders 
Drones demand extra scrutiny because of their ability to transcend borders. Christof 
Haynes, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, 
mentioned as early as 2013 that “The expansive use of armed drones by the first States to 
acquire them, if not challenged, can do structural damage to the cornerstones of 
international security and set precedents that undermine the protection of life across the 
globe in the longer term.”198 In short, these pinpoint strikes blur the line between war and 
peace. Moreover, they transform the social context of war; something once considered an 
act of “supreme sacrifice and national mobilisation” has become a distant, secretive 
process of robotic strikes against an unknown kill-list.199  
 
Mary Ellen O’Connell describes drones as “seductive” because they lower the political 
and psychological barriers to using lethal force.200 Such assertions are again supported by 
empirical data: a March 2011 report from the Development, Concepts, and Doctrine 
Centre of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence concluded that the availability of 
drone weapons was indeed a factor in the decision of British leaders to participate in 
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military operations in Pakistan and Yemen.201 The report stated, “It is unlikely that a 
similar scale of force would be used if this [unmanned] capability were not available.”202 
 
The blurring of war and peace has long-standing effects: states are able to employ force 
on a routine basis, continuously, for an indefinite period of time. Heyns quite crucially 
asserts that a wider use of force for longer periods of time would “run counter to the 
notion that war – and the transnational use of force in general - must be of limited duration 
and scope, and that there should be a time of healing and recovery following conflict.”203 
The transformation of armed conflict from a fixed territory over a limited period of time, 
to boundless scope over an indefinite period of time, is truly significant. The Global War 
on Terror, often used to justify this increased scope, is viewed by most countries and 
international agencies as in breach of international law and would thus not qualify as an 
official armed conflict.204 
 
States have the ever-growing temptation to increasingly engage in low-intensity but 
drawn-out applications of force that know few geographic or temporal boundaries.205 A 
counter argument is that new weapons may indeed spread war farther, but they will 
“render it shallower in its destructiveness.”206  This lure of reduced destruction may 
however encourage mission expansion. In other words, densely populated civilian areas 
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that would otherwise be protected by IHL could become viable targets due to the promise 
of greater accuracy, in turn increasing the magnitude of potential damage.207 There are a 
number of reports of civilians living in areas where drone strikes have taken place, citing 
frequent cases of PTSD. Some suffer anxiety attacks upon hearing the sound of kettle, 
reminiscent of the whizzing of a drone – a sign of imminent death. Such an effect over an 
entire population, young children and the elderly included, may not be proportionate to 
the military objection therein, especially over long periods of time.  
 
Drone advocates argue that they do not inflict unnecessary suffering, like poisoned bullets 
or blinding lasers,208 but the abovementioned psychological trauma inflicted as a result 
can be interpreted as disproportionate. These same advocates boast the idea of “near 
constant, ubiquitous air support” 209  as praise, disregarding the impact of constant 
surveillance on an entire nation. While there is no doubting the well-established historical 
relationship between dehumanisation and war, the physical and psychological distancing 
of contemporary forms of warfare aids this dehumanisation.   
  
2.5 Accuracy and decision-making 
It is said that the drone is the most efficient weapon to date in differentiating between 
combatants and civilians.210 This claim leads to a conflation between the accuracy of the 
drone itself, and the precision of intelligence and methodology. Chamayou states, “The 
fact that your weapon enables you to destroy precisely whomever you wish does not mean 
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that you are more capable of making out who is and who is not a legitimate target.”211 In 
other words, the precision of a strike has no bearing on the pertinence of the targeting in 
the first place. Chamayou uses the analogy that it would be tantamount to saying that a 
guillotine, because of the precision of its blade, makes it better able to distinguish between 
the guilty and the innocent.212 The “total vertical vision”213 of the drone operators is 
conflated with the precision of the military intelligence used to make a decision.  
 
Professor Michael Schmitt summarises the point by making a distinction between 
accuracy and precision: “Accuracy is the ability of a weapon to strike a specified 
location…precision involves identifying targets in a timely fashion and striking them 
accurately.”214 Flawed intelligence,215 human error,216 and information overload217 can 
all contribute to the reduced precision of a drone attack, and technological malfunctions218 
can also compromise its accuracy.  
 
By compiling thousands of hours of surveillance, a “pattern of life analysis” 219  is 
employed whereby certain behavioural patterns are analysed. If there are any 
inconsistencies found, the target is found to be a potential threat. This is part of the two-
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track approach to targeted strikes termed “personality strikes” and “signature strikes” 
used against individuals on a “kill list.” 220 The former refers to strikes aimed at a known 
combatant in an area and is therefore specifically targeted. The latter involves strikes 
where it is not known for certain that a potential combatant is in the area. However, the 
area is targeted because it is believed that certain individuals “match a pre-identified 
signature of behaviour that the US links to militant activity or association.”221 This means 
that an individual may be targeted simply because of their movements, behaviour, 
affiliations, or relationships. 
 
It is difficult to see how such damage could be controlled or limited when signature 
attacks are being used. Initially, drone attacks were termed personality strikes carried out 
on named high-value targets.222 However, the process soon evolved to signature attacks, 
which consist of striking unidentified terrorists based on their personal networks and 
patterns of behaviour and movement. The process is defined in the following way: 
“Determining someone is a member of a terrorist group involves looking at a variety of 
signatures, from the information and intelligence that in some ways is unique to the US 
government, for example, to the extent the individual performs functions to the benefit of 
a particular terrorist group, or to the extent an individual’s activities are analogous to 
those traditionally performed by a military.”223  
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The strikes are based not on sound intelligence that the person targeted is a terrorist, but 
rather that they are sufficiently similar to warrant attack. This has led one US official 
declare that a person in such a scenario is considered a terrorist until proven otherwise.224 
The problem with such a statement is that the purported terrorists never get a chance to 
prove otherwise, as they are subject to extrajudicial termination. This results in a process 
of indiscriminately killing people without actually verifying who they are. The fact that 
they are acknowledged as suspects and are not yet convicted for wrongdoing means that 
the legal threshold of danger justified to kill someone is often not met.225 The targets are 
dehumanised to the extent that they are not considered worth the due process afforded to 
anyone else under international law.  
 
The problem is further exacerbated by the difference between pre-planned and dynamic 
strikes. The former is based on specific intelligence and is timed to take place at a specific 
time. The latter is based on when a window of opportunity unexpectedly presents itself. 
This means that there is usually insufficient time to make full assessments of the validity 
and accuracy of intelligence or even the potential for collateral damage in the strike zone. 
It is this indiscriminate ‘hit and miss’ approach that more often leads to large numbers of 
civilian fatalities and injuries, thereby potentially breaching the United Nation’s 
stipulation regarding the proportionality of targeted killings.226 This potential breach is 
especially relevant as innocent people have been wrongly targeted on both personality 
and signature lists.227 The pattern of life analysis must receive greater scrutiny as a form 
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of ascertaining a potential threat. The margin for error is inherently larger, as patterns of 
activity are always subject to interpretation.  
  
As outlined above, drones and any other unmanned weaponry systems still largely rely 
on human intelligence to identify potential targets. The accuracy of the drone itself 
therefore has no impact on the accuracy of the intelligence provided. According to Jane 
Mayer, local informants used in northern Pakistan are “notoriously unreliable.”228 In fact, 
local informants often manipulate the CIA and their counterparts to forward local political 
agendas. In 2010, a US drone killed Jaber al-Shabwani, a Yemeni deputy governor, based 
on the faulty intelligence of a local political rival.229 Moreover, despite the claim that US 
drones are targeting high-level Al-Qaeda operatives, statistics show that the majority of 
those targeted in drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan are low-level militants 
predominantly engaged in local insurgencies.230 One may begin to develop reservations 
about such a permissive approach to targeted killing. 
 
Drones are praised for their ability to gather information over a long period of time. 
Notwithstanding the moral implications outlined above, this abundance of intelligence 
also has an effect on the efficiency of the information gathered. While on-board sensors 
identify who is taking part in an act, they cannot decipher why; they are unable to 
understand the social dynamics of a particular conflict. There is an overload of 
information, most of which is irrelevant, thereby drowning out the necessary facts needed 
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for a successful operation. A SEAL Team assault was chosen to target Osama Bin Laden 
as opposed to a drone strike for this very reason.231 The operation was of course much 
riskier than a precision-guided bomb, but President Obama wanted to be absolutely sure 
of the accuracy of the intelligence. One must then note the discrepancy between the 
assurance that drones are accurate enough in their intelligence, and the insistence for an 
on-the-ground team when the stakes are raised. Obama declared that, “As a matter of 
policy, the preference of the United States is to capture terrorist suspects”232 which 
directly contradicts the infamously exponential rise of drone operations over the two 
decades.233  
 
Sara Kreps and John Kaag highlight the fact that the decision to attack a particular target 
depends on moral calculation, not technical capacity. “The ability to undertake more 
precise, targeted strikes should not be confused with the determination of legal or ethical 
legitimacy.”234 In other words, the concepts of distinction and proportionality must be 
treated separately. The added emphasis placed on scrutinising drones is because their 
unique characteristics conflate the two aforementioned notions. Similarly, the concepts 
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are brought into play. These discussions are analysed in 




231 Helene Cooper, ‘Bin Laden Dead, Obama Says’, (The New York Times, 2011) available at < 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html> on 17 
October 2019 
232 Barack Obama, The Future of Our Fight Against Terrorism, 23 March 2013, available at < 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/06/remarks-president-
administrations-approach-counterterrorism> on 29 September 2019 
233 See Chapter 6 for statistics 
234 Sarah Kreps and John Kaag, ‘The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Contemporary 
Conflict: A Legal and Ethical Analysis’, Polity, vol.44, no.2, (2012) 276 
	 65	
This aim of this chapter was to explain the impact of dehumanisation on armed conflict. 
It demonstrated the role of technology, in particular drones and UAVs, in exacerbating 
the issue of detachment and dehumanisation. It concludes that through physical and 
psychological distancing, drones dehumanise and anonymise the enemy, leading to a 
reduced resistance to killing and in turn a greater willingness to engage in low-intensity 
operations of armed aggression.   
 
This chapter underpinned the moral implications of drone warfare. Undoubtedly, warfare 
is growing in autonomy and technology is developing exponentially. The wish to carry 
out military operations without risking the lives of home soldiers or civilians now takes 
the form of the drone phenomenon. The first drone strike was reported in 2002,235 and 
since then their usage has grown considerably. In Pakistan, there were 46 strikes from 
2004-2008, compared to 308 from 2009-2013.236 Since 2015, there have been 1,383 
drone strikes in Afghanistan alone.237 
 
While there are calls to ban all autonomous weapons,238 this thesis acknowledges that 
drones are, as a matter of fact, a significant part of armed conflict, and their use will only 
increase. Industry estimates predict that the global market of UAVs will rise to $89 billion 
over the next ten years.239 According to the Congressional Research Service, UAVs “are 
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expected to take on every type of mission currently flown by manned aircraft.”240 While 
the US currently dominates the global deployment of drones, their relatively accessible 
technology means that it is likely for more and more nations, as well as non-state actors, 
to engage in drone warfare.241  
 
This trend, in conjunction with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and 
robotics, has serious implications for the future of armed force as well as international 
law, which must be scrutinised in light of dehumanisation and detachment. The remainder 
of this thesis considers the various legal frameworks by which UAVs may be governed, 
focusing on IHL, IHRL, and UK domestic law, but also considering soft law guidance 
and administrative regulation. If drones are not deemed to be inherently illegal, which 
they are not, and if their presence is acknowledged, then the most pertinent questions at 
hand are regarding their implications, their governance, and their relationship with the 
law. Are the abovementioned modes of law sufficiently equipped to deal with the rapid 
developments and impacts of drone warfare? Do they sufficiently consider the effects of 
dehumanisation and its impact on armed conflict? If not, what changes or adjustments 







240 Jeremiah Gertler, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Manned Aerial Systems, no.6 (2012) 
241 Alan Dawson, ‘China Considered Killing Naw Kham with Drone’, Bangkok Post (20 
February 2013) available at <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/336872/china-





The Law of Armed Conflict 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses the research objective of assessing whether contemporary armed 
conflict is in line with existing legal principles and the values that are meant to govern 
them.242 The previous chapter identified the connection between distance, detachment, 
and dehumanisation and technological advancements in armed conflict over the course of 
the last few decades. It concluded that the lack of human agency coupled with the physical 
and psychological distancing of drone warfare contributed to the dehumanisation of the 
enemy. This chapter progresses the thesis by examining the applicability of IHL to 
changes in military strategies arising from the use of technology. The chapter begins by 
discussing the topic of jus ad bellum and issues pertaining to the permissibility of entering 
war. While the premise and bulk of the chapter is strictly related to jus in bello, 
international humanitarian law, the unique nature of UAVs and drone warfare has often 
led to a conflation between the two concepts. Individual acts of armed aggression give 
rise to academic discussions about the nature of the acts as well as their permissibility in 
the first place. It is therefore necessary to make mention of issues related to the decision 
to resort to drones before delving into the intricate matters of IHL rules during warfare. 
The chapter then analyses the applicability of existing IHL to drones and UAVs.  
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In order to pursue the research aim in this chapter, it is necessary to examine at least three 
aspects of the applicability of IHL to the drone warfare tactics.  First, the chapter 
examines the evolution of military warfare as the basis to argue that military techniques 
have long evolved over time and the law has to change in step with these developments. 
Second, the chapter then progresses to examine the various uses of drone warfare as the 
basis to explore the contemporary use of drone warfare as a military tactic. Third, the 
chapter examines the ability of existing IHL as the basis to control and regulate the use 
of drone warfare. The final section provides a conclusion by arguing that there are 
weaknesses in the applicability of IHL that require development in order to ensure state 
usage of drone warfare can be legitimately analysed. It further concludes that drones need 
not be banned outright, and that IHL can instead be updated in light of the capabilities 
posed by UAVs. Throughout the chapter, the theme of dehumanisation is maintained and 
the legal discussions are conducted within the context of UAVs’ lack of human agency 
and the moral implications that such technological advancements carry. 
 
The question at hand is not about the legality of drones per se, but the regulation of their 
use to secure the values at the core of the IHL system, such as the protection of life and 
the containment of the use of force.243 The primary objective of the discussion in this 
chapter is to conduct an assessment of the ability of IHL to regulate the use of drone 
warfare. The objective of this discussion is to assess whether, if at all, IHL can provide a 
basis to regulate the use of drone warfare tactics. The discussion in this chapter will 
demonstrate that there are significant issues with IHL as it is currently constructed to 
regulate conduct of parties during hostilities.244 Through the work of key writers such as 
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Crawford,245 Dinstein,246 and Ryngaert,247 the discussion will show that a significant part 
of the problem with IHL as a regulatory tool is the fact that IHL is not clear on the 
distinction between combatants and civilians in determining the rights of those involved 
in hostilities.248 The particular problem arises where the actor involved in hostilities does 
not fit the state-centric view of IHL law whereas in reality there may be state and non-
state actors.249 The complex problem created by non-state actors is the fact that they may 
well act like combatants but from a strict legal perspective they cannot be considered as 
combatants in light of the construction of IHL law. Nevertheless, the discussion will also 
show that there are issues around defining non-state actors as civilians. This confusion 
around the definition of non-state actors poses a significant issue as to the rights that are 
owed to these non-state actors on the basis of IHL. 
 
3.2 Background 
A general theme over the last century has been the rise of the technological era, which 
has spilled into every facet of life, including military strategy. The exponential 
advancement of technology and its subsequent impact on the development of weaponry 
has thrust autonomous systems into the legal spotlight. 250  Specifically, the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) provides states with the ability to engage militarily 
without the need of placing any human resources at risk. As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
has had an impact on military strategy, namely the normalisation of a more permissive 
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approach to armed conflict. Heyns, Cortright, and Fairhurst all note that the prospect of 
multiple states operating secretive drone policies according to their own interpretation of 
international law is not a desirable outcome from a global security perspective. 251 
Although the lawfulness per se of drones as military weapon is not the purview of this 
chapter, it is necessary to consider the lawfulness question given that the discussion will 
show that there is a degree of conflation between lawfulness per se of drones and their 
regulation during hostilities. Ambiguity in international law in this regard naturally 
“leaves dangerous latitude for differences of practice by States.”252  
 
Martin Cook adds that it would be simply unacceptable for every nation to use drones on 
their own authority for surveillance and lethal attack inside the sovereignty of states with 
which they are not at war. Such an international standard “would be radically 
destabilizing to any notion of an international legal regime.”253 As of 2013, between 75 
and 87 countries allegedly possess drone technology, with 26 of those countries already 
possessing armed models.254 Those numbers would likely have increased considerably 
by now. Mark Mazzetti describes the situation in the US as a largely ad hoc system 
without any clear standards as to when it is permissible to kill, or who is a legitimate 
target.255 If every state then decided on its own independent approach, it may very well 
develop into an anarchic international atmosphere that could raise inter-state tensions. 
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Within modern times, IHL and IHRL have both struggled to place normative constraints 
on the use of remote or dispersed violence.256 Of particular concern is the presumption of 
states such as the US and the UK that the law should conform to the use of drones rather 
than drone use conforming to international law.257 It is therefore imperative to consider 
drone warfare in light of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), especially considering their 
unique attributes already discussed.   
 
3.3 Jus ad bellum: the decision to resort to drones 
Although the decision to resort to drones in conflict is primarily a matter of jus ad bellum, 
it may be argued that a preliminary and precursory issue relates to assessing the 
lawfulness of deciding to use drones in the first instance.258 Specifically, the relevance of 
considering jus ad bellum here is to demonstrate that some of the arguments on the ability 
of IHL to regulate drones as a military tactic is conflated with the decision to use drones 
in the first instance given this relatively new military tactic.259 The decision to resort to 
drones is controlled by international law and follows the same approach that would apply 
to any state decision to engage militarily. Specifically, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”260 In light of the discussion in the 
previous section, it is clear that the decision to use drones to pursue a military objective 
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would necessarily engage international law in the same vein as the decision to use any 
other warfare tactic such as soldiers, armed vehicles, and so on.  
 
Despite the general prohibition in international law on the threat or use of force, there are 
two general accepted exceptions to this prohibition.  
  
3.3.1 Self-defence 
The first situation where a state can justify the use of drones is on the basis of [either 
collective or individual] self-defence.261 This is indeed the case for any other use of 
military tool. Specifically, Article 51 of the UN Charter expressly allows for the use of 
force in self-defence. It reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”262 For this exception to apply, a number of 
components need to be satisfied. The first condition is “armed attack”; this can take many 
forms and does not need to reach a certain threshold of intensity in order to be considered 
for the purpose of self-defence. 263  The second condition is that it is “on-going or 
imminent”; this stipulation is subject to much debate.264 Some argue that the armed attack 
must occur, and others argue that self-defence can be triggered before an attack occurs, if 
the threat was imminent.265 While the former is more explicit in Article 51, the latter 
interpretation seems to have traction, such as in the United Nations Secretary-General’s 
response In Larger Freedom: “Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which 
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safeguards the inherent right of sovereign states to defend themselves against armed 
attack. Lawyers have long recognised that this covers an imminent attack as well as one 
that has already happened.”266  
 
Customary legal usage defines imminence as the clear and present danger of a concrete 
and specific threat of violence.267 There must therefore be a demonstrable threat of attack 
or loss of life. The Obama administration has attempted to bypass this obstacle by 
redefining the very term. It was noted in Department of Justice ‘White Paper’ in 2013 
that imminence “does not require…clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons 
and interests will take place in the immediate future,”268 which is the opposite of the long-
understood and agreed-upon definition of imminence. International law insists that 
imminence requires evidence of a specific attack in the immediate future, whereas the 
Obama administration only requires a target to be “generally engaged” in terrorist 
activities.269 It may also be useful to point out here that the US justification can be 
supported by reference to their own domestic legal standards such as the ‘Authorisation 
for the Use of Military Force’ 2001 (AUMF),270 which was created in the aftermath of 
the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, as the basis to justify taking military action 
against those responsible forces and/or those associated forces. According to American 
Civil Liberties Union’s Jameel Jaffar, the AUMF aimed to “redefine the word imminence 
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in a way that deprives the word of its ordinary meaning.”271 The UK Attorney General 
Jeremy Wright has also endorsed the idea that the absence of specific evidence of where 
an attack will take place or of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a 
conclusion that an armed attack is imminent.272 Wright maintains that this approach does 
not necessarily dispense with the concept of imminence, however for all intents and 
purposes it does, as it creates a situation where the updated definition overrides the initial 
definition entirely. 
 
The Caroline Case is an authoritative formulation, stating that an imminent attack is 
described as “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”273 However, it obvious that expanding the rule to include attacks that have 
not actually happened is dangerous, as it could be stretched in a way that harms the world 
order. In light of this danger, and despite it predating the UN Charter, the Caroline Case 
is still cited for setting the requirements for a pre-emptive strike. The Caroline Case 
requires self-defence to be “nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by 
the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within 
it.”274 This was further established by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case,275 stating this rule 
is customary. The ICJ stated in the Nicaragua Case that the definition of “armed attack” 
could extend to cover attacks by “armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries”, but 
these actors must have been sent “by or on behalf of a State.”276 
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In the past, the US has relied upon Article 51 to justify drone strikes against the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda.277 The use of drones in Iraq and Syria has also been justified by the UK 
and the US in a similar way.278 The Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department Harold 
Koh stated in 2010 that, “As a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed 
conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the 
horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defence 
under international law.”279 More specifically, he noted: “It is considered the view of this 
Administration – and it has certainly been my experience during my time as Legal 
Adviser – that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use 
of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.” 
The use of such lethal weapons, with such ease, requires a higher standard of justification 
than anticipatory self-defence.  
 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston, 
dismissed the use of pre-emptive drone strikes as it “threatens to eviscerate the human 
rights law prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of life.”280 In 2002, the Bush 
administration stretched the concept of legitimate anticipatory self-defence in IHL to 
cover independent US actions to eliminate the capabilities of the enemy without the need 
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for intelligence of specific imminent attacks or threats.281 As a result, it is arguable that 
IHL has the ability to form the basis to regulate the use of drones during hostilities.  
 
It is important to emphasise here that the focus of the discussion in this section is on the 
ability of the law, specifically IHL, to regulate the on-going use of drones as a warfare 
military tactic. Therefore, the discussion on the decision to resort to drones is not 
necessarily as relevant to this thesis as this is a separate legal issue. Specifically, the 
decision to resort to drones brings into question the lawfulness of the military action in 
first instance, whereas the discussion in this chapter is on the applicability of IHL to drone 
warfare operations.282 Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the decision by any 
state to rely on a drone to pursue a military objective is subject to review in international 
law so as to determine the lawfulness of the action in first instance.283 IHL is often 
referred to as jus in bello, and the laws regulating the rightfulness of the use of force is 
known as jus ad bellum.284 The two regimes should always be seen as separate and not 
be confused with another. 285  Advocates of the proliferation of drones cite the legal 
separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello as a defence of the use of drones. John 
Yoo articulates the argument as follows: 
 
“A nation’s decision to wage war cannot automatically rule in or 
out any types of weapons. Once a conflict has begun, the laws of 
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war switch from the lawfulness of going to war and the narrower, 
repeated question whether the choice of weapon in a particular 
context is reasonable. Whether to use a drone, or a ballistic 
missile, or a commando team to kill an enemy commander has no 
bearing on whether the United States legitimately could use force 
in Pakistan or against al-Qaeda.”286 
 
While the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is imperative, the argument 
here is conflated. The call to scrutinise the use of drones and its effect on armed conflict 
is not pertaining to the legality of the war itself, but rather its ability to transcend the 
traditional boundaries of war as outlined above. The ability to attack with relative 
immediacy, without the need to retreat, results in a situation where a nation enjoys peace 
at home while maintaining armed aggression elsewhere.287 Security analyst Lawrence 
Korb states that perhaps “robots will make people think, ‘Gee, warfare is easy’ and that 
leaders will hold the impression that they can win a war with just “three men and a satellite 
phone”.288 Those three men, it may be noted, are not in harm’s way, whereas the enemy 
most certainly are. This lack of human agency required in drone warfare, at least from 
one side, calls for extra scrutiny. This is especially the case as technology develops to 
potentially grant these weapons decision-making capability and even responsibility. 
Chapter 2 already elucidated the dehumanisation and detachment as a result of this 
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The second exception to the prohibition of the threat or use of force is where a state has 
given its consent to the use of military intervention by another state. In the past, countries 
have cited the consent of another nation as giving permission to use lethal force.289 It is 
important to note here that the state “may only grant consent to operations that it could 
itself legally conduct” and the state “cannot lawfully allow attacks that would violate 
applicable human rights or humanitarian law norms, since it does not itself enjoy such 
authority.”290 Therefore, a state can only consent to the use of drones insofar as it would 
legally be entitled to resort to drones itself.291 The US claims that the governments of 
countries where airstrikes are conducted either consent, or have lost the right to consent 
if they fail to act sufficiently or take responsibility.292 However, international law does 
not currently provide specific guidance as to what constitutes capacity or willingness; 
there is no time limit before the victim state can act on behalf of another state, or whether 
they must have express permission. If the state in which an attack is being planned or 
terrorists are located is both capable and willing to subdue the terrorists, it is not 
permissible in international law for the victim state to use its own force.293 In Yemen, for 
example, officials were cited as claiming that they were not given sufficient opportunity 
for their own US-trained counterterrorism squads to pursue al-Qaeda operatives.294 The 
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Yemeni civilian parliament issued a formal declaration demanding that drone strikes 
cease.295 
 
In April 2012, Pakistani politicians repeatedly called for an end to US drone strikes in 
Pakistan.296 Further, in 2013 the Pakistani government explicitly rejected the notion that 
it was unwilling or unable to combat the terrorists on its soil, citing the 145,000 Pakistani 
armed forces members across its border and increased communication with tribal 
communities, amongst other things.297 The UN Special Rapporteur for Counterterrorism 
and Human Rights, Ben Emmerson, has also examined this specific question and 
concluded: “as a matter of international law the US drone campaign in Pakistan is being 
conducted without the consent of the elected representatives of the people or the 
legitimate government of the state.”298 Mark Mazzetti and Martin Cook report that the 
Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence in Pakistan authorised US drone strikes,299 
however the decision to consent under international law lies with the head of state. 
Moreover, the notion of “unable or unwilling” is not found in customary international 
law, treaties, or general principle in law, but instead originates from Chatham House, a 
UK international affairs think tank,300 which does not bind any state under international 
law. In any case, international law under the UN will necessitate evidence of a sufficient 
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threat of or an armed attack so as to ensure that the resort to drones was proportionate and 
necessary.301 
 
3.3.3 The evolution of military warfare 
The decision to resort to drones is inextricably linked to the technological developments 
that lead to such a choice. Warfare has developed over time in phases, and with each 
phase, the dynamic of armed conflict shifts accordingly. As aforementioned, a key shift 
in drone warfare is the ability to commit to relatively spontaneous acts of aggression. In 
order to better understand the implications of such developments, it is pertinent to briefly 
review the historical development of military warfare. The starting point should be to 
define an armed conflict to understand the circumstances a state may need to rely on 
warfare to achieve its objectives.  
 
For the purposes of the discussion in this thesis, “armed conflict” is defined non-legally 
as being “the logical outcome of an attempt of one group to protect or increase its political, 
social and economic welfare at the expense of another group.”302 The evolution of modern 
warfare can be divided in to at least three distinctive phases: the era of ‘mass war’ from 
the French revolution to the World Wars; the era of ‘expert wars’ from the Cold War to 
the 21st century; and the current era of technology and non-state actors. The division of 
warfare usage into these three phases assists the analysis by being able to explain the 
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3.3.3.1 The era of mass war 
Up to the mid-19th century, subject to exceptions, armed conflicts have followed the 
Rousseauian conception of war; namely, the meeting of two armies disconnected from 
their civilian populations.303 The laws of war were therefore modelled on this traditional 
format.304 As a result, IHL treaties are largely applicable to these types of conflicts. In 
fact, the only treaty provisions that apply to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) 
are Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Prior to the French Revolution, the use 
of war in the eighteenth century in Europe was premised upon a unity of time, action, and 
place. Battles emerged in towns and villages across Europe waged by soldiers in search 
of reward for loyalty or as a feudal duty.305 Victory was won on the battlefield by soldiers 
in combat, which meant that war had a clear starting point; the engagement of battle, and 
a clear end point; the victorious side winning the battle.306 This understanding of armed 
conflict is important as it demonstrates that original foundations of international legal 
standards were deeply shaped by this understanding and implementation of war and the 
use of warfare. 
 
The French Revolution brought about a period of reconfiguration in Europe with 
countries seeking expansion and conquests.307 A key consequence of the use of warfare 
arising from the French Revolution was the first use of mass conscription where citizens 
were compulsorily enlisted to join the army to fight for the nation. 308  The use of 
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conscription changed the face of wars by giving states military might that never existed 
prior to the French Revolution. The development of nation armies meant that there was a 
new need for a development in weaponry to equip these new nation armies. In supporting 
the development of nation armies, progress was made in armed conflict through the 
development of ballistics where rifled barrel weapons with automatic fire and 
improvements to explosives allowed citizen armies to become significantly more 
equipped but without demanding professional training. Other technological 
developments, such as the arrival of the railway, also helped nation armies by facilitating 
their quick deployment around a country.309   
 
The American Civil War from 1861-1864 and the Boer War from 1899-1902 revealed 
the impact of the development of mass nation armies, and that a very high number of 
civilian casualties can be inflicted by large armies with improved weaponry.310 The loss 
of life associated with mass war arising from technological developments sharply focused 
the consequences of developments and ‘improvements’ in warfare.311 The development 
and improvement in warfare during this phase primarily revolved around the ability to 
make explosives on an industrial scale that were capable of causing serious destruction 
to life and property. While these advancements were intended to cause destruction on a 
greater scale, they were motivated by loss of life, further reinforcing the notion that loss 
of life is the foremost factor that affects decision-making in armed conflict. Removing or 
severely reducing the possibility and risk of loss of life on one side will therefore have a 
tremendous impact on the way in which an armed conflict is carried out. 
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The 20th century’s application of “total wars”312 tested the value of IHL treaties and their 
applicability. Entire nations, including civilians, were thrust into the reality of war along 
with their many atrocities by and against them. A.J.P Taylor notes, “The 19th century 
formulated the laws of war; the 20th century was expected to apply them.”313  Gerd 
Oberleitner adds that the traumatic First and Second World Wars demonstrated that its 
“technocratic rules could either be easily circumvented or used to justify morally 
abhorrent episodes.”314 Traditional understandings of war being fought on the battlefield 
across Europe but especially in France and Belgium remained in World War I, but 
advancements in weaponry revealed the destruction to life and property that can stem 
from mass war engagement.315 In World War II, the development of aerial bombardment 
and the emergence of the total war strategy revealed the impact of the developments in 
warfare and its ability to inflict mass human casualties and the total destruction of towns 
and villages. The arrival of mass nation soldiers with weapons, armoured vehicles, and 
planes created the backdrop for the development of international legal standards as the 
basis to attempt to establish minimum standards on the use of such armed conflict. 
 
The era of mass war highlighted the fact that contemporary warfare developed from the 
emergence of nation armies. These armies were capable of inflicting mass destruction 
given the technological developments in explosives and weapons that were characterised 
by the use of soldiers, armoured vehicles, and planes. The type of warfare utilised during 
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this phase is best classified as being a form of industrialised warfare given the style and 
scale of mass destruction.316 
 
3.3.3.2 The era of expert wars 
In the aftermath of World War II, a period of decolonisation and polarisation between 
Eastern and Western countries resulted in a decline of the type of warfare utilised in 
previous conflicts. 317  Industrial war between two opposing sides relying on the 
deployment of national armies using weapons, explosives, planes, and armoured vehicles 
has virtually dissipated. The Cold War marked a distinction in warfare that rested on 
threats, intelligence operations, and spying between Western and Eastern countries in an 
attempt to exert their supremacy at the international level in the new world order that 
stemmed from the end of World War II.318 The horrors of the consequences of war 
highlighted from World War I and II may in part explain this change in warfare where no 
state had the political desire for war on an industrial scale.  
 
At this stage, a conscious effort was made to reduce human agency in armed conflict in a 
bid to reduce home casualties.319 Further, throughout the course of the early twentieth 
century there was a growing human rights awakening where the horrors particular of 
World War II exposed a political willingness to construct minimum human rights 
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obligations on the state.320 This had an impact given the lack of political appetite to fund 
and face all out mass war. 
 
During the course of the 1990s, the use of military force emerged sporadically in response 
to a particular humanitarian need to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. 
For example, the US intervened in Somalia in 1992 on humanitarian grounds due to the 
concerns around serious abuses of human rights by the state.321 This phase marked a 
period where states sought to rely on military warfare for the supposed protection and 
maintenance of international peace and security. This theme of using military force 
continues with the most recent and enduring ‘war on terror’, which resulted in military 
action in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2001. The justification for the most recent use of the 
military action was constructed on the basis of an alleged necessity for self-defence by 
dealing with terror.322  
 
According to Ferraro, there are at least three ways to classify this phase of armed 
conflict.323 First, the use of warfare tactics to deal with the threat to international security 
posed by non-state actor groups who have the capacity to inflict mass destruction in states. 
Second, the prolonged period of military action in the most recent Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars has dampened the willingness of Western countries to resort to the use of military 
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interventions that require ground resources such as soldiers.324 Third, there is a growing 
realisation by Western governments of the political perception of military action on their 
national electorate making them less electable.325 The seemingly less evasive and more 
covert employment of UAVs developed in the third era of warfare is viewed as less 
damaging in terms of public opinion, danger to home soldiers, and cost. This reality is 
perhaps evidence of the successful dehumanisation of armed conflict as explain in 
Chapter 2.  
 
3.3.3.3 The era of technology and non-state actors 
There are three issues that require discussion: the use of drones in international armed 
conflicts (IACs); the use of drones in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs); and the 
ability of states to accurately target military objectives through drone usage. 
 
IHL makes a distinction between international armed conflicts (a conflict between states) 
and non-international armed conflicts (a conflict between states and non-state actors, or 
between multiple non-state actors). IHL applies to both but differentiates the two and 
applies different rules to each scenario. In NIACs, those who can be targeted include 
“dissident armed forces and other organized armed groups.”326 Additional Protocol II, 
Article 13(3) includes civilians who take a direct part in hostilities. 327  Sarkees and 
Wayman note that NIACs occurred three times more than IACs up until 2007,328 with the 
likelihood of an increase since then. An example of such a case is Nicaragua v United 
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that the US and Nicaragua were in an IAC, while rebels and Nicaragua were in an 
NIAC.329 At first instance, it could be assumed that this move from IACs to more NIACs 
causes a gap in the law applicable to NIACs. However, while treaty law separates the 
two, CIL has bridged the gap, making most rules applicable to both IACs and NIACs. 
The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) confirms this, stating: 
“Notwithstanding these limitations, it cannot be denied that customary rules have 
developed to govern internal strife.”330 
The existence of an international armed conflict does not require a declaration of war or 
the recognition of war. For example, Roscini’s work on the relevant rules on the use of 
force in international law relevant to cyber-attacks notes that commonly there will be no 
need for a state of war to be formally declared.331 Specifically, Common Article 2 of the 
Geneva Conventions clearly expresses “all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if 
the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” The regulation of these types of 
conflicts fall under the four Geneva Conventions 1949 and Additional Protocol I 1977, 
as mentioned above. The Geneva Conventions have universal recognition as the baseline 
standard required of all those engaged in hostilities and can be considered as existing as 
part of customary international law.332 As a result, it is clear that where an international 
armed conflict is engaged, the use of drones as the basis to target military objectives must 
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be in compliance with IHL principles, which may be supplemented by principles from 
other areas of international law such as IHRL (Chapter 4).333 
 
The rise of NIACs has intensified since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US where 
non-state actors demonstrated an ability to inflict mass destruction almost anywhere in 
the world.334 Consequently, states have responded to this threat emanating from non-state 
actors as the basis to maintain international peace and security by specifically seeking to 
target known non-state actors. To further clarify, it is important to note here that for the 
purposes of the discussion in this chapter, an NIAC is where there is “protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State.”335 This means that there must be a sufficient degree of fighting 
that involves a non-state group that is sufficiently organised.336  
 
Further, if Additional Protocol II from Geneva Conventions is to apply, there is a higher 
threshold required where the non-state actor must have an organisational command and 
be in control of a territorial area or region.337 However, Additional Protocol II has not 
become part of CIL yet, which means that this additional threshold currently is only 
applicable between contracting states as part of international treaty law.338 As a result, the 
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threshold required is merely that the non-state group is sufficiently organised and the 
fighting is sufficiently intense. 
 
In the context of NIACs that have emerged over the course of the last decade, this 
definition does not always match the reality in practice. For example, the US often refers 
to their on-going conflict with “al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other associated forces.”339 
While the 2001 AUMF does not actually use the phrase “associated forces”,340 the Obama 
administration has since used it frequently in numerous operations.341 This means that the 
US is effectively using the term “non-international armed conflict” as an all-
encompassing umbrella term to describe all of its responses to various groups or 
individuals who follow an ideology established by al-Qaeda or the Taliban. This 
attribution is problematic from a legal perspective, as it tends to conflate different military 
groups that may share an ideology but are not necessarily connected to represent a 
sufficiently organised group in line with the legal definition of an NIAC. 
 
For example, in the fight against al-Qaeda, many US strikes are not actually targeted at 
core al-Qaeda members. Instead, most targets are “associated forces of al-Qaeda.”342 In 
2012, John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, identified four “adherents” and “affiliates” of al-Qaeda targeted in 
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Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria, and other parts of North and West Africa.343 Since then, it has 
gone further to include “associates of associates” in Syria, Libya, and Mali.344 Moreover, 
the claim of association or adherence is weak; a shared ideology is not sufficient to be 
identified as cobelligerents. An associated force is not any terrorist group in the world 
that merely embraces the al-Qaeda ideology.345 One of the primary groups often targeted, 
al-Shabab, is said to have very “weak” organisational links to al-Qaeda; “the strongest tie 
between al-Shabab and al-Qaeda seems to be ideological.”346 While President Obama 
stated that the United States “must define our effort not as a boundless war on terror”,347 
the reality on the ground is not reflective of such. Some countries, such as the UK, have 
rejected the US’ contention that they can brand their actions against various groups as 
being NIACs for this very reason.348 
 
Following 2001, the then President George W. Bush issued a national security directive 
that lifted a long-standing ban on CIA involvement in assassinations,349 and since then 
targeted attacks on leaders of militant organisations have become a norm, each of which 
justified as a part of the war on terror.350 Examples include the targeted attack on Osama 
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bin Laden in Pakistan, which may be questioned as to whether it could be considered 
lawful to invade a sovereign country and to kill an individual within that country in a 
manner that poses a significant threat to his family.351 Legally, terrorists can be killed on 
sight, regardless of the threat they currently represent.352 In 2001, the AUMF passed by 
US Congress authorised the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planed, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11th 2001, or harboured such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.”353 Such a broad and 
encompassing description has facilitated the abovementioned permissive approach to 
targeted killing.  
 
Killing is permitted by the LOAC when a state of armed conflict exists but is limited 
insofar as civilians must not be directly targeted. Specifically, as noted above, it is the 
killing of combatants that is only considered to be permissible. As contemporary wars 
aimed at managing the terrorism are not bounded by geography or time, this allows for a 
free reign of killing. For instance, the US’ AUMF expressly recognises a perpetual right 
to target those responsible forces and their associated forces for the 11 September 2001 
attacks. 354  In 2011, UAVs were sent to Libya, ultimately contributing to Colonel 
Qaddafi’s death. The US were not in armed conflict with Libya yet were given authority 
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by the UN Security Council to use all necessary means to protect the civilians.355 At the 
same time, the US relied on the fact that they were not technically at war to claim that 
they did not require congressional authorisation for its actions. In sum, the US acted 
aggressively similar to a nation in war, while reaping the rewards of technically not being 
at war. Jennifer Walsh argues that the US is very well aware of its ambiguous position, 
noting that the fact that US officials use “imminence” as a justification implies that the 
“US itself believes – despite its invocation of the war paradigm – that it is engaged in a 
qualitatively different kind of activity…and that an independent justification for every act 
of targeted killing is morally and legally required.”356 
 
In 2010, the US government confirmed that it no longer uses the term “global war on 
terror” and instead is in armed conflict357 with “al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and 
associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent 
with its inherent right to self-defense under international law.”358 While the term has 
changed, strikes in half a dozen countries continue, with a dramatic increase in 
Afghanistan. Article 51 implies that the use of force in self-defence is restricted to a state 
that is responsible for an attack, and the Afghani Taliban, which was responsible, was 
already removed from power.359  
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There are two key concepts that require further exploration: the degree of organisation, 
and degree of intensity required before an NIAC can be recognised to trigger IHL rules. 
 
3.3.3.3.1 NIACs: the degree of organisation required 
There has been much consideration of the degree of organisation required before an NIAC 
can be recognised to trigger IHL rules. For example, Article 1 of the Additional Protocol 
II makes clear that there must be a degree of organisation in light of its definition of an 
NIAC.  Specifically, Article 1 defines an NIAC as: 
 
“…taking place in the territory of a High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them 
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol.”360 
 
Additionally, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 
Boskoski 361  opined, “the degree of organisation required to engage in ‘protracted 
violence’ was lower than the level of organisation that it would take to conduct a 
“sustained and concerted military operation.” 362  It is made clear that the level of 
organisation is not the same as the level of organisation of a state’s forces. The ICTY 
identified a number of different factors including “the existence of headquarters, 
designated zones of operation, and the ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms, 
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the use of spokesperson and public communiqués, and the erection of checkpoints” as the 
basis to identify sufficient levels of organisation.363 Additionally, in Haradinaj it was 
identified that there would normally be “a command structure” to support a contention 
that sufficient organisation existed so as to be considered capable of formulating military 
tactics.364 
 
It may be argued that this definition of organisation would not be met by the likes of al-
Qaeda, as it is not a single global entity with a command structure capable of directing 
and formulating military objectives. Rather, modern groups such as al-Qaeda may be 
more akin to developing an ideology capable of inspiring small groups or even pockets 
of individuals who would not meet the threshold currently envisaged for IHL to apply to 
NIACs against these types of groups. However, it may be possible that some entities 
under the umbrella of al-Qaeda, such as al-Qaeda in Pakistan, al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, or al-Shabab may be sufficient to fall within IHL.365 Nevertheless, again it 
may be argued that IHL has another deficiency here were it may not apply to particular 
individuals or pockets of individuals who are al-Qaeda inspired given the lack of 
organisation to meet the threshold for IHL to apply.366 
 
3.3.3.3.2 NIACs: the degree of intensity required 
The requirement of a minimum intensity is aimed at excluding some types of internal 
violence such as “riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar 
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nature.”367 However, the attainment of a sufficient degree of intensity is decided on a 
case-by-case basis. The ICTY identified “the seriousness of attacks and whether there has 
been an increase in armed clashes, the spread of clashes over territory and over a period 
of time, any increase in the number of government forces and mobilisation and the 
distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict, as well as whether the conflict 
has attracted the attention of the United Nations Security Council, and, whether any 
resolutions on the matter have been passed.”368 It may be therefore argued that the level 
of intensity requires a consideration of the duration and the magnitude in order to 
determine whether the required threshold has been reached. It is highly debatable as to 
whether the individualised and randomised attacks perpetrated against prevailing non-
state actors can be considered as sufficient to meet the minimum threshold envisaged by 
the intensity requirement.369 
 
As a result, the legal definition of an NIAC might not necessarily match the reality in 
practice where drones may be deployed to pursue a state’s military objective. A 
significant issue here is the fact that some uses of drones may well be occurring outside 
IHL given that the definition of NIACs does not necessarily reflect the reality in practice. 
Consequently, it may be argued that there is a specific problem with the current definition 
of NIACs, where technically speaking states may not be regulated by IHL given that their 
use of drones may fall outside of the legal definition.370   
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A further issue is the fact that NIACs may have an international dimension; members of 
small organisations can cross borders without notice. This can be misleading given the 
classification of this type of conflict as being non-international. For instance, in 
Afghanistan there were numerous instances where the states engaged in military conflict 
against non-state actors spilled over into Pakistani territory.371 This creates a technical 
legal problem given that the very nature of the definition of a non-international conflict 
is meant to occur within the same territorial border. However, this problem may be 
resolvable by the fact that the Common Article 2 Geneva Convention is clear that an 
international war is “between two or more High Contracting Parties”. As the spill over of 
NIACs have not been directed against another state but specifically against a known non-
state actor, it may be acceptable that this type of conflict remains accurately classifiable 
as non-international. However, it would not be entirely foreseeable that states may 
interpret such military action as being in violation of their national sovereignty. If this 
were to be the case, then there may still be a problem with the definition of NIACs being 
connected to territory. 
 
3.3.4 Jus ad bellum: a summary 
This chapter has been split into two overarching sections: 1) jus ad bellum, the 
permissibility, decision, and requirements of entering an armed conflict, alongside related 
issues pertaining to the nature and history of warfare, and 2) jus in bello, the principles 
and rules of war to be followed once armed conflict has commenced. The unique nature 
of drone warfare and its technological capabilities necessitated an in-depth discussion as 
to how these technological advancements have affected the notions and implications of 
armed conflict.  
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The chapter first begins by introducing the topic of technology, in particular how it has 
shifted the nature of armed conflict into a more permissive affair. The relative ease by 
which UAVs are deployed from a state of peace has contributed to a conflation between 
arguments on drones being used as a military tactic, and the decision to resort to armed 
conflict in the first instance. The chapter clarifies that the decision to use drones engages 
international law in the same vein as any other warfare tactic. It then elaborates on the 
relevant exceptions to the probation of the threat or use of force, namely self-defence and 
consent. Self-defence must in retaliation to an attack that is on-going or imminent, and 
consent must be given by states that have the authority to conduct those operations 
themselves.  
 
The section then discusses the evolution of military warfare in a bid to contextualise the 
phenomenon of drones and UAVs in general. It highlights three primary shifts in armed 
conflict: 1) the era of mass war, based on the Rousseauian conception of warfare between 
two structured armies disconnected from their civilian populations, 2) the era of expert 
wars following the horrors of the World Wars, creating a conscious effort to reduce 
human agency in war, and 3) the current era of technology and how exponential 
technological advancements have thrust forward the relevance of non-state actors and 
their roles in NIACs. 
 
The analysis will now turn to jus in bello and how the principles of IHL apply to drone 
warfare.  
 
3.4 Jus in bello: principles of IHL 
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The discussion will now proceed to examine the principles of IHL in order to identify and 
evaluate the current legal standards. The purpose of this section is to begin considering 
whether existing IHL standards are capable of regulating the use of drones as a military 
warfare tactic. After briefly outlining the different facets of IHL, the remainder of the 
chapter will discuss the protection of life under IHL, due process under IHL, the principle 
of distinction, and the principle of proportionality, relating them all back to the core theme 
of drone warfare. The case of Guantanamo is examined as a case study to demonstrate 
the relevance and importance of defining combatants in armed conflict as well as the 
implications of bypassing said categorisations. The chapter ends by analysing the issues 
of targeting arising from drones and the ability, or lack thereof, of IHL to regulate non-
human weapons.  
 
IHL essentially asks the questions: when can you attack? Who can you attack? In what 
way can you attack? And is it permissible to attack at all? The following subchapters of 
the protection of life, due process, distinction, and proportionality are the main principles 
that deal with these questions and are therefore discussed in the most detail. 
 
IHL does not seek to end war, but rather seeks to balance military necessity with 
maintaining an element of humanity. First codified in 1864 with the creation of the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field, 372  modern IHL continued to develop through numerous treaties and 
conventions, covering diverse aspects of the conduct of warring parties.373 IHL seeks to 
limit the effect of armed conflict. It does so by offering protection not only to civilians 
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and civilian infrastructure, but also to combatants who are for example wounded or 
captured.374 In order to do so, IHL is centred mainly on a number of principles that can 
adapt to the changing technologies of contemporary armed conflict.375  
 
Since the first Geneva Convention in 1864, a number of treaty-based sources have 
enriched IHL. These include, but are not limited to: the First Geneva Convention of 1949, 
which covers the protection and care for the wounded and sick of armed conflict on land; 
the Second Geneva Convention of 1949, which concerns the protection and care for the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked of armed conflict at sea; the Third Geneva Convention 
of 1949, relating to the treatment of prisoners of war; the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949, concerning the protection of civilians in time of war; Additional Protocol I of 1977, 
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts; Additional Protocol 
II of the same year, covering the protection of victims of non-international armed 
conflicts; the 1954 Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property during armed 
conflict; the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; the 1980 Convention on 
Conventional Weapons; and 1993 Convention on Chemical Weapons.376 
 
Customary International Law (CIL) is also a binding source of international law. The 
International Committee of The Red Cross has built a database that contains 161 rules 
customary IHL. 377  The database covers areas such as targeting, protected persons, 
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methods of warfare, weapons, treatment of civilians and persons Hors De Combat (out of 
action due to injury), and rules pertaining to the implantation of IHL.378  
 
According to the ICRC, the principles of IHL can be broadly categorised into 15 rules 
directed towards combatants.379 These are: 1) do not target civilians, civilian property, or 
civilian public buildings; 2) do not launch any attack if the civilian collateral damage is 
expected to be greater than the military advantage; 3) take the necessary precautions to 
protect civilians before and during attacks; 4) do not use prohibited weapons and do not 
engage in unlawful methods of war; 5) collect and car for the wounded and dead, whether 
friend or enemy; 6) respect the rights of prisoners and all other people under your control, 
and treat them humanely; do not commit summary executions; 7) do not take hostages, 
or use human shields; 8) do not displace civilians, unless necessary for their safety or for 
imperative military reasons; 9) respect civilian property; do not loot or steal; 10) respect 
women; do not commit or permit rape or sexual abuse against anyone; 11) protect 
children; do not recruit them into our armed forced and do not use them in hostilities; 12) 
respect medical personnel, hospitals, and ambulances; do not misuse protective symbols 
such as the Red Cross or Red Crescent; 13) allow impartial humanitarian relief for 
civilians in need; 14) put these rules into practice; respect them even if the enemy does 
not. Abstain from reprisals which are in violation of the law or armed conflict; 15) prevent 
violations of these rules; if violations occur, report it to your commander. Violations must 
be investigated and sanctions in accordance with international standards. 
 
Illustrated by the above, IHL covers a wide range of rules relating to conflict. It regulates 
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both actions and omissions. It also awards specific protection to groups such as 
humanitarian workers, medical staff, women, and children. That said, IHL allows for 
targeting of combatants if the targeting was not conducted with illegal means, such as 
with banned weapons or through perfidy. According to IHL, not all civilian casualties 
amount to breaches. IHL allows for collateral damage according to military necessity, 
also known as the principle of proportionality, discussed in detail in Subchapter 3.4.5.380 
IHL does not require the eradication of all civilian casualties. Instead, it requires the 
combatants to exercise due consideration of IHL.381 However, exercising judgement is an 
inherently human attribute. Issues such as distinguishing between civilians and 
combatants, assessing the military necessity, applying exceptions to vital humanitarian 
norms, are all difficult questions that have severe consequences attached to them.  
3.4.1 The protection of life under IHL 
The protection of life under IHL is governed by the principle of distinction, which means 
that direct attacks are only permitted against members of the armed forces that are part of 
a conflict; it is not permitted to target civilians.382 Dorman makes the point that, “in 
combat situations, the entire body of international humanitarian law can be reduced to the 
obligation to observe the principle of distinction.”383 This has been a contested topic by 
the United States, which argues that distinction gives an unfair advantage to terrorists, as 
IHL demands that combatants distinguish themselves from civilians and refrain from 
deliberately or indiscriminately targeting them. The principle of distinction was first 
outlined in the St Petersburg Declaration 1868, which mandated that weakening the 
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enemy’s military forces was the only legitimate object that states should endeavour to 
accomplish during war. 384  The principle was not specifically mentioned in the 
Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
in 1907. However, it was alluded to in Article 25, which prohibits attacks on civilian 
centres such as towns, villages, dwellings, and undefended buildings. 385  It is also 
contained in the Geneva Conventions 1949 relating to the victims of international armed 
conflicts, as well as being codified in Articles 48, 51(2), and 52(2) of Additional Protocol 
I.386 This is because groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad 
al-Rafidayn (also known as Al Qaeda in Iraq) either blend in with local populations or 
use them as potential shields. Consequently, counter terrorism operations are almost 
certain to breach the principle of distinction, as it is often difficult to make a clear 
judgment in identifying a terrorist as opposed to a civilian.   
 
IHL consists of a series of treaties, conventions, and customs that deal with humanitarian 
problems that stem from armed conflicts. It is primarily concerned with protecting life 
and property by placing limits on the way conflicts can be carried out.  IHL is only 
applicable to armed conflict and does not cover internal tensions or disturbances such as 
isolated acts of violence. “The law applies only once a conflict has begun, and then 
equally to all sides regardless of who started the fighting.”387 IHL is primarily contained 
within the Geneva Conventions, improving the protections offered to civilians in conflict. 
The Protocols also extended protection to other groups such as medical personnel, 
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detainees, and internees. Collectively, they form the core of IHL, especially as they codify 
the rules of warfare.388 However, its genesis goes further back to ancient texts such as the 
Art of War by Sun Tzu, which outlined the obligation to care for the wounded and 
prisoners as well as the Codes of Chivalry which were developed from medieval codes 
of conduct regulating moral codes of conduct and the laws of war,389 to the First Hague 
Peace Conference of 1899, which revised the declaration concerning the laws and 
customs of war decided by the Conference of Brussels in 1874.390 This was superseded 
by the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.  
 
A difference between the Hague and Geneva Conventions relates to the concept of 
reciprocity. The Hague Conventions makes limited provision for reciprocity. It was 
contained within the Martens Clause (also known as the si omnes clause) named after 
Fyodor de Martens, the Russian delegate at the Convention in 1907. It maintained that 
the provisions of the Convention would only apply exclusively to signatory states. 
However, the Geneva Conventions apply without considerations of 
reciprocity.391Additional protections are contained within the 1954 Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict392 and the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention; 393  the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and its five 
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protocols; the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention; the 1997 Ottawa Convention on 
Anti-Personnel Mines and the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the rights of 
the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.394  
 
The protection of life has also been stretched to include circumstances where there is an 
intention to take life, even if no life has actually been taken. This was established in the 
case of Makaratzis v Greece, which involved the Greek police shooting someone for 
failing to stop.395 The argument made before the court was that the police had used 
excessive force in trying to apprehend him, thereby placing his life in danger. He 
furthermore alleged that there had been an inadequate investigation conducted by the 
authorities. In reaching a decision, the Court considered a number of relevant factors such 
as the prevailing terrorist threat at the time in Greece posed by groups such as ‘17N’ or 
‘17 November’ and the accompanying heightened sense of anxiety among law 
enforcement officials396 in light of the recent assassination of American officials near the 
US embassy.  
 
The Court went on to acknowledge that the police would have been justified in using 
firearms to neutralize the threat being posed by the driver.397 The fact that the driver 
subsequently turned out to be unarmed did not invalidate the perception of threat and the 
reasonable suspicion that led to the use of force. However, the actual response was still 
considered to be chaotic and lacking in control and professionalism, inasmuch as the 
police responded with a hail of fire from a variety of firearms including revolvers, pistols, 
and submachine guns.398 This unprofessionalism raised serious questions regarding the 
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conduct and organisation of the police’s operation and response. The Court duly ruled 
that the officers of the state had violated the requirement to protect life from the use of 
lethal force irrespective of whether life had actually been taken. The actions of the police 
in repeatedly shooting at the suspect in circumstances where he posed no threat to theirs 
or anyone else’s lives therefore contravened Article 2.399  
 
Other relevant cases have included Andreou v Turkey in which Turkish armed forces 
indiscriminately fired into a crowd of demonstrators, injuring but not killing the 
complainant. This represented another example of the excessive use of force which 
threatened life, even though none was actually taken. Another example is the case of 
Soare and Others v Romania in which the 19-year-old claimant was shot in the head by 
the police and yet survived although in a paralysed condition. The ECHR ruled 
unanimously that the actions of the police constituted a breach of the Article 2 protection 
of the right to life.   
 
3.4.2 Due process under IHL  
A prime factor involved in due process under IHL is the determination that the beginning 
or existence of an armed conflict will in turn trigger the applicability of IHL. In this 
respect the ICRC states the following: 
 
“International humanitarian law distinguishes two types of armed 
conflicts, namely: international armed conflicts, opposing two or 
more States, and non-international armed conflicts, between 
governmental forces and nongovernmental armed groups, or 




distinction between non-international armed conflicts in the 
meaning of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and non-international armed conflicts falling within the definition 
provided in Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II”.400  
 
IHL is particularly robust in the protections it provides in relation to due process. It 
contains obligations that apply to individuals hors de combat and allows no 
exceptions to these duties.401 The way that a state wishes to define a specific person 
or group makes no difference to its applicability. The obligations hold once there are 
two or more parties in armed conflict irrespective of one party choosing to define the 
other as a terrorist, criminal, or unlawful combatant. Even more relevant is the fact 
that IHL prohibits the very acts that are often described as terrorism, such as 
threatening to or indeed carrying out attacks on civilians. It also does not prevent 
governments from adopting measures to combat such unlawful acts within the 
confines of due process. Furthermore, IHL is based on non-reciprocity, which 
prohibits reprisals in kind. The breach of obligations by one side does not empower 
the other to respond in the same manner. In this respect the ICRC quotes rule 140 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regarding the principle of reciprocity 
by stating: 
 
 “The Geneva Conventions emphasise in common Article 1 that 
the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure 
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respect for the Conventions ‘in all circumstances’. The rules in 
common Article 3 must also be observed ‘in all 
circumstances’. General recognition that respect for treaties of a 
humanitarian nature cannot be dependent on respect by other 
States parties is found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.”402 
   
Due process with regards to the right to a fair trial under IHL is guaranteed under the 
Geneva Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights. 
These collectively outline what a suspect is entitled to. 
 
The United States has continuously securitised the threat posed by transnational terrorism 
as an existential threat requiring extraordinary measures that would not ordinarily be 
countenanced.403 Paradoxically, it has been argued that the IHL principle of distinction 
has been partially responsible for the proliferation of extra-judicial killings by drone 
attacks. This principle requires combatants to be distinct from civilians, which usually 
comes in the form a uniform of some description that identifies them as a combatant.404 
However, the rise of asymmetric warfare as a means of countering great military powers 
such as the United States has led to terror groups both not distinguishing themselves from 
civilian as well as using civilians as shields. While IHL has recognised the practice of 
shielding as unlawful, it has still been clear that this does not justify reciprocal attacks on 
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such targets. Lewis and Crawford make the argument that while it has been suggested 
that the use of drones has been driven by the need to protect aircrew, in reality such risks 
are minimal. Instead, drones have been justified precisely because of issues such as 
shielding and distinction in that smart targeting can theoretically eliminate targets while 
protecting civilians.405  
 
3.4.2.1 Establishing jurisdiction for drone strikes  
Establishing jurisdiction for drone strikes would entail whether a state is exercising 
control over an area when it decides to use drones or UAVs as an offensive weapon for 
the purpose of violating the right to life. Even in instances when a state uses drones 
extraterritorially at the invitation of, or with the permission of, the host state, there is still 
the prohibition under IHL to not use force that is unnecessary, disproportionate, 
unreasonably collateral, or which targets non-combatants.406 While the ECHR in the 
Bankovic ruling rejected the claim that an aerial bombardment constituted effective 
control, this applied to the use of conventional manned fighters and bombers. However it 
has been suggested that control should indeed be applied to UAVs, especially as they are 
slower than conventional aircraft and can spend extended periods of time over an area 
before a decision is made to strike a ground target. This has been described by 
“jurisdiction in waiting.”407 Targeted killings by drones can therefore be permissible 
under IHL, especially as under IHRL the right to life does not apply once it is conducted 
during a legal act of war. The one proviso however is that the targeted combatant must 
be operating under a “continuous combat function.”408  
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Consequently, complying with IHL involves the careful planning of attacks to ensure that 
collateral damage is reduced as much as is feasible. In particular, the Additional Protocol 
I or API jus in bello proportionality standard of IHL409 entails a responsibility to cancel 
or suspend an attack if there is the likelihood that a target is not of a military nature, or 
that the collateral damage is likely to be excessive or lacking in proportionality. Failure 
to adhere to this stricture regarding proportionality can be a source of criminal liability if 
an attack is planned and exercised in the knowledge that it will cause significant collateral 
damage.  
 
3.4.3 Distinction  
The principle of distinction, the principle that belligerents must take steps to distinguish 
between combatants and civilians, is one of the foremost principles of law relevant to this 
thesis. As discussed above, the principle of distinction, alongside the principle of 
proportionality, governs the protection of life in IHL. The very first rule of the ICRC IHL 
CIL database reads: “Rule 1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish 
between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. 
Attacks must not be directed against civilians.” “Civilians” according to rule 5 of the 
ICRC study “are persons who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian 
population comprises all persons who are civilians.” Therefore in order to understand 
who is a civilian, we must understand who qualifies to be a combatant. Combatants are 
defined as “All members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are combatants, 
except medical and religious personnel”. However, not all states adopt the 
abovementioned definition of a “combatant.”410 For example, the US government uses 
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very broad definitions of “combatant” or “militant” in a bid to reduce the civilian death 
toll.411 US policy in Yemen and Pakistan defied normative LOAC guidelines; males of 
fighting age were assumed by default to be combatants unless evidence was provided to 
the contrary.412 This directly goes against the core values of the LOAC, in particular the 
immunity of civilians to acts of deliberate killing.413 The purpose of the principle of 
distinction is to ensure that from a legal perspective only those who are classified as being 
a combatant can lawfully participate in conflicts or be treated as primary targets.414 
Therefore, the definition of a combatant holds significant implications from the 
perspective of IHL in determining the rights and obligations owed by participants in 
conflicts.  
 
In light of the significance of the formal recognition of combatants, a core concern that 
arises is whether a terrorist should be viewed as being a combatant or a civilian.  If 
terrorists are capable of being viewed as combatants, then the status of terrorists in armed 
conflicts are elevated to that of state armies involved in armed conflicts.415 This would 
mean that terrorists could lawfully become legitimate military targets under IHL.416 
However, if terrorists can only be viewed as being civilians, then they cannot lawfully be 
targeted under IHL and as a result IHL would not necessarily regulate the use of many 
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drone attacks. 417  Consequently, the distinction between combatants and civilians is 
fundamental to the question as to whether IHL law can regulate the use of drones.  
 
This is especially the case given the rise in the use of drone technology to target non-state 
actors who are commonly classified as being terrorists.418 If terrorists may be classified 
as civilians, then IHL law would suggest that any direct targeting of civilians would be 
unlawful. However, if terrorists can come within the definition of a combatant then they 
can be lawfully targeted as part of a legitimate military objective. Diverging from 
international norms, the Bush administration coined the term “non-lawful combatant” 
through a series of memos in 2002 by the Office of Legal Counsel. The term describes 
failed-state and non-state actors, who therefore are not protected by Geneva Conventions 
ore even US federal War Crimes Act, as they are technically not lawful enemy 
combatants.419  
  
In order to explore who can become a combatant, it is necessary to examine the 
philosophical foundations of the principle of distinction as the basis to understand the 
current construction of the principle in IHL.420  Nabulsi argues that the principle of 
distinction is one of the most fundamental principles in IHL, as it underpins the very 
rationale of having a set of legal principles to regulate the conduct of participants in on-
going hostilities.421 This is due to the fact that the principle of distinction is about ensuring 
that civilians should be immune from any targeting in conflicts. One of the earliest 
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constructions of this belief was in the Preamble of the ‘Declaration of St. Petersburg 
1868’ which expresses that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”422    
 
In the early writings on international law, it was often argued that civilians could never 
be considered legitimate targets unless they participated in the conflict. For example, 
Grotius contended that “by the law of war armed men and those who offer resistance are 
killed...it is right that in war those who have taken up arms should pay the penalty, but 
that the guiltless should not be injured.”423 Additionally, in one of the first attempts to 
codify the principle of distinction, the Lieber Code 1863 affirmed that: 
 
“As civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has 
likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the 
distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile 
country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The 
principle has been more and more acknowledged that the 
unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as 
much as the exigencies of war will admit.”424 
 
It is evident from the historical development of the principle of distinction that the law 
has long sought to differentiate between those directly involved in hostilities and 
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civilians. The most recent expression of this principle in IHL law is found in Additional 
Protocol I, Article 48, which states that: 
 
“In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at 
all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives 
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives."425 
 
This definition is now considered part of CIL even though a number of states have yet to 
ratify the Additional Protocols. 426  This definition creates at least two important 
obligations for participants in hostilities relevant to considering who can be a 
combatant.427 First, those involved in hostilities must distinguish between civilians and 
combatants so that only combatants are directly targeted. This creates a further obligation 
on participants to clearly distinguish combatants from civilians where combatants are 
expected to be clearly visible to participants in hostilities.428 This visibility is commonly 
achieved by the wearing of common military uniforms or insignia that can identify 
individuals as being a combatant. Second, states must also mark military installations so 
they can become distinguishable from civilian properties.429 This effectively means that 
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military installations should be removed from civilians insofar as it can be considered 
feasible to do so, which has been confirmed in various cases before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).430 
 
The requirements of the principle of distinction, which necessitate a separation of 
combatants and civilians, may be considered as clearly applicable to states involved in 
hostilities.431 The complication is the rise of non-state actors where non-state armed 
groups or individuals become involved in hostilities.432  Although it may be argued that 
the exclusion of non-state actors from the distinction principle would only serve to defeat 
the purpose of IHL and its role in regulating the conduct between participants in 
hostilities, it is undeniable that the construction of IHL is very state-centric.433 The current 
construction of IHL only envisages the control of hostilities where the main actors in 
those hostilities are states, or more accurately, state armies. Cases where there may only 
be one state involved and one or more non-state actors in hostilities effectively blur the 
line between civilians and combatants, as it is difficult to pinpoint the precise point at 
which a civilian, as a non-state actor, becomes a combatant.   
 
The state-centric view of IHL is further compounded by the Commentary to Protocol I, 
which expressly confirms that a state has a primary obligation to its own population.  It 
is difficult to find a legal basis to hold non-state actors responsible to its own population 
to ensure that they distinguish themselves from civilians. This exposes a significant 
weakness in IHL where there is effectively a gap in the construction of IHL so as to be 
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able to distinguish effectively between civilian and combatants.  This is due to the fact 
that the failure on the part of IHL to either include or exclude terrorists as being 
combatants may be giving terrorists an advantage where they are not obliged to 
differentiate between combatant and civilians, whilst state actors involved in hostilities 
will be required to do so. 
 
This gap evident in the construction of IHL has led some, such as Quenivet, to argue that 
IHL may have informally moved to three categories of participants in hostilities.434 The 
combatant and civilian distinction remains but a further category of “unlawful combatant” 
arises as a direct result of non-state actors being involved in hostilities.435 “Unlawful 
combatants” do not easily fall within the traditional definition of combatants given that 
IHL draws a distinction only between combatants and civilians.436 The necessity for a 
further category of combatants was exposed by the existence of US detention centre based 
in Guantanamo Bay, as illustrated further shortly in Subchapter 3.4.4.  
 
A proportion of those detained in Guantanamo Bay were neither classifiable as civilians 
not participating within hostilities, nor as combatants being fully engaged in hostilities.437 
The difficulty with distinction is also argued by Watkin who describes a lack of consensus 
that “people” fall solely into one of the two groups: “lawful combatants”, and 
“civilians”.438 Therefore, it is not accurate to suggest that there are only two categories of 
those involved in hostilities. It is further argued by Newton that a third category of person 
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has always existed but just has never been expressly included in IHL given that the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) remained wedded to the notion of the 
civilian/combatant distinction.439  This is despite the ICRC Commentary to the Geneva 
Conventions expressing that:  
 
“…every person in enemy hands must have some status under international 
law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third 
Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, [or] a member 
of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First 
Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can 
fall outside the law”.440 
 
The recognition of a third category is further supported by some countries, such as the 
United States (US), who recognises that there are people who falls outside the strict remit 
of the civilian/combatant divide who cannot be classified as being either a combatant or 
a civilian.441 However, Quenivet contends that a more accurate understanding of IHL is 
to accept that the distinction between combatants and civilians remains as is currently 
constructed in IHL.442 However, there are now evident sub-categories within these two 
main categories of participants in hostilities. This approach is also supported in the 
“Direct Participants in Hostilities” Guidelines (DPH), which suggests that civilians who 
get involved in hostilities become participants and can be labelled as “civilians losing 
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their protection”.443 However, it is important to acknowledge even if IHL has evolved to 
a state of two categories with sub-categories, there remains much debate around the level 
of rights retained or lost by said sub-categories.444 
 
This discussion highlights the gap in IHL around the definition of a combatant. This is 
particularly evident when considering whether terrorists can accurately be defined as a 
combatant or a civilian.445  Nevertheless, it does not seem to be appropriate to label 
terrorists as combatants given that IHL does not expressly support this contention.446 It is 
equally inappropriate to refuse to recognise the potential that a third category exists which 
blurs the line between civilian and combatant. Consequently, it seems suitable to accept 
Quenivet’s argument that sub-categories in each of the two main categories exist. It would 
seem that terrorists could fall within a sub-category of civilian when those terrorists are 
non-state actors. However, the more formalised those non-state actors in hostilities are, 
the greater the likelihood that they become directly comparable with armies and may 
therefore be realistically considered as being a subcategory in the combatant category.447  
 
This approach to defining the scope of the principle of distinction may also be supported 
by reference to IHL that regulates cyberspace. Although the discussion in this thesis does 
not concern the hostilities conducted in cyberspace, there has been some recent 
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developments in this area of IHL that may indeed serve a useful comparator.448 According 
to the Tallinn Manual, an individual who does not belong to an armed organised group 
cannot be considered a combatant even if they comply with combatant criteria. 449 
However, Rule 26 of the Tallinn Manual provides that armed forces who “…fail to 
comply with the requirements of combatant status lose their...combatant immunity.”450 
This may be considered as consistent with IHL discussed above, as the current 
construction of IHL only recognised combatants and civilians.   
 
This discussion exposes a significant issue in IHL that will need to be addressed if IHL 
can be considered as capable of regulating hostilities. If drone warfare tactics are to be 
utilised on an increasing scale in the future, there will need to be a clearly defined legal 
framework that establishes the legality of the use of this type of military tactic.  This is 
especially relevant as the future proliferation of drone use threatens to transform the 
nature of war from an exceptional situation in which conflict takes place within a limited 
space and duration to an on-going, low intensity engagement that transcends territorial 
boundaries. At present, IHL offers fewer protections to life than IHRL, which will be 
discussed in great detail in Chapter 4, precisely because war is perceived as a limited 
exception to the norm of peace. Technological advancements in the areas of cyber-
warfare, robotics, artificial intelligence, and UAVs however are the future of armed 
conflict. These developments pose the prospect of conflict becoming the norm in the form 
of protracted low intensity affairs. The need for a clearly defined framework is also 
relevant as to date drones have seldom been used in inter-state conflicts but rather in 
NIACs. That being said, it can be argued that there are not nearly as many inter-state 
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conflicts as there are NIACs. Yet, in the few inter-state conflicts, such as between Russia 
and Ukraine, drones have been used.451 
 
One suggestion for clarity relates to instances when a state uses UAVs against non-state 
actors operating in a number of different states. Heyns et al. suggest that under IHL these 
could be considered as a single, global, NIAC. In such a scenario IHL rules would apply 
to all drone strikes carried out irrespective of where they were. This would require 
aggregating the entire spectrum of violence employed when establishing the intensity 
threshold for NIACs.452 However such an approach would only apply within the IHL 
context of how force can be used, but not whether or when it should be used, which legally 
falls outside the scope of IHL. The issue of distinction will also be examined in greater 
detail at the end of this chapter. 
 
3.4.4 Defining combatants in IHL: Guantánamo as a case study 
The case of Guantanamo embodies the primary themes about IHL covered in this thesis, 
combining the issues of the protection of life as well as due process and the distinguishing 
of combatants and civilians. Guantanamo is a striking illustration of what can unfold 
when protections conferred by IHL are not implemented, further highlighting the 
shortcomings of current IHL with particular regards to categorising different types of 
combatants. 
It is indisputable that US and British military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan constitute 
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armed conflict in accordance with IHL. 453  Therefore, anyone captured, arrested, or 
detained in these conflicts fall under the protections of IHL. They fall into two categories: 
captured combatants who are protected by the Third Geneva Convention, or civilians who 
are protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention. The issue with regard to their detention 
in Guantanamo is that the US argues that they occupy neither status as combatant nor 
civilian, but rather are “unlawful combatants”.454 They are therefore “subject only to the 
protections afforded by IHL because of its lex specialis status, and not IHRL.”455 In 
addition, the fact that they are not being held in the United States but in foreign countries 
means that they are not covered by the laws or constitutional human rights protections of 
the United States.456 This has been challenged as contrary to IHL, as a country cannot 
arbitrarily create a category that prevents an individual from being considered as neither 
a combatant who has become a prisoner of war nor a civilian.  
 
The US position raises the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction over sites such as 
Guantanamo and other black sites around the globe. IHL dictates that terror suspects are 
afforded protection, either as enemy combatants who have become prisoners of war, or 
as civilians. As Tuck and de Saint Maurice state:  
 
“The designation of a group as a ‘terrorist organisation’ or its 
conduct as ‘terrorist acts’ has absolutely no bearing upon the 
applicability and application of international humanitarian law. 
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The law applies in each and every case in which – as a matter of 
fact two or more organised parties are in armed conflict against 
one another, regardless of whether they are labelled terrorists or 
criminals.”457  
 
The correct procedure for people apprehended for these offences would have been 
prosecution and imprisonment if found guilty. Arguably, the main reason this has not 
been done rests on the general illegality of the means by which they have come into 
captivity or treatment once in captivity. This refers to processes such as extraordinary 
rendition in which people have been illegally kidnapped in countries across the globe and 
secretly transported to black sites and interrogated, often with the use of “enhanced 
interrogation techniques”, often a euphemism for torture.458 They have been denied the 
fundamental principles of due process such as the right to legal representation, 
impartiality, the presumption of innocence, habeas corpus and the right to be brought to 
trial in timely manner.459  
 
This all means that any subsequent trial would be dismissed on the grounds that the 
defendant’s rights have been flagrantly abused. It is instructive that in the recent case of 
Belhaj and Anor v DPP, the UK’s Supreme Court ruled that with respect to rendition, the 
doctrine of state immunity does not prohibit claims being made against the government 
arising from further detention.460 This is one of a number of similar rendition-based 
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rulings handed down by domestic courts and the ECHR.461 Therefore, the US has had to 
construct alternative legal justifications for their actions. These examples demonstrate a 
pattern of illegality and disregard for international law on the part of the US and its allies 
with specific reference to the UK in the way they have prosecuted the war on terror.  
 
The case of Guantanamo is controversial, as the US has effectively attempted to place the 
detainees beyond the law. The US has categorised these detainees as existing in a legal 
limbo as they are perceived to be neither combatants nor civilians. However, as Sassoli 
avers, no one can be considered outside the classifications and protections of a combatant 
who has become a prisoner of war under the Third Geneva Convention or a civilian under 
the Fourth Geneva Convention. 462  He asserts that the captured Taliban should be 
considered as prisoners of war, and as for al-Qaeda members captured in Afghanistan, 
“…it may be justified to deny them prisoner of war status, on a number of legal grounds. 
However, as protected civilians, they may not be deported to Guantánamo, but may be 
detained in Afghanistan for the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences 
(including for having directly participated in hostilities).”463 
Pearlman also categorically argues that US activity in Guantánamo Bay violate its 
obligations under the Third Geneva Convention as well as the International Covenant 
for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 
addition to customary international law (CIL).464 These violations “…include illegal 
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and indefinite detention, torture, inhumane conditions, unfair trials (military 
commissions), and many more. These are human rights violations.” 465  The 
extraterritorial legality of the use by the United States of its detention facility in 
Guantanamo is therefore an important test case regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
De Londras makes the point that the prosecution of the war on terror has been 
characterised by attempts to deny suspects access to the right of habeas corpus in a US 
federal court.466  
 
This is especially relevant as some prisoners have died while in custody, and their 
prolonged detention without due process can be construed as a violation of their right to 
life.467 There have also been allegations that deaths reported as suicides were actually 
homicides, though a lack of transparency and accountability has made these allegations 
difficult to prove. Examples include the deaths of Mohammed al-Hanashi in 2007 and 
Abdul Rahman Al Amri in 2009, in which data released by the National Criminal 
Investigative Service under the Freedom of Information Act (despite heavily redacted 
sections) supported investigative evidence suggesting that these two detainees did not 
commit suicide.468 Another prime example concerns deaths of Yassar Talal Al Zahrani, 
Mani Shaman Turki Al Habardi Al Tabi, and Ali Abdullah Ahmed, who all allegedly 
hanged themselves on the night of 9 June 2006.469 The official accounts of this mass 
suicide failed to explain some basic questions as to how the three suspects managed to 
bind their own hands and feet together, shoved rags down their own throats, managed to 
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hang the noose themselves at an inaccessible height, or hid their deaths from guards for 
two hours. 470  These are some examples of a general process of obfuscation in 
investigating this event.471  
 
The decision to label non-US terror detainees as enemy combatants and deny them 
constitutional protections in Guantanamo and other black sites around the world was 
based on the decision of the Supreme Court in both 1883 and 1891, namely that the 
constitution had no extraterritorial applicability in another country “as an axiom of 
international jurisprudence.”472 Another key ruling was made in the case of Ahrens v 
Clark in which the Supreme Court ruled that a federal district court could only issue a 
writ of habeas corpus for a person who was detained within court’s territorial 
jurisdiction.473 This also correspondingly meant that detainees could only file petitions 
with courts in the districts where they were being detained. This ruling therefore failed to 
the address the situation of those being detained abroad and outside US federal 
jurisdiction. A similar ruling was made in the case of Johnson v Eisentrager to the effect 
that German war criminals being detained in Germany were not in the jurisdiction of US 
courts, as they had at no time been physically present on US sovereign territory.474 
 
In the case of Boumediene v Bush, the US Supreme Court ruled against the use of 
Guantanamo as a rights-free detention zone.475 While the lease of 1903 allows the United 
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States complete jurisdiction over the area, sovereignty ultimately remains with Cuba. The 
Supreme Court ruled by a 5-4 majority that the Military Commissions Act 2006 allowing 
for the right of habeas corpus of detainees to be suspended was unconstitutional and that 
detainees were entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. The response of Congress was the 
passage of the Military Commissions Act 2009 provided key rights to non-citizens of the 
United States charged or suspected of planning or committing acts of terrorism against 
the country.476 These protections included the non-admissibility of statements obtained 
by torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, protection against self-incrimination, 
protections against double jeopardy, and the rights to counsel, present evidence, or appeal 
decisions. However, these developments still did not address the issues regarding the 
legality of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Guantanamo under international law.477  
 
The United States government has always claimed that the detainees at Guantanamo are 
only entitled to the protections provided under IHL as a result of its lex specialis status 
(or law governing a specific subject matter which overrides laws pertaining to general 
matters), but not under the protection of IHL.478 In this case, the specific matter at hand 
is the viewing of Guantanamo detainees as enemy combatants who were engaged in 
armed conflict. As stated earlier, they were not even covered by human rights protections 
afforded under American law by virtue of their being detained in Cuba rather than the 
United States. This interpretation of international law presupposes that IHL and IHRL are 
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mutually exclusive, although this view has been contested. For example, some see a form 
of complementarity in that they aim to perform the same function, but in different ways.479  
 
Some also see a mixed framework where human rights law is used “as a robust gap-filler 
by tending to construe the absence of individual rights under IHL as a legal lacuna, and 
not a ‘negative arrangement’”.480 The United Nations as well as the Inter American 
Commission in Human Rights (IACHR) have both concurred that Guantanamo is 
controlled not by Cuba, but by the United States.481 This obviates the following argument 
made by the US authorities regarding obligations over sovereign US territory. 
 
The US government has tried to make a distinction between sovereignty and jurisdiction, 
arguing that the original leasing agreement with Cuba allows for it to retain sovereignty 
over the area.482 As a result, detainees are not entitled to the same protections available 
to those on sovereign US territory. This interpretation is based on the traditional 
Westphalian approach to the sovereignty of the nation state whereby one state cannot 
breach the jurisdiction of another state within its own territorial limits.483 In making this 
argument, the US government fell back on the case of Johnson v Eisentrager where the 
Court ruled that German prisoners of war held in detention in Germany at the end of the 
Second World War were not entitled to contest their detention on the grounds of a breach 
of habeas corpus. This was based on the reasoning that American courts had no 
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jurisdiction in Germany, as well as the fact that the German prisoners were never on 
sovereign US territory.  
 
Of particular relevance here is the Lotus case, 484  which involved a collision in 
international waters between the Lotus and a Turkish ship, Boz-Court, in which eight 
Turkish sailors drowned. The Turkish authorities subsequently prosecuted the French 
officer on watch of the Lotus with manslaughter. France objected that Turkey did not 
have jurisdiction over a French citizen for an event that occurred in international waters. 
The case was referred to the International Court of Justice, which ruled that Turkey had 
not violated international law by its actions. This ruling meant that France did not exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction over what occurred in its ships on the high seas. Therefore, an 
offence committed on a French ship that had an impact on a vessel of another state, in 
this case Turkey, meant that there was nothing in international law prohibiting the Turkish 
authorities from responding as if the offence had been conducted on its vessel as well. 
This was referred to as subjective territorial jurisdiction and would go on to have a 
significant impact on customary international law.485  Further case law corroboration 
came from the case of United States v Spelar486 in which the Court ruled: “A US airbase 
in Newfoundland which had been acquired from Great Britain in 1941 was a foreign 
country within the provisions of the Federal Torts Act excluding recovery thereunder for 
claims arising in a foreign country”.487 It should be noted however that in instances such 
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as this, Status of Force Agreements with states hosting US military forces will also govern 
the status and jurisdiction of military personnel.488   
 
This view of extraterritorial jurisdiction was always a problematic basis for denying 
jurisdictional responsibility, especially as the existence of embassies, considered the 
sovereign territory of the foreign rather than the host state, has always been a repudiation 
of this strict interpretation of sovereignty. Proponents of international law in particular 
have always contested this interpretation.489 Both the ICCPR and the UN Human Rights 
Committee have reiterated the same point, namely that a country cannot commit acts 
deemed unlawful in its own territory, in the territory of another state.490 This has been 
confirmed in a number of domestic rulings such as in Gherebi v Bush and US v Shiroma. 
As Winchester argues, the conclusions under IHL, IHRL, and US case law is:  
 
“The United States has de jure sovereignty over Guantánamo 
Bay; de jure meaning that sovereignty has been relinquished from 
one group and given to another. Therefore, the United States is 
fully sovereign in the de facto sense; de facto is the term used to 
describe a government that is actually in control of a territory 
although it may not be legally recognized.”491 
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Approximately nine people have died at Guantanamo since its inception.492 Some have 
died under suspicious circumstances. Many of these detainees, alongside others in similar 
sites around the world, have been subject to torture, abuse, cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
acts and behaviour.493 The pictures released from Abu Ghraib demonstrated the true 
extent of the atrocities committed by US personnel.494 Such acts are contrary to IHL as 
well as IHRL. Guantanamo therefore represents what Reprieve terms a declaration of “no 
human rights; as it has effectively created a category of human beings for whom universal 
human rights, which are deemed to be outmoded, do not apply.”495 This is an abrogation 
of its commitments under international law, especially with reference to Art. 3 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees the right to life, liberty, and 
the security of the person. However, the consensus based on both international law and 
case law is that extraterritorial jurisdiction does apply to the human rights violations that 
have been taking place in Guantanamo as well as other countries where the US is 
conducting similar activities. 
 
3.4.5 Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality is another core principle designed to uphold the 
preservation of life under IHL. Rule 14 of the ICRC IHL CIL database reads: “Launching 
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
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excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is 
prohibited.”496 
 
Not all civilian casualties amount to breaches of IHL.497 In fact, they do not have to be 
casualties resulting of an error or mistake; a party to the conflict can be sure that there 
will be collateral damage in civilian lives, and still proceed with the attack legally. 
Instead, the legality is dependent on the object of the attack and its justification.498 Article 
8(2)(b)(vi) states that that proportionality is measured “in relation to the concrete and 
direct overall military advantage anticipated.” 499  Given the fluidity of this concept, 
proportionality is measured on a case-by-case basis. The level of human judgment 
involved is significant, as what may be a military advantage for one commanding officer, 
may not be for the other. Equally, what may be seen as excessive collateral damage by 
one may not be by the other.500 This brings an element of uncertainty to drone warfare, 
where fully autonomous systems would be following a standard of law designed for 
human recognition and interpretation. The more autonomy granted to technology in 
armed conflict, particularly with regards to decision-making, the more significant this 
matter will become. The issue is then compounded manifold with the advent of artificial 
intelligence, however the technology and capabilities of artificial intelligence is outside 
the scope of this research. It will nevertheless be an extremely pertinent area of research 
in the near future, particularly in relation to armed conflict. 
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The subjectivity of applying the principle of proportionality poses further questions such 
as: who is responsible when a violation of IHL is committed by an autonomous weapon? 
What if this violation was committed without the intent or recklessness of a human being? 
Intentionality or recklessness is required for a war crimes prosecution, 501  and so a 
potential loophole is created. Some have argued for command responsibility to apply to 
autonomous weaponry.502  Command responsibility, or superior responsibility, places 
responsibility of an act on a superior if they, with sufficient exercisable control, have 
knowledge of the subordinate’s act or intended act, and fail to take necessary and 
reasonable measure to prevent or punish them.503 However, command responsibility is 
based on the premise of intention, namely the failure to detect or report said intention. It 
is therefore difficult to apply to autonomous systems. Punishing superior officers for the 
crimes of autonomous weapons may be more akin to punishing negligence as opposed to 
recklessness or intention. War crimes would then need to be expanded to include 
negligence, which may risk over-criminalisation. At the same time, not holding anyone 
accountable can be viewed as accepting injustice.  
 
The premise of responsibility may be taken further to the extent that fingers are pointed 
at weapons manufacturers. Examples can be taken from WW2 cases such as United States 
v Carl Krauch, et al., also known as The IG Farben trial.504 The directors of IG Farben, a 
German conglomerate of chemical firms, were found guilty of committing war crimes 
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amongst other counts for their role in manufacturing Zyklon B, a poison gas used in the 
Nazi extermination camps. 505  Such cases may be used as precedents for placing 
responsibility on drone manufacturers. However, a distinction could be made noting that 
Zyklon B was produced solely for the illegal intent of contributing to genocide. Drones 
and UAVs on the other hand are not inherently illegal and are more akin to the 
manufacturing of guns as opposed to chemical poisons.506 A more relevant comparison 
may be the use of Caterpillar Bulldozers utilised frequently by the Israeli army to bulldoze 
Palestinian houses, ultimately leading to the death of American citizen Rachel Corrie in 
2003.507 Caterpillar Inc. was indeed taken to court however the case was dismissed and 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit, 
ruling that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case because Caterpillar's 
bulldozers were ultimately paid for by the United States Government. It found that it did 
not have jurisdiction to decide the case because it would intrude upon the United States 
political branches' foreign policy decisions.508 The question then remains as to how the 
issue of responsibility will be dealt in light of UAVs’ increasingly autonomous nature. 
 
3.4.6 The issue of targeting arising from drones 
Targeted killing can only be implemented against those combatants who are in a 
recognised armed conflict and there is “extremely clear evidence” that they are directly 
participating in hostility, or are an immediate threat to life and where capture is not 
feasible.509 However, the DoJ 2013 White Paper on drone strikes specifically states that 
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the US “does not require clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons and interests 
will take place in the immediate future.”510 A common justification for not adhering to an 
accurate definition of imminence in counterterrorism is that in the context of targeted 
killing, the “last resort” of killing comes earlier than in routine police work, because 
terrorists “operate outside the legal jurisdiction of the people they intend to kill.”511 
Jennifer Welsh notes that it is difficult to argue that individuals pose a genuinely 
imminent threat when the US, as largely is the case, do not know who they are or what 
they intend to do.512 
 
As previously outlined, one of the core principles of IHL is that the state must distinguish 
between civilian and military targets.513 In the context of drones, this principle may be 
considered as being particularly important to the way drones are used by states as opposed 
to their deployment as a combat mechanism. Article 48 of the Additional Protocol I 
requires that “the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives”. This requirement of targeting is further recognised in Article 51(1) 
of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(1) of the Additional Protocol II.  Further, this 
principle is also recognised as a core principle of customary international law.514   
 
Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I clearly expresses that “attacks shall be limited 
strictly to military objectives.515 Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives are 
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limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military 
advantage.” As a result of these standards, it is evident that there is a clear requirement 
on states to make sure that they take sufficient precautions that civilians are not targeted 
as part of the pursuit of their military objectives. Article 57 of the Additional Protocol I 
is also clear that as part of the state’s precautionary steps, they must ensure that civilian 
entities are sufficiently protected.516 
 
The main rationale for the distinction between civilians and combatants is to ensure that 
civilians are not targeted during hostilities. However, this prohibition in IHL law is not 
absolute. IHL only provides rights to combatants to participate in hostilities and therefore 
there is a degree of confusion as to whether terrorists or non-state actors defined as being 
within a sub-category of civilians have such rights to participate in hostilities. Those 
participants defined as combatants have rights contained in the Geneva Conventions 1949 
and the Additional Protocol I. Specifically, Article 4A of the Geneva Convention III 1949 
provides a right to prisoner of war status if captured during hostilities.517 Articles 43 and 
44 of the Additional Protocol I define “armed forces” and “combatants” so as to afford 
them a particular right to participate in the enduring hostilities.518  
 
The significant advantage of being labelled combatants is that they are immune from 
criminal prosecution so long as their conduct during the hostilities has been in compliance 
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with LOAC. 519  They also have the right to a fair trial. 520  However, the significant 
downside of being defined as being a combatant is the fact that they become legitimate 
military targets until they surrender or are wounded.  
 
Those participants in hostilities that are labelled as civilians who take part in hostilities 
are treated differently from combatants whereby they are only considered as taken “direct 
part in hostilities” without the rights associated with combatants, such as prisoner of war 
status or combatant immunity.521 This effectively means that those civilians who take part 
in hostilities do not become combatants but merely become civilians who take direct part 
in hostilities, costing them their civilian immunity.522  Furthermore, they also become 
legitimate targets for the remainder of their involvement in the conflict without the 
combatant rights. The loss of rights for civilians who take part in hostilities is clear from 
Article 51(3) of the Additional Protocol I which states that “civilians shall enjoy the 
protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.”523 This protection afforded to civilians relates to not being the target of 
hostilities, the protection of civilians from the dangers in the hostilities, and the 
prohibition on indiscriminate attacks on civilians. 
 
From a legal perspective, a critical issue is what constitutes “direct participation in 
hostilities” as the definition of this will determine whether a civilian participating in a 
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conflict will lose their civilian rights.524 There has been some attempt to provide clarity 
on what is meant by “direct participation in hostilities. For example, the ICTY also 
undertook a definition of “direct participation in hostilities” in Strugar which defined it 
as “acts of war which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the 
personnel or equipment of the adverse party.”525 The ICTY provided some examples of 
direct participation:  
 
“…bearing, using or taking up arms, taking part in military or 
hostile acts, activities, conduct or operations, armed fighting or 
combat, participating in attacks against enemy personnel, 
property or equipment, transmitting military information for the 
immediate use of a belligerent, transporting weapons in proximity 
to combat operations, and serving as guards, intelligence agents, 
lookouts, or observers on behalf of military forces.” 
 
However, the Israeli Supreme Court in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v 
Government of Israel526 identified the dangers of having too broad or too narrow of a 
definition with a need for courts to be mindful of the need for a flexible definition where 
judges should adopt a functional approach on a case-by-case basis. In this particular case, 
the Court opined that those who acted voluntarily by, for example, acting as a human 
shield should be considered as being a direct participant.527 However, those who provided 
essential goods or services such as the selling of food to combatants should not be 
considered as being directly involved in hostilities.528 
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The ICRC has issued guidance on what is capable of amounting to direct participation by 
reference to the definition to the rights of a civilian as being: 
 
“…persons who are not members of State armed forces or 
organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians and, 
therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack unless and 
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. In non-
international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute 
the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist 
only of individuals whose continuous function is to take a direct 
part in hostilities.”529 
 
However, this definition does not provide clarity on what is capable of constituting direct 
participation.530  Further, the ‘ICRC Study on the Customary Status of International 
Humanitarian Law’ expressly conceded this point by expressly acknowledging “a precise 
definition of the term ‘direct participation in hostilities’ does not exist.”531 The definition 
is particularly complex in NIACs where Article 3 in the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II acknowledges participants but does not legitimise participation in 
conflicts. The ‘Interpretative Guidance’ states that:   
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“…In non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups 
constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and 
consist only of individuals whose continuous function is to take a 
direct part in hostilities (continuous combat function).”532 
 
The key problem is that there is no definition of what constitutes direct participation and 
further there is a new term that requires interpretation including “continuous combat 
function”. This does not provide a basis to understand the point at which a non-state actor 
in hostilities loses their civilian status. The Interpretative Guidelines goes on to qualify 
the meaning of direct participation as being linked to three cumulative acts including: 
 
“(1) The act must be likely to adversely affect the military 
operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, 
alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or 
objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm); (2) 
there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm 
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military 
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
causation); (3) the act must be specifically designed to directly 
cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the 
conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).”533 
 
The requirement of these three cumulative acts may be taken as evidence of a 
desire to ensure that those civilians involved in a minimal participation in 
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hostilities are not considered participants in the hostilities.534 As a result, it may 
be argued that before a terrorist, as a non-state actor, becomes a legitimate military 
target, they must engage in a minimal range of acts before losing their civilian 
immunity.535  However, it seems from the construction and interpretation of IHL 
that this determination on a minimal range of acts is very subjective to the facts of 
a conflict.536 
 
The problem with this approach in IHL is that terrorists can easily rely on this 
weakness to effectively blend in with populations as a guise to retain civilian 
immunity which questions whether IHL can regulate this type of hostility.537 The 
lack of clarity on the level of participation required creates considerable 
opportunity for terrorists to retain their civilian status, which would in effect limit 
the application of IHL given that civilians cannot be targeted.538 In light of this 
discussion it is now appropriate to progress to the next section to analyse the 
applicability of IHL to drone warfare operations. 
 
3.4.7 IHL’s ability to regulate non-human weapons 
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It may be argued that there are at least three blind spots in the applicability of IHL to 
regulate the on-going use of drones in NIACs.  
 
First, the definition of an NIAC may not capture the reality of NIACs in practice.539 
Specifically, the requirement of an adequately intense conflict where the non-state entity 
is sufficiently organised may not always be the case given that modern threats to 
international peace and security can emanate from individuals as well as groups. While 
these groups and individuals may be bound by an ideology, it is highly questionable 
whether they are sufficiently organised in line with the definition envisaged for an NIAC. 
This suggests that states may have a need to engage in using drones to pursue a military 
objective, but that usage is not accurately captured by the legal definition of an armed 
conflict.  
 
Second, there may be a need for IHL to recognise the need for NIACs to span international 
borders given the ability of non-state actors to move between countries as the basis to 
hide from states.540 The problem exposed by the definition of combatant and civilian 
highlighted the potential that terrorist can use the gap in IHL to conceal themselves as 
civilians.541  
 
Third, the level of organisation required does not capture all NIACs. Specifically, those 
individuals or smaller groups who may be inspired by larger entities may not be covered 
by IHL. This would mean that if an individual was inspired by al-Qaeda but operated 
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outside of a specific command structure, any action taken against them by a state would 
not necessarily be regulated by IHL.542 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter was to assess the ability of IHL to regulate the use of 
drone warfare. The study then demonstrated that warfare has dramatically changed in step 
with technological developments. This technological shift has proven to be a pivotal 
moment in the evolution of armed conflict. As demonstrated throughout the chapter, 
much of current IHL has been premised upon the fact that wars have traditionally been 
fought on the battlefield. These wars were usually fought in defined periods of high-
intensity battles between states. The proliferation of technologically advanced weaponry, 
in particular UAVs, has led to two established changes in armed conflict: prolonged 
periods of low-intensity conflict, and the rise and significance of non-state actors. Current 
IHL was not therefore written with the expectation of the increasingly fast-paced military 
operations experienced today.  
 
 
The chapter then progressed to examine the ability of IHL as an international legal 
standard to regulate the use of drones. This discussion found that there were two issues 
at hand. First, the issue of the lawfulness of a state’s action to engage militarily, which is 
addressed as part of the normal rules of international law found within the UN framework 
of laws. Second, after the decision to engage militarily, a further issue is whether IHL is 
equipped to sufficiently control the use of drones. The discussion here found that there at 
least two core key limitations of IHL in the regulation of drones. First, IHL does not 
define NIACs sufficiently to cover the prevailing circumstances where a state may decide 
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to use drones to pursue a military objective. Second, there are issues around constructing 
the threshold requirements of IHL for a minimum level of organisation and a sufficient 
degree of intensity before IHL can apply.543 This creates a significant blind spot where 
IHL may not technically apply to circumstances where a state decides to rely on drones 
to pursue a military objective. There is an almost complete failure in IHL to define with 
sufficient clarity whether a terrorist can be considered a combatant or a civilian.544 
Furthermore, IHL does not sufficiently define the point at which a terrorist might be 
viewed initially as a civilian in a conflict but subsequently becomes involved in hostilities 
and loses their civilian immunity.  
 
Rebecca Crootof identifies four ways in which new technology can be “legally 
disruptive”. It can (A) alter how rules are created or how law is used; (B) make more 
salient an on-going but unresolved issue; (C) introduce new uncertainty regarding the 
application or scope of existing rules; or (D) upend foundational tenets of a legal regime, 
“necessitating a reconceptualization of its aims and purposes.”545 Drone warfare can be 
said to have disrupted IHL in two of the four ways, namely (B) and (C). It has made more 
salient the fact that IHL has been developed with a particular state-centric framework in 
mind based on historic norms that do not necessarily always apply in contemporary 
conflict. As a result, rules pertaining to non-state actors, for example, require further 
clarity.546 The use of drones also highlights questions regarding the relationship between 
the LOAC and IHRL, which shall be expanded upon in Chapter 4. However, it has not 
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disrupted the law to the extent that rules are created differently. And while this research 
makes frequent reference to the dehumanising effects of drone warfare urging a re-
establishing of the aims and purposes of IHL, there is not sufficient argument to claim 
that it has upend foundational tenets or that a complete reconceptualisation is required. 
 
Given the rise and importance of non-state actors, there is now a need to review the 
capability of IHL to regulate and control contemporary armed conflict tactics such as 
drones. Technology and law adapt conjointly; as non-state actors begin to wield more 
power and influence in international conflicts, states have sought to develop more flexible 
and autonomous weaponry to combat these sporadic threats. In turn, the law must be 





3.5.1 Approaches to change 
There are at least three options as to how IHL can better regulate the use of UAVs. The 
first would be an inclusionary approach where IHL requires an update to expressly 
include drones and UAVs.547 This would provide a pragmatic basis to recognise that 
drones and UAVs have formed part of military warfare and now require inclusion within 
legal frameworks. The first practical advantage is that UAVs deliver missile payloads that 
are less powerful than conventional bombs and which provide greater command control 
over firing decisions. For example, these missiles are “one-twentieth the size of a standard 
laser guided bomb or cruise missile and less than half the size of the smallest precision 
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ordnance dropped from conventional aircraft.”548 Their use can therefore be construed as 
attempts by governments to comply with the principle of distinction and should therefore 
be recognised in IHL.  
 
It can also be argued that such provisions for the inclusion of new weapons such as UAVs 
are already in place with regard to Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (AP I) in which states are required to decide whether the use of new 
weapons or methods of warfare are prohibited under IHL. This requirement to review the 
legality of new weapons applies to all states irrespective of whether they are party to AP 
I. As the ICRC states, “The assessment will entail an examination of all relevant empirical 
information, such as the weapon’s technical description and actual performance, and its 
effects on health and the environment.”549 Even if there are no specific rules governing 
the use of UAVs under international law, their use is still governed by these long-standing 
provisions of IHL. The advantage of this option is clearly that the provisions governing 
the use of new weapon systems such as UAVS are already covered in IHL and there is 
no further need for IHL to be updated which in itself is a difficult prospect.  
 
The problem with this option, however, is that it leaves states with the autonomy to self-
authorise new weapons as conforming to IHL. The normal procedure is for states to first 
review whether a particular weapon is bound under treaty or customary international law. 
Having done this, they are then obliged to assess whether the use of such weapons comply 
with the provisions under Additional Protocol I. Finally, “in the absence of relevant treaty 
or customary rules, the reviewing authority should consider the proposed weapon in light 
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of the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, as well as likely future 
developments of the law.”550 As a result, the United States has controversially legitimised 
the use of drones in targeted killings as being in accordance with IHL, even though this 
has been contested. This has been predicated on the argument that current threats 
necessitate a transformation of the ideas, norms, and rules that constitute the global 
international order.551 The subject of targeted killings is discussed further in great detail 
in Chapter 4 with particular reference to ‘the right to life’ under IHRL.   
 
Questions have been raised regarding whether the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello can still apply to asymmetric forms of warfare between states and terror groups, or 
whether the principle of jus in vim (the just use of force) should be applied to these 
circumstances instead. This can be legitimately applied to “state-sponsored uses of force 
against both state and nonstate actors outside a state’s territory that fall short of the 
quantum and duration associated with traditional warfare.”552 One rationale is that while 
targeted killings theoretically increase the efficiency of jus in bello through increased 
effectiveness and harm reduction, it also reduces the effectiveness of jus ad bellum by 
making the resort to force easier.553 The resulting premise is that targeted killings are 
theoretically justifiable once large-scale military intervention is deemed morally 
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permissible.554 The use of jus ad vim is therefore applied to the use of force that falls 
outside the confines of traditional warfare.  
 
Transnational terrorism has been largely responsible for creating an in-between space of 
moral and legal uncertainty where, although war has not been declared, force is still being 
used on a limited, though consistent, scale by state actors.555 As Brunstetter and Braun 
state, “The need for a theory of jus ad vim arises from a normative trend in military 
affairs, namely, the perception that in contemporary and future conflicts the large-scale 
use of force may give way to small-scale, or ‘surgical,’ applications of force that not only 
have more limited and more predictable effects, such as reduced collateral damage, but 
also cost less and do not put ‘our’ soldiers in harm’s way.”556    
 
One of the potential criticisms of jus ad vim is that all forms of violence have the potential 
for escalation. As Frowe argues, “It is conceivable that belligerents will intentionally 
structure their actions in such a way so that it is impossible to initiate ad vim action 
without a plausible probability of escalation to war. If so, then the ad vim framework 
might do more harm than good.”557 Marx gives the example of Boko Haram’s tactic of 
kidnapping Nigerian girls and keeping them in their camps in close proximity to their 
fighters. This precludes ad vim actions such as drone strikes as these run the risk on the 
one hand of harming the victims, and on the other of instigating a full-blown conflict with 
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Nigeria. Such actions may, however, encourage other non-state actors to utilise similar 
actions to prevent the use of drone strikes. In such scenarios, the ad vim frameworks 
would have actually encouraged the use of violent behaviour rather than acting as a 
restraint.558  
 
Another criticism of jus ad vim is that the more human rights influence is applied to IHL, 
the less feasible its application may be. By increasing individual rights and protections to 
a certain extent, states may in turn apply IHL even less through claims that it will hinder 
their military capabilities, thereby proving to be counterproductive. Finally, there is the 
argument that jus ad vim makes war less exceptional and more acceptable. In general, 
these solutions, considering the difficulties in changing international law such as the 
Geneva Conventions, appear to be Foucauldian forms of discourse aimed at the creation 
of legal constructs for legitimising acts such as targeted killings that clearly contravene 
international law.  
 
The second option as to how IHL could regulate the use of UAVs would be an 
exclusionary approach where IHL could place a ban on the use of drones and UAVs, 
although a ban may fail to appreciate the reality of the arrival of this new technology 
which has already formed an important part of military warfare machinery.559 Placing a 
ban on the use of drones under IHL would involve justifying why such weapons are 
sufficiently dangerous to warrant exclusion. The ICRC’s legal review on the exclusion of 
weapons under IHL outline the types of prohibited weapons which include examples such 
as mines and bobby traps, asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, bacteriological and 
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toxin weapons, and blinding laser weapons.560 The missiles used by UAVs do not fall 
into this category of severity, so it would be difficult to rationalise their exclusion based 
on similar excluded weapons. Also, UAVs have the theoretical advantage over 
conventional bombing of being more targeted and less discriminatory. Therefore, they 
have a significant advantage over for example cluster munitions, which indiscriminately 
takes lives over a large area.  
 
Another potential problem with the banning of UAVs under IHL is that some have argued 
that it is the principle of distinction that has encouraged the use of such weapons. While 
some countries have simply ignored the prohibition under IHL against attacking civilians 
being used as shields by irregular armed forces, others have tried to comply by finding 
technological means of targeting these forces in a manner that protects civilians.561 In this 
respect, the United States has claimed that their targeted strikes try to comply with IHL 
by making certain that reliable intelligence on potential targets is gathered, often in real 
time. The fact that a drone can linger over a target for extended periods of time also allows 
for the time necessary to validate the relevant intelligence, for example through the use 
of ‘pattern of life analysis’ techniques.562 However, the questionable veracity of ‘pattern 
of life analysis’ is indeed explained in Subchapter 2.5. The third option is that IHL can 
be left unchanged, but this approach would also fail to appreciate the use of drones and 
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The most pragmatic solution would be for IHL to continue to update and evolve to ensure 
that the use of drones and UAVs are regulated. A potential method of updating or 
evolving the law is to follow the method of the Tallinn Manual. Such methods do not 
immediately change the law, but provide further explanation and detail as to how those 
laws ought to be applied as well as providing further clarity as to what the laws mean. If 
states begin to sign up and endorse such manuals, it would be easier to formalise them 
into law, serving as a stepping-stone of sorts. 
 
Drones, as with other weapons, must satisfy two key legal criteria. The first is that it 
prevents unnecessary death, injury, and suffering. The second is that it has the capacity 
to adequately distinguish targets rather than being indiscriminate. This solution of 
updating IHL would arguably best be achieved in accordance with the four core principles 
of the law of armed combat: distinction, proportionality, preventing unnecessary 
suffering, and military necessity. One such area would be clarifying the distinction 
between direct participants in a conflict as opposed to those not directly involved. This 
especially applies to terrorists who fall neither within the categories of combatant nor 
civilian under IHL. The distinction needs to be narrowed, as having too wide an 
interpretation leads to civilians becoming lawful targets. IHL also needs to be updated to 
consider factors such as what constitutes military targets, proportionality, and the fact that 
most conflicts take place intra-state rather than inter-state.563  
 
Proportionality on the other hand seeks to minimise incidental casualties and collateral 
damage. This requires a process of verification of all relevant areas such as the presence 
of the target, timings, and the need to issue warnings or evacuate an area. However, IHL 
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needs to produce guidelines as to what constitutes proportionate incidental casualties. 
This is especially relevant as it is argued that drone strikes kill more people as collateral 
damage than the actual target, with the kill proportion being on average ten innocent 
people to every targeted person killed.564 In like manner, the core objective of preventing 
unnecessary suffering needs to be clarified under IHL as there is no universally accepted 
agreement on what constitutes unnecessary suffering. Finally, the objective of military 
necessity means that states can only deploy force for the purpose of subduing the enemy 
or achieving specific military objectives. The first point is that theoretically force cannot 
be resorted to without the existence of actual armed conflict, and the mere presence of a 
terror suspect in a village or town of a foreign state does not constitute an armed conflict.  
 
Further, the issue of achieving military objectives by firing drones at targets in a country 
that has not given its permission has become an issue. Pakistan serves as an example of a 
state that has withdrawn its permission for drone strikes to take place in its territory. Some 
commentators argue that such a right automatically exists under the UN Charter’s Article 
51 right to self-defence.565 However, others have argued that such actions violate both 
US policy and the sovereignty of the targeted state.566 IHL therefore needs incremental 
updating to clarify many of these issues especially as the use of drones will only 
proliferate in the near future. These proposed adjustments must also take into 
consideration the increasingly autonomous nature of UAVs as well as their subsequent 
lack of human agency. The link between drone warfare and detachment and 
dehumanisation outlined in Chapter 2 may serve as a reference point for adjustments in 
IHL.  
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International Human Rights Law 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues to address the research objective of assessing whether 
contemporary armed conflict is in line with existing legal principles and the values that 
are meant to govern them.567 Chapter 2 established the connection between drone warfare 
and dehumanisation. It concluded that there is a link between physical and psychological 
detachment that can affect the operation and laws of armed conflict. Chapter 3 assessed 
	
567 Research objective number three outlined in Chapter 1 
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current IHL and whether it is sufficient to regulate the rapid development of warfare 
technology. It concluded that IHL contains weaknesses in dealing with modern 
international conflicts stemming from its state-centric premise. In particular there is a call 
for greater clarity with regards to the distinction between combatants and civilians in the 
context of non-state actors. These changes are proposed through adjustments and updates 
to current laws, as opposed to wholesale overhauls or bans.  
 
The current chapter reviews International Human Rights Law in light of the above. IHRL 
is assessed in detail after IHL as it is of growing relevance and application to the 
governing of situations of armed conflict. In some respects, it is a more detailed code and 
has a stronger enforceability system, such as individuals’ right to take people to court. It 
therefore provides an outlet in cases where IHL may not. Despite this, IHRL poses its 
own problems that require discussion; there are uncertainties as to whether IHRL applies 
to a particular conflict, whether it applies to jurisdictions not party to IHRL, and to what 
extent it applies responsibility to allies of those involved in conflicts. These issues are all 
discussed throughout the chapter, starting with general issues in IHRL, in particular 
jurisdiction and responsibility, affirming states’ positive obligation to proactively 
preserve life according to Article 2. The chapter then delves into specific rights under 
IHRL, namely the right to life and due process, followed by IHRL’s applicability in armed 
conflict, concluding that it is indeed applicable in both times of war and peace.     
 
4.2 General issues: jurisdiction and responsibility 
4.2.1 Spatial and personal models of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
	 153	
The concept of IHRL obligations involves the development of the spatial and personal 
models of extraterritorial jurisdiction.568 The former refers to the control exercised by a 
state over a specific area. The latter occurs in instances when agents of a state have or 
exercise power and authority over someone in another state. This requires that the actions 
of the agent are attributable to the state she or he is representing, rather than the state 
where the control is being exercised.569  
 
The ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in the Al-Skeini570 case established 
the fact that the exercise of controlling power by a state in the territory of another 
constituted jurisdiction. Other recent examples can be found in the case of Jaloud v 
Netherlands,571 which involved the killing of Azhar Sabah Jaloud in 2004 at a military 
checkpoint in Iraq by Dutch soldiers. The Dutch authorities argued that control over the 
area where the killing occurred lay with the British and United States governments, 
inasmuch as they were the controlling powers. The Dutch soldiers were technically under 
the authority of the British Army.572 The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the 
main issue in question was not that of the status of the occupying power, but rather that 
of the factual circumstances of the event.573 The fact that operational control lay with the 
British Army did not absolve the Dutch of its jurisdictional obligations. The Dutch 
soldiers were not operating in Iraq due to having been deployed there by the British 
	
568 Aldo Ingo Sitepu, ‘Application of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in European Convention on 
Human Rights, Case Study: Al-Skeini and Others v. UK’, Jurnal Hukum International, vol.13, 
no.3 (2016) 353-374 
569 Eleni Kannis, ‘Pulling (Apart) the Triggers of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, University of 
Western Australia Law Review, vol.40 (2015) 221-243 
570 Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom App no 55721/07 (ECHR, 7 July 2011) 
571 Jaloud v Netherlands App no 47708/08 (ECHR, 20 November 2014); Friederycke Haijer and 
Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Reflections on Jaloud v. Netherlands’, Journal of International 
Peacekeeping, vol.19 (2015) 174-189 
572 F Fleck, The Handbook of the Law on Visiting Forces (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2018) 
573 Jane M. Rooney, ‘The Relationship Between Jurisdiction and Attribution After Jaloud v. 
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government but rather by the Dutch government. They were therefore considered by the 
Court to be in full command at the time of the shooting and that responsibility for the 
“impugned act” lay with the Netherlands.574  
 
This ruling has been questioned and is indicative of the inherent problems concerning the 
establishment or extension of jurisdictional responsibility, the practical authority granted 
to a legal body to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility. For example, 
Sari argues that “just because States retain full command does not mean that they exercise 
effective control over their armed forces or that those forces cannot fall under the effective 
control of another State or organisation.”575 This ruling is hard to reconcile with the ruling 
in the case of Behrami v France576 involving the responsibility of a French brigade that 
was part of the KFOR security force in Kosovo for injuries caused by unexploded 
bombs.577 The Court ruled that Convention could not be applied to UN Security Council 
Resolutions and that the application was therefore inadmissible on the ground that it was 
inadmissible ratione personae.578    
 
“This was because the UNSC retained ultimate authority and 
control and that effective command of the relevant operational 
matters was retained by NATO. In such circumstances, KFOR 
was exercising lawfully delegated Chapter VII powers of the 
	
574 Friederycke Haijer and Cedric Ryngaert, Reflections on Jaloud v. Netherlands’, Journal of 
International Peacekeeping, vol.19 (2015) 3 
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vol.54 (2015) 12 
576 Behrami and Behrami v France App no 71412/01, ECHR (2 May 2007) 
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no.4 (2017) 783-804 
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UNSC so that the impugned action was, in principle, ‘attributable 
to the UN’.”579 
 
The sending state therefore was not construed as surrendering effective control, even 
when its armed forces were part of a multinational force.580 This has been described as a 
novel ruling inasmuch as the European Court had always maintained that the application 
of the Convention abroad to be applicable, the state in question needed to “exercise 
control over a territory much as it did at home”.581 The ruling was therefore construed as 
diluting the previous threshold of control advocated by the Court.     
 
The second relevant example is the case of Pisari,582 which was another case of a shooting 
at a checkpoint in 2012, this time by Russian soldiers at a security zone established in the 
Transdniestrian region of Moldova. In 2015, the European Court of Human Rights ruled 
unanimously that there had been “a violation of Article 2 (right to life and investigation) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights against the Russian Federation and that 
the Russian Federation should be held responsible for consequences arising from a 
Russian soldier’s actions even though they had not occurred in Russia.”583 The ability to 
make this decision was made easier by the earlier admission of the Russian government 
to the important points that Pisari was under their jurisdiction and that the shooting had 
	
579 ibid 
580 Terry D. Gill and Dieter Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the International Law of Military 
Operations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 237 
581 Amy Shepherd, Reflections on Extra-Territorial ECHR Jurisdiction: Jaloud v The 
Netherlands (2015) 476 available at <https://njcm.nl/wp-content/uploads/ntm/40-
4_Special_Shepherd.pdf> on 15 November 2018  
582 Lea Raible, The Extraterritoriality of the ECHR: Why Jaloud and Pisari Should be Read as 
Game Changers (University of Maastricht, Maastricht, 2016) 
583 ECHR, ‘Russian Federation Responsible for the Death of a Moldovan Citizen at 
Peacekeeping Checkpoint’, ECHR (21 April 2015) available at 
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been their responsibility.584 However, the Court’s ruling in these two cases involves some 
ambiguity with regard to the two aforementioned spatial and personal models. In the 
Jaloud case, there is the implication, though it is not explicitly stated, that the spatial 
model applies.  
 
This ruling in the Jaloud case is in keeping with the reasoning in the Al-Skeini case 
regarding the principle of controlling public powers. In this instance, the Court stated that 
“the Court has recognised the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting 
State when, through the consent, invitation, or acquiescence of the Government of that 
territory, it exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that 
Government.”585 In the circumstances of the Jaloud case, the Court implied that the 
spatial model applies as the Dutch were operating in an area with the consent of the British 
who were effectively exercising the public power over that territory.586 However, the 
explicit statement made by the Court uses the terms, “authority and control over persons 
passing through a checkpoint”, which indicates the applicability of the personal model.587 
As already stated, the spatial model applies to the control a state has over a specific area. 
The personal model, however, covers instances when someone acting on behalf of a state 
is empowered to exercise power over someone else in another state where responsibility 
is assigned to the contracting state rather than the state where the power is exercised.588  
	
584 Friederycke Haijer and Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Reflections on Jaloud v. Netherlands’, Journal of 
International Peacekeeping, vol.19 (2015) 174-189 
585 Marko Milanovic, ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’, European Journal of 
International Law, vol.23, no.1 (2012) 128 
586 Stuart, ‘Refining A-Skeini v. UK: The ECHR’s Grand Chamber Hearing in Jaloud v. 
Netherlands’, European Journal of International Law, available at 
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netherlands/> on 5 December 2019 
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588 Samantha Besson, ‘International legal theory, The Extraterritoriality of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What 
Jurisdiction Amounts to’, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol.25 (2012) 857-884; Cedric 
Ryngaert, ‘Clarifying the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights,’ Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, vol.28, no.4 (2012) 58-60 
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In the Pisari case though, due to Russian acceptance of responsibility and jurisdiction, 
there is much less elaboration on the judicial reasoning behind the Court’s decision.589 
Therefore, there is no overt expression of whether the spatial or personal model applies. 
However, in referring to the concept of “public powers” articulated in the Al-Skeini case, 
there is the implicit suggestion that more emphasis is placed on the personal model. Some 
commentators have made the assertion that size can cause the spatial model to be 
subsumed within the personal model.590 This is based on the reasoning that events that 
occur in a spatially limited area, such as a checkpoint in these two instances, are too small 
for the logical consideration of territorial control.  
 
Further instruction might be derived from the case of Tagayeva v Russia, which dealt 
with the Beslan school siege in 2004 and the way the Russian state responded to the 
Chechen hostage-takers. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that states remained 
bound by the terms of the European Convention on Human Rights during a large-scale 
hostage situation. Galani examines this within the context of recent developments in 
which hostages are considered victims of human rights abuse. This can include breaches 
of their rights to life and to not be subject to torture as well as restrictions on their liberty 
and freedom of movement. The breach of human rights does not just apply to the way 
hostages are treated by terrorists, but also extends to the way states plan for, and respond 
to, this threat.  
 
Galani identifies through the Court’s case law a threefold responsibility by states in the 
way they deal with such threats. The first obligation is to take preventative measures to 
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ensure such actions do not occur. This applies when the state has knowledge of, or should 
have had foreknowledge of, an impending hostage-taking attack. The second obligation 
deals with the way the state deals with the actual hostage-taking scenario. The third is the 
responsibility in the wake of such an event to adequately investigate the events and take 
the required remedial action, which can include some form of compensation to victims. 
Galani describes this as the preventative, operational, and procedural obligation states 
have under Article 2 and 13 in the fight against terrorism.591 The Court examined the 
Russian state’s performance in all three areas and concluded that it had failed to meet all 
three obligations under Article 2. 
 
The importance of the ruling lies in the way the Court balanced the requirements of 
protecting the human rights of victims of hostage-taking with the requirements of 
governments being given a margin of appreciation in dealing with challenging situations 
where any course of action carries a high level of risk. It also confirmed the applicability 
of positive obligations on states to proactively take steps to uphold the Article 2 right to 
life. It can be argued that by placing victims and their rights to life under the Convention, 
the Court has raised the bar in terms of treating victims in a humane fashion. In this case 
at virtually every level, the Russian government was seen as failing to give primacy to 
the rights and safety of the hostages. The importance of the right to life of hostages was 
therefore an important step in humanising such victims that may be in this position in the 
future. There are certain parallels that can be drawn between this case and the actions of 
terrorists that hide within civilian populations. The question may arise as to whether 
civilian populations are being held hostage by terrorists, and whether the same accusation 
can apply to those civilian populations. This is especially relevant for civilian victims of 
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drone strikes often considered to be collateral damage. If the definition of hostage 
extended to those civilian populations, the stakes would certainly be raised for states 
considering engaging in drone attacks. 
 
It can be next argued that there are problems in applying these precepts to the 
extraterritorial use of drones as a counter terrorism tactic.592 Responsibility for a drone 
strike that violates the right to life is difficult to assign under the spatial model; by 
definition, such strikes are used to reach enemies in areas where the targeting government 
has no territorial control.593 There is also the fact that the right to life is not absolute. For 
example, from an international perspective, the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) only allows derogations from human rights law and the mandate 
to not violate human life in extraordinary circumstances, such as in times of national 
emergency or risk where the survival or life of the nation is threatened.594  
 
Examples of states derogating from IHRL include the case of Brannigan v UK.595 In this 
instance, the applicant challenged the derogation by the United Kingdom. This derogation 
led to their detainment without trial on suspicion of being involved with terrorist 
associated activity in Northern Ireland. The Court ruled that the derogation was justified 
and within the appropriate margin of appreciation. However, in the cases of Şahin Alpay 
v Turkey596  and Mehmet Hasan Altan v Turkey, 597  the Court ruled that Turkey had 
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violated their rights to liberty and free expression by not ending their pre-trial detention 
once the Constitutional Court had ruled that their detention was unlawful. Turkey’s 
derogation in this instance was extreme and did not fit the criteria of being necessary and 
proportionate.  
 
Derogations by states from their obligations under the ICCPR have generally been for 
internal situations that threaten the life of the nation in some manner. These have included 
cases of serious political and social disturbances (Bolivia and Yugoslavia); terrorist 
activities (Azerbaijan, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Nepal, Peru, and the United Kingdom); 
subversive activities (Ecuador and Bolivia); national disasters (hurricane Mitch in 
Guatemala); acts of sabotage (Peru and Sri Lanka); or civil war (Sudan).598  However, 
whenever derogations under Article 4 ICCPR take place, a state is required to ensure that 
these only occur within strictly defined circumstances, as shown above. These must also 
be conveyed to the Human Rights Committee to justify the derogations. These 
requirements were further established in the rulings in the cases of Ramirez v Uruguay 
and Landinelli Silva v Uruguay.599  
 
Failure to justify derogations would constitute a breach of a country’s international law 
obligations. For example, Michaelsen gives the example of anti-terrorism legislation 
implemented by the United Kingdom, which attempts to justify derogations from their 
international legal obligations under both the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the ICCPR. He argued in 2005 that the circumstances do not meet the required standards 
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550 
599 ibid 551-552 
	 161	
for justifying derogations and as such are therefore unlawful.600 Drone warfare could 
perhaps be explicitly addressed in the ICCPR. An amendment may clarify that drones 
should only be used where there is “clear evidence of a threat to life” in order to limit any 
permissive drone use in future.  
 
4.2.2 Jurisdiction in waiting 
The concept of “jurisdiction in waiting”, where a state may instantly exercise all or some 
of the public powers normally exercised by the home state, does not apply when bombing 
is used in an indiscriminate manner. 601 It is argued that because drones have the ability 
to cruise over a particular area for longer periods of time to make a more informed and 
accurate decision, they do not fit into the category of fighter planes.602 However, while 
drones theoretically use targeting weapons, it is still difficult to have such precision as to 
only kill those in a “continuous combat function” and not innocent bystanders and 
civilians.603  
 
Under IHRL, the arbitrary killing of civilians is prohibited and can only ever be justified 
when the act has occurred accidentally or unintentionally. From the latter perspective, it 
is possible for unintended acts to be foreseen as long as they were indeed unintended, 
“but even then it is licit only where there is no alternative to it.”604 Civilians are therefore 
afforded protection from direct attack as long as they are not actively taking part in the 
conflict. For attacks such as bombings and drone strikes, the attacker must take every 
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reasonable measure to ensure that civilians are neither attacked nor harmed, or that the 
nature of the attack is not indiscriminate. IHRL employs the principle of proportionality 
to ensure that the force used is not excessive for the purpose being used.605 This consists 
of four basic elements which find their legal basis in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: “(a) the requirement of proportionate force relating to a state’s resort to the use 
of force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter; (b) the concept of a 
proportionate, belligerent response in reprisal against an adversary’s violation of IHL; (c) 
the jus in bello obligation to ensure that an attack does not cause disproportionate 
collateral damage; and (d) a state’s duty under IHRL to ensure that the use of lethal force 
for law enforcement purposes is restrained and in proportion to the harm presented.”606 
 
The increased emphasis on drone warfare by the United States alongside other Western 
nations in recent years has brought the topic of the proportionate use of force into sharp 
focus.607 Many communities in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen live 
with the daily reality that there are drones invisible to the naked eye hovering overhead 
that could deliver their devastating payload at any moment. This constant surveillance 
and fear of danger is a source of on-going terror for civilians, as it creates a daily scenario 
of unprecedented anxiety and fear that daily threatens the right to life.608 This constant 
watch is an example of how the pursuit of enabling extraterritorial obligations in securing 
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the right to life is hampered by the way in which international relations takes place, 
especially where it undermines international (human rights) law.  
 
4.2.3 The applicability and jurisdiction of IHRL in armed conflict 
A primary issue that requires discussion is whether IHRL is applicable in armed conflicts. 
A traditional understanding of IHRL is that it is applicable in all situations.609 However a 
state may, under certain circumstances, suspend all but the non-derogable aspects of 
IHRL. These circumstances are limited to cases of public emergency in which the life of 
the nation is threatened. The ICRC also makes the point that “Derogations have to be 
distinguished from limitations which are intrinsically related to qualified rights – such as 
freedom of expression – as opposed to absolute rights, such as freedom from torture, 
which provide for no possible restrictions and can never be derogated from.”610 The only 
other permissible exceptions are derogation clauses that have been included in specific 
treaties.  
 
However, for the purposes of IHRL, the existence of an armed conflict or terrorist attack 
does not necessarily comply with the way it is defined under domestic law. Such instances 
are therefore not always sufficient in themselves to warrant being characterised as a state 
emergency. Instead, the events must pose an imminent threat to the organised life of the 
nation. Once such circumstances apply and a state of emergency and accompanying 
derogations have been declared, the state in question is required to notify the relevant 
international body and outline both the reasons for the derogations and the actions 
implemented. Even then, there is still a list of limitations that must apply to the declaration 
of derogations from IHRL commitments. Derogation measures must be “strictly required 
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by the exigencies of the situation.”611 States must therefore limit the scope, duration, and 
severity of derogation according to the specific need of the crisis.612 Entire rights cannot 
be eradicated or suspended even in the case of an emergency, and states are obliged to 
ensure that proper safeguards are in place to prevent abuse. Derogations must also be 
consistent with other obligations of the derogating state under IHL, and derogation must 
not discriminate based on “race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin”613   
 
IHL614 and customary international law615 generally form a more appropriate and explicit 
means of controlling and regulating the use of armed force in armed conflicts. IHL also 
constitutes the lex specialis, which governs the lawfulness of the use of force against 
lawful targets in IACs. It can also be argued that the traditional understanding of IHRL is 
conceived on this basis. There are exceptions to the general guarantee to the right to life. 
For example, Art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights places an obligation 
on the state to protect the right to life. These obligations are negative, in that it prevents 
the taking of life as well, and positive, in that it also requires states to protect the lives of 
its citizens.616 However, the obligations of Art. 2 are not violated when death occurs in 
self-defence of oneself or another, during the lawful arrest of someone, or in the course 
of lawfully quelling a riot.617  
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In the case of law enforcement, the principles of necessity and proportionality are vital, 
as they can legitimise the use of deadly force.618 Therefore, the decision regarding the 
amount of force to be used must be proportionate to the threat. The principle of necessity 
is also relevant as the use of deadly force must be absolutely necessary for the protection 
and preservation of life.619 Otherwise, offenders must be apprehended. In reality it is often 
difficult to distinguish between peaceful citizens and those with hostile actions or intent. 
An example of this difficulty can be found in the findings of the Watson Institute of 
International and Public Affairs, which has noted that while between 2003 and 2015 
approximately 165,000 civilians died in Iraq from direct war related violence, at least 
twice that number may have died indirectly.620 One of the many causes of these deaths 
was civilians who were killed as part of law enforcement during the period of occupation 
rather than the war itself.  
 
The applicability of human rights in armed conflict is a hotly contested issue on the basis 
that it would unduly restrict military operations in an unrealistic manner.621 Specifically, 
some military personnel engaged in armed conflict perceive IHRL as an unrealistic 
restraint on military action simply incapable of reflecting the realities of tactical military 
decision-making.622 Despite this contention, IHRL remains applicable to all conflicts and 
represents a further basis to review the lawfulness of the use of UAVs and drones. This 
argument rests on at least three bases. 
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First, IHRL by its very nature has margins of appreciation capable of taking into account 
military requirements such as practical and tactical security operations. The term refers 
to the flexibility and room for manoeuvre that the European Court of Human Rights is 
prepared to allow states to fulfil their human rights obligations under the Convention.623 
The reason that this flexibility is often substantial is because in cases such as times of 
war, states are allowed, under the provisions of Article 15, to suspend all but a few rights. 
As O’Boyle states, “a generous margin of appreciation is allowed at such times as national 
authorities are better placed than Strasbourg institutions to judge when this criterion has 
been fulfilled (also known as the better position rationale).”624  
 
Second, there is a growing body of case law such as Hassan v United Kingdom that has 
converged on the acceptance of the applicability of human rights law to armed 
conflicts.625  Examples of rulings establishing this principle include the International 
Court of Justice.626 Take the case of Al-Jedda v UK in 2011,627 which involved the 
applicability of the ECHR to jurisdiction in an area of armed conflict. The applicant was 
a British national who was interned in Basrah by British forces between 2004 and 2007 
on the allegation of being responsible for the recruitment of terrorists. The Court rejected 
the British government’s claim that the internment was attributable to the United Nations. 
Instead it affirmed the applicability of Article 5.1 of the Convention and that internment 
was attributable to the United Kingdom.628  
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Third, the construction of IHRL affords states the ability to derogate from their 
obligations in times of emergency, which includes the ability of states to derogate from 
even the most fundamental human right, the right to life.629 However the default position 
is the inherent right to life, which is likewise emphasised and enforced by all human rights 
treaties and conventions. For instance, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) prohibit any “intentional deprivation of life” while the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) and the UN International Covenant on Human Rights (ICCPR) 
place an express prohibition on the “arbitrary deprivations of life.”630 The permissible 
derogation from the right to life in the ECHR allows states to derogate from this 
obligation to the extent that they engage in “lawful acts of war”. Similarly, the UN ICCPR 
and the ACHR both allow for the derogation of the right to life as long as no life is 
“arbitrarily deprived.”631 This issue has been examined by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) where in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, it expressly opined that: 
 
“…the Court observes that the protection of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of 
war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby 
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national 
emergency.632 Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a 
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provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of 
one's life applies also in hostilities.”633 
 
However, the ICJ went on to explain that: 
 
“The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then 
falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the 
law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities. Thus, whether a particular loss of life, 
through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered 
an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the 
Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable 
in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant 
itself.”634 
 
This statement is significant as it reveals that the view of the ICJ is that IHL, as opposed 
to IHRL, should be used to determine the lawfulness of the use of drones or UAVs during 
a conflict as a means of warfare.635  This contention rests on the basis that IHL is 
specifically designed and constructed to deal with this type of conflict situation. However, 
not every use of warfare will necessarily constitute an ‘act of warfare’ so as to engage 
IHL law. It is often the case that governments will attempt to re-classify a situation as 
something other than an act of warfare to evade obligations under IHL.  
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For example, the British government consistently denied that military action in Northern 
Ireland constituted an NIAC. Instead, it categorised “the Troubles” as an internal matter 
pertaining to criminal law.636 IHRL thus provides a basis to continue to apply to these 
types of circumstances where a state engages in military action outside of the scope of an 
act of war.637 In light of the fact that the military actions over the course of the last three 
decades have frequently occurred outside of an official declaration of war, IHRL provides 
an important basis to regulate the use of force, and in particular context of this thesis, the 
use of drones and UAVs. The ICJ observed that there are at least three different 
permutations of the relationship between IHRL and IHL: “…some rights may be 
exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters 
of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international 
law.”638  
 
In light of this discussion it is evident that IHRL may be applicable to the use of drones.639 
That being said, it is important to recognise that IHRL does not apply exclusively but 
rather shares justification with IHL. However, with reference to IHL it is necessary to 
understand the thresholds under which the concept of IAC is applicable. The 
commencement of an IAC is defined as follows:  
 
“Any difference arising between two States and leading to the 
intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict 
within the meaning of [Common] Article 2, even if one of the 
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Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no 
difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes 
place, or how numerous are the participating forces; it suffices for 
the armed forces of one Power to have captured adversaries 
falling within the scope of Article 4 [of the Third Geneva 
Convention]. Even if there has been no fighting, the fact that 
persons covered by the Convention are detained is sufficient for 
its application.”640   
 
This relatively low threshold only requires a dispute between two states to result in the 
intervention of their armed forces. An IAC comes to an end under IHL when there is a 
cessation of hostilities that is both permanent and stable. This latter requirement is to 
avoid the problem where there are ceasefires or lulls in conflict followed by a resumption 
of hostilities.641 Milanovic makes the point that the test for completion of an IAC must 
be an objective and factual one indicating the end of hostilities between all belligerents.642 
Nevertheless, the applicability of IHRL has an important role to play in examining 
whether it can control states’ use of drones, as it has the potential to cover circumstances 
where IHL simply does not apply given the nature of specific military operations.643 
Examples include where there is no combatant capable of being identifiable in a specific 
military operation. A state may face internal military operations, where violence is 
exercised causing disruption, but not reaching the required intensity of violence or 
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organisation of forces. In such circumstances, the protections provided by IHL will not 
be available, while IHRL will continue to apply. 
 
An issue that arises with examining the applicability of IHRL to the use of drones as a 
military tactic is where IHRL applies to a specific military operation or particular armed 
conflict. It has been demonstrated that IHRL continues to apply to armed conflicts, but 
the enforceability of IHRL may vary according to ratifications of specific jurisdictions.644 
In many instances, military operations or armed conflicts occur in jurisdictions that may 
not be a specific party to IHRL treaty law, which can impact its enforceability. For 
instance, the armed conflict might take place outside of the physical jurisdictional 
location of international human rights treaties. Therefore, a specific issue is whether, if at 
all, an affected individual can ever come within the jurisdiction of IHRL.645 
 
This issue has been examined in human rights jurisprudence, which has commonly 
determined that ‘jurisdiction’ as noted within international human rights treaties has at 
least two possible dimensions.646 Specifically, there is a territorial jurisdiction that is 
connected with the physical location of the state, but there is also secondary jurisdiction 
that is connected by having a “personal dimension.”647 This simply means that individuals 
who are within the physical borders of a state automatically come within the physical 
territorial jurisdiction of the state which automatically engages the state’s human rights 
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obligations to that individual. For example, in Al-Skeini the applicant was located in the 
physical territorial jurisdiction of Iraq where the UK no longer had effective operational 
control given that the Iraq operation was deemed to have ended 1st May 2003. However, 
the applicant had a personal connection in that the military operation in question was 
perpetrated by British special forces operating on the ground in the newly reformed Iraq.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) determined in Loizidou that where a state 
exercises control over another jurisdiction by undertaking the exercise of some public 
powers normally associated with a state, then the human rights obligations of that state 
can extraterritorially apply within the controlled other jurisdiction. 648  It therefore 
reinforces the concept of spatial control in which a state exercises control of an area in 
another state. This may arise in some instances as a consequence of a military occupation 
of a country or part of a country. For instance, in Loizidou,649 Turkey had undertaken the 
exercise of state-like powers by invading part of Cyprus in 1974 but subsequently refused 
to allow the applicant access to their property. This assumption of power in Cyprus and 
exercising of state-like powers was sufficient to allow the enforceability of the ECHR on 
an extra-territorial basis. This interpretation of ‘jurisdiction’ simply means that where a 
state exercises sufficient control in a foreign territorial jurisdiction, any human rights 
obligations of that state can apply on an extraterritorial basis specifically within the 
foreign territorial jurisdiction.650 
 
Beyond a physical territorial connection with a location, and even where states do not 
exercise sufficient control over a foreign region, the state involved in military operations 
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remains bound by their human rights obligations. This means that a state remains bound 
by human rights on a personal basis between state and citizen.651 For example, in the Al-
Skeini case the ECtHR determined that arrested individuals or other individuals held in 
physical custody by agents of the state within the jurisdiction of another state remain 
within their international human rights treaty obligations.652  
 
Examples such as the war on terror, the use of black sites for interrogation purposes in 
Guantanamo, extraordinary rendition, and the agreement of some states for the use of its 
air space by the US have all posed challenges to the extraterritorial applicability of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.653 European states that have allied themselves 
with the US-led war on terror have brought into question the extent to which the 
Convention’s scope applies to such issues. Some have simply argued that the 
Convention’s jurisdiction should be applicable anywhere that a member state is 
exercising control over the rights of an individual or individuals. However, this is contrary 
to both the Convention and the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights. In the 
Bankovic case, 654  the Court delineated the exceptions concerning the territorial 
competence of a state. These exceptions apply in instances where a challenge is made to 
an extradition or exclusion order where there is joint control by two states; where a state 
has effective control of an area within the territory of another state and in diplomatic and 
consular cases.655  
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This definition of extraterritorial jurisdiction was narrow and did not conform to the 
Court’s ruling in the case of Issa v Turkey.656 In this instance, the case involved the 
detention, abuse, and killing of a group of shepherds in Iraq in 1995 by Turkish soldiers 
who were conducting military manoeuvres near and over the border.657 In refuting the 
charges of the applicants who were family members of the murdered shepherds, the 
Turkish authorities argued that they never had jurisdiction in that area of Northern Iraq.658 
The presence of their soldiers in the area did not conform to the requirements of Article 
1 inasmuch as they were not in effective control of the area. The applicants responded:  
 
“Turkey’s ground operations in northern Iraq at the time were 
sufficient to constitute ‘effective overall control’ (within the 
meaning of the Loizidou judgment). Given the degree of control 
enjoyed by the Turkish armed forces of the area, they argued that 
the Turkish government had de facto authority over northern Iraq 
and its inhabitants, as opposed to de jure sovereignty.”659  
 
The Court went on to uphold the view that a state can be accountable for the violation of 
the right to life in the territory of another state as long as its agents or representatives are 
in some form of control of the area at the time of said violation.660 It does not matter 
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whether the control being exercised is lawful or not.661 The rationale for the ruling was 
that to rule otherwise would have enabled a state to commit violations on the territory of 
another state in which it was not empowered to do on its own territory.  
 
There has been limited jurisprudence dealing with whether a state exercising insufficient 
control over another state can remain bound by their human rights obligations for specific 
actions. This is in relation to specific military operations within foreign jurisdictions 
where the affected individual is not in the physical custody of the state. The state, for 
example, may be a contracting party to a human rights treaty but does not have sufficient 
control over a foreign jurisdiction within which they are engaged in military action but 
do not have the affected individual in their physical custody.662  This would be the case 
if a military operation were pursued by a state in another territorial jurisdiction where the 
pursuit ultimately impacts the domestic population but none of the local population is 
within the custody of the state pursuing the military action. The issue remains as to 
whether that state remains bound by their international human rights treaty obligations 
even though they may lack sufficient control over the foreign territory.663  
 
Cases such as the Issa case suggest that it is possible for IHRL to hold states accountable 
even when the affected individuals are outside of the state’s physical custody. For 
instance, in Issa the Turkish authorities pursued a military operation in Iraq which 
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resulted in the deaths of some Iraqi shepherds.664 The circumstances of the deaths were 
unclear but the evidenced presented to the ECtHR seemed to suggest that the Turkish 
authorities only came across the shepherds during the course of their military operation.665 
This opened the question as to whether Turkey was not in control at the time their deaths 
were caused. In this type of circumstance, the ECtHR opined that the state could be 
theoretically held responsible for their military action even though the concerned 
individuals were technically not within the control of the state.666 As a result, it seems 
that human rights jurisprudence may be willing to impose human rights obligations on 
states on an extraterritorial basis even if they do not exercise sufficient control over a 
foreign jurisdiction as long as the affected individual is within the physical custody of the 
state. 
 
There are at least two key contrasting cases of note that have explored the liability of the 
state in this type of circumstance. First, in the Alejandre case,667 the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IAC) determined that the shooting down of two small 
planes by the Cuban military was in breach of the right to life enshrined in the ‘American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.’668 This case is significant as it highlights 
the willingness of an international commission to accept that Cuba retained its human 
rights obligations over a region that was physically located in international waters.669 
Therefore, Cuba remained liable for its human rights obligations even though it exercised 
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no territorial control over international waters and the planes in question were not in the 
physical custody of Cuba. Second, in the Bankovic case670 the ECtHR determined that a 
military operation undertaken by NATO was not bound by the ECHR human rights 
obligations given that the contracting states involved in the military operation did not 
exercise sufficient control over the foreign jurisdiction.671 In Bankovic, the issue was 
pertaining to NATO air strikes in Iraq directed at news and media broadcasting outlets. 
In this particular case, the lack of control exercisable by the NATO countries meant that 
the ECHR could not apply on an extraterritorial basis given the exceptional nature of 
extraterritorial liability.672 
 
Specifically, it may be argued that individualised attacks such as those in Alejandre,673 
which focus on specific targets, may come within the extraterritorial application of human 
rights law.674 This may be attributable to the fact that individualised military operations 
in international waters may be taken as a desire on the part of the state to exercise control 
where no other state has exercised such control in that territorial area.  
 
4.2.4 Summary of general applicability 
This chapter is divided into two main sections: general issues in IHRL, namely state 
jurisdiction and responsibility, and specific rights under IHRL, in particular the right to 
life and due process. The first section began by comparing the spatial and personal models 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, analysing the relevant cases and assessing their rulings and 
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application in IHRL. The section confirms the applicability of positive obligations on 
states to actively take steps to preserve life as per Article 2. The chapter then introduced 
the concept of “jurisdiction in waiting” where a state may extraterritorially apply the 
public powers of another state instantaneously. The said power cannot be exercised in the 
case of indiscriminate aerial bombings such that as of fighter jets, and arguments were 
given as to whether or not drones fall into this category. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
applicability of IHRL in armed conflicts, arguing that IHRL does apply to armed conflicts 
but has questionable enforceability on a practical level. It is a hotly contested issue 
requiring a balancing act between the provision of rights and the consequent restrictions 
to military operations. IHRL must become more practical as a remedy for individuals 
suffering injustices; otherwise states will continue to bypass its procedures to maintain 
military objectives. 
 
The chapter will now turn to specific rights under IHRL, in particular the right to life and 
due process, assessing how they are applied to drone warfare.  
  
4.3 Specific rights under IHRL 
After introducing the general issues of jurisdiction and responsibility, the next section 
will examine specific rights under IHRL with emphasis on the right to life and due 
process. The section will include the varying sources that guarantee the right to life, such 
as ICCPR, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, the American declaration 
of Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights. The section will also 
examine the concepts of positive and negative rights and obligations, the extraterritorial 
applicability of the right to life, and due process under IHRL. The concept of the right to 
life is especially important within the overall context of dehumanisation, which is the 
central theme of this research.  
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The use of technologically advanced weapons such as UAVs enables the dehumanisation 
of the enemy as elucidated in Chapter 2. This has raised the paradoxical juxtaposition of 
people increasingly being individualised and personalised (through targeted killings) yet 
simultaneously dehumanised. In this respect, the use of drones or UAVs represents 
specific circumstances that are unlike other types of weapons. This has been described as 
follows: 
 
“The crucial difference between ‘fire and forget’ weapons such 
as cruise missiles and drones is rooted in the fact that a cruise 
missile is directed against a target that is defined and located 
beforehand, such as a specific military object. Drones, however, 
can be deployed into a theatre of war and hovering for a long time, 
waiting for targets to appear or looking for targets actively via 
remote control and video feed. This characteristic of a more active 
and flexible use is what makes drones a special case and not 
simply the next step in a long line of weapons aiming to cover 
growing distances.”675 
 
This chapter concentrates on the right to life and due process as these are the rights most 
directly breached by the use of drones in targeted killings. This is an important process 
in addressing the research objectives of assessing the extent to which the nature of modern 
warfare has enabled the moral distancing from the dehumanisation process as well as the 
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increasing compartmentalisation of warfare that only exposes the civilians of one side of 
a conflict to danger.  
 
There are a number of specific rights that will not be addressed. While they contribute to 
the overall process of dehumanisation, they are not necessarily carried out through drone 
warfare. These include prohibitions against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, or prohibitions against arbitrary arrest and detention. Indeed, it 
can be argued that while political assassinations have long been a feature of politics, the 
process of individualisation of conflict represents a paradigm shift towards a form of 
individualised warfare.676 This is facilitated by capabilities provided by UAVs and pose 
new challenges to IHRL. 
 
4.3.1 The right to life 
As stated above, the right to life is guaranteed in a number of sources of IHRL. Article 2 
of the European Convention on Human Rights states the following: 
 
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall 
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a 
sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which 
this penalty is provided by law. Deprivation of life shall not be 
regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results 
from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order 
to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
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lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection.”677 
 
Article 2 imposes requirements on states to not just refrain from actions that jeopardise 
the right to life, but also obligations to ensure such rights are protected and maintained. 
These are negative and postive rights respectively and will be examined later in this 
section. However the obligation to positively protect the right to life by taking appropriate 
steps to safeguard the lives of people within its jurisdiction applies across a range of 
potential areas. One important point wth regards to positive obligations is that there may 
be a potentially infinite number of instances in which there is a need to provide potections 
to life. It is therefore unreasonable to expect the state to be held responsible for blanket 
universal protections from all forms of threats to life, especially those that occcur in 
private. There is also a sense in which individuals are personally responsible for not 
placing themesleves in situation where their lives are threatened. The Court therefore 
attempted to address this isue in the case of Öneryildiz v Turkey678 in which it stated: 
 
“…this [positive] obligation must be construed as applying in the 
context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right 
to life may be at stake, and a fortiori in the case of industrial 
activities, which by their very nature are dangerous, such as the 
operation of waste-collection sites (‘dangerous activities’ – for 
the relevant European standards.”679 
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This case dealt with protection from dangerous industrial activities, and the ruling 
therefore mandated that the obligations to provide protections to the right to life 
was based on the dangerous nature of the activities being undertaken in this case 
within its jurisdiction. These activities were dangerous by their very nature and 
were proving a threat to workers rather than activities which they were voluntarily 
exposing themselves to. 
 
Providing such protections requires advanced planning by the state to ensure the 
establishment and maintenance of adequate legal, regulatory, and institutional provisions. 
Such obligations have especaily been established in a number of Court rulings. For 
example in the case of Paşa and Erkan Erol v Turkey, the Court ruled that the Turkish 
state had a positive obligation to protect the right to life by taking effective measures to 
protect life from being endangered by an anti-personnel mine.680 In the case of Budayeva 
and Others v Russia, which concerned mortal risks to a community from mudslides, the 
Court held that “there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its substantive 
aspect on account of the State's failure to discharge its positive obligation to protect the 
right to life; and that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its 
procedural aspect, on account of the lack of an adequate judicial response as required in 
the event of alleged infringements of the right to life.”681  
 
The Court has established similar obligations to take preventative actions to protect 
individuals from risks to life in a number of other areas. These include but are not limited 
to: the killing of a person in a conflict zone, the killing of someone who has been the 
witness to a crime, killings of hostages during a terror attack, and the killing of a conscript 
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during military training or service. In like manner, obligations have been imposed for the 
protection of members of society from threats to the right to life in the areas of healthcare, 
domestic violence, environmental harm, the mentally ill, and self-harm. Protections from 
such risks to life require the state to be proactive in planning and establishing systems for 
such protections to be available for the general population, as elucidated above in the case 
of Tagayeva v Russia.682 
 
As mentioned, these obligations all require a degree of advanced planning by the state so 
as to protect the right to life. However, the Court has made clear that these obligations do 
not obviate the individual’s responsibility for ensuring his or her personal safety. 
Therefore Article 2 does not provide or suggest an absolute right to security and 
protection. This was established in the case of Molie v Romania683 and Gokdemir v 
Turkey.684  
 
The right to life under Article 2 has been interpreted as an absolute right, but there are 
exceptions whereby the article regulates the way state can legitimately use [lethal] force. 
Therefore, there are certain usages when the right to life contained in Article 2 is not 
breached. These include when a public authority uses necessary force to: stop someone 
from committing unlawful violence, make a lawful arrest, prevent them from escaping 
custody, and to stop a riot, uprising, or other threat to public order.685  
 
As for protection in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1960, Article 
6.1 states that: 
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684 Gökdemir v Turkey, App no 66309/09, ECHR (19 May 2015) 
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“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall 
be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, 
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious 
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the 
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the 
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be 
carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent 
court.”686  
 
The current concept of the right to life was outlined in international documents in the 
United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948. Article 3 of the United Nation’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone has a right to life, liberty, 
and security of the person.”687 However, the European Convention on Human Rights of 
1950 was the first international document to offer a means of enforcing this right, as well 
as delineating the circumstances under which it was permissible to take human life.688 
These included capital punishment, a sentence handed down by a court once due process 
had been carried out, and in cases of self-defence where lethal action was justifiable for 
the protection of one’s life or the life of another.   
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The case of Timurtas v Turkey led to another unique application of Article 2 of the ECHR 
by the Court.689 This case involved the disappearance of a man taken into custody by 
Turkish authorities. The unique aspect of this ruling is that the Court stated that 
circumstantial evidence was permissible in the absence of a body. It therefore ruled that 
the Turkish authorities had violated Articles 2 and 3 despite no body having been 
found. 690  This case moved away from the necessity for direct evidence previously 
established in Kurt v Turkey.691 This was partly based on the fact that in the Kurt case, 
even though the Turkish authorities had provided details on the relevant domestic legal 
provisions, they had failed to provide similar details in the Timurtas case.  
 
The Court also took into account the contradictory nature of the existing state of 
emergency powers existing in the region at the time prohibiting liability claims being 
made against the regional authorities. Article 125 of the Turkish Constitution mandated 
that all acts by state authorities were subject to judicial review and that such authorities 
were liable to reparations for damages caused by their actions. Furthermore, the Court 
could not ascertain the authenticity of the official documentation relating to the victim’s 
detention. In the process it ruled that Convention proceedings did not always require the 
rigorous application of the principle of affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges 
something must prove that allegation).692 The importance of this distinction is that it 
places a positive, rather than negative, right on states with regards to the right to life. This 
extends the state’s duty further than merely safeguarding the right to life to being obliged 
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to ensure the right to life is maintained. The Court therefore ruled that the provisions of 
Article 2 included positive obligations on the state to protect the right to life.693 
 
4.3.1.1 Positive and negative rights 
The concept of rights in general, whether under constitutional or international law, has 
traditionally been depicted in terms of negative rights. Isaiah Berlin was one of the key 
thinkers to articulate a difference between negative as opposed to positive freedoms and 
rights.694 Negative or first-generation rights have been of particular importance because 
they underpin most constitutional rights that aim to protect the individual from excessive 
state power.695 However, there has always been the argument that negative rights on their 
own do not enable the individual to access these rights fully and therefore need to be 
complemented with positive rights, which require state action rather than ensure 
forbearance. These are the right to access and secure a certain standard of living.696 The 
juxtaposition of these two concepts is inherently paradoxical because whereas negative 
rights place limits on a state’s power and right to intervene, positive rights require active 
state intervention.  
 
A key argument within the field of IHRL, however, is whether positive rights translate to 
positive obligations and are applicable to areas such as the right to life, liberty, security, 
a fair trial, privacy, and all the other rights contained in international law such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Positive obligations placed upon states arguably 
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take on an even greater significance when applied to extraterritorial jurisdiction. These 
obligations are positive in that they require a state to take substantive action to eradicate 
or severely limit the use of the death penalty. This is further elaborated upon below in 
subsection 4.3.1.2. 
 
The idea of positive rights places a responsibility on the state to actively protect rights 
rather than simply refraining from interference. The European Court of Human Rights 
has adopted a twin-track approach in dividing the obligations of states into both negative 
and positive obligations.697 Initially, the Convention only dealt with negative rights. This 
began to change in 1968 with the Court’s ruling in the Belgian Linguistic case698 in which 
“The European Court held that the right to education does not imply a duty on the state 
party to provide free or subsidized education of a specific type or a specific level. But the 
court confirmed that there was a right to access for individuals to the existing educational 
institutions and for individuals to receive official recognition of the studies they have 
undertaken.”699  
 
This interpretation theoretically extended the requirements of an obligation from 
refraining from doing certain things to obligations to take measures to protect the rights 
of the individual. Akandji-Kombe makes the distinction between the two by stating 
“Violation of the Convention will result in the first case from inaction, i.e., passivity, on 
the part of the national authorities, and in the second case from their preventing or limiting 
the exercise of the right through positive action.”700 It can therefore be argued that Art. 2 
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of the Convention not only places a negative obligation on the state to refrain from any 
action that could jeopardise life, but also includes a positive obligation to actively adopt 
measures to protect life.  
 
A prime example of positive obligations in the context of the right to life where a state 
was required to take substantive action can be found in the case of al-Sadoon and Mufdhi 
v United Kingdom701 in which the ECHR ruled that the UK government had done nothing 
to ensure that the applicants’ Convention-based right to life would be secured when 
transferring them to Iraqi custody. 702  The Court similarly ruled against the UK 
government in the case of McCann and Others v United Kingdom.703 This case involved 
the shooting of supposed terror suspects by the SAS on the basis of intelligence, which 
turned out to be partly false. 704  The court ruled that the deployment of the SAS 
demonstrated a failure to consider arrests, meaning that the force was disproportionate to 
the threat and that the provisions to the right to life under Article 2 had been breached. 
This effectively meant that the state had a positive responsibility to ensure that the 
principles of the right to life and due process had been maintained. 
 
Examples of rulings given by the Court pertaining to the controversial policy of 
extraordinary rendition include the cases of Al- Nashiri v Romania705 and Abu Zubaydah 
v Lithuania.706 The Al-Nashiri case involved the renditioning of the suspect to Romania 
where he was subject to arbitrary detention as well as ill treatment at one of the CIA’s 
secret black site facilities. He was detained at this facility for eighteen months while 
facing charges in the United States of being involved in terror attacks, which carried the 
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death penalty. The Romanian authorities duly denied responsibility for US actions carried 
out on these CIA run facilities. However, the Court ruled that the Romanian government 
knew of the types of activities being carried out on its territory and that these actions 
contravened rights contained within the Convention. Romania therefore had a positive 
obligation to ensure that there were no violations of Convention rights being undertaken 
within its jurisdiction.707   
 
In like manner in the Zubaydah case, the suspect was subject to enhanced interrogation 
techniques, including waterboarding. As with Romania, the Lithuanian government 
claimed to have no knowledge of or control over the activities conducted on its territory 
by the CIA. However, the Court made the point: 
 
 
“Following an extensive and detailed analysis of evidence in the 
present case, the Court has established conclusively and to the 
required standard of proof that the Lithuanian authorities knew of 
the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities in their country 
and cooperated in the execution of the HVD Programme; and that 
the Lithuanian authorities knew that, by enabling the CIA to 
detain terrorist suspects – including the applicant – on their 
territory, they were exposing them to a serious risk of treatment 
contrary to the Convention.”708  
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Consequently, the government had failed in its positive obligation to comply with its 
responsibilities under the convention for actions carried out in its territory. The 
importance of positive obligations in this regard has been affirmed by the United 
Nations. 709  These positive obligations apply to states which are required to protect 
individuals on its territory or over which it has jurisdiction from infringement on their 
rights. This means taking active steps to ensure that no one operating on its territory is 
engaging in or contributing to acts of torture.  
 
In addition, “while clearly responsible for wrongful acts committed extraterritorially or 
having an extraterritorial effect, a State may also be responsible for indirectly attributable 
extraterritorial wrongfulness owing to a failure to fulfil its positive human rights 
obligations. In such scenarios, the criterion of “effective control” may be taken into 
account to assess the standards of due diligence that a State is legally obliged to 
demonstrate in a given situation.”710 Moreover, the principle of non-refoulement imposes 
an obligation on states to not expel, extradite or refoule an individual to another state 
where there was a real risk of that person being subject to torture, ill treatment, or the 
death penalty in the receiving state. The Court ruled in the case of Soering v United 
Kingdom that the state executing the extraditing or refoulement would be responsible for 
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As for the ICCPR, The Human Rights Committee commented on Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by stating, “Article 6 recognizes and 
protects the right to life of all human beings. It is the supreme right from which no 
derogation is permitted even in situations of armed conflict and other public emergencies 
which threatens the life of the nation.” The Committee went on to stipulate that this 
comment imposes a positive obligation on a state to enact legislation and measures that 
actively protects the arbitrary deprivation of life from all threats that are preventable and 
foreseeable, whether caused by an act or an omission.712  
 
Also, state obligations include protecting individuals from threats to the right to life posed 
by other states, and any institution or company that is operating within its jurisdiction, or 
most importantly, in other areas subject to its jurisdiction. 713  With regard to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Committee also reiterated the requirement that states 
respect the right to life of those who are outside the territory of a state but still under its 
effective control or comprises territory that it is occupying. Even in instances where the 
state in question is not exercising effective control, the obligation remains if their military 
is in the position to have an impact on the right to life of a person or persons.714 
 
4.3.1.2 Positive and negative obligations 
Positive and negative rights are analysed from the perspective of the individual, whereas 
positive and negative obligations are analysed from the perspective of the state. As briefly 
mentioned in Subchapter 4.3.1.1, positive obligations represent obligations that go 
beyond the requirements to merely respect human rights and require active measures to 
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ensure the protection of such rights as well.715 Subchapter 4.2.1 articulates the difference 
between the spatial and personal models of territorial control, namely that the former 
refers to the control exercised by a state over a specific area whereas the latter occurs in 
instances when agents of a state exercise power and authority over someone in another 
state.  
 
Milanovic, however, argues for a third concept; states should be bound by negative 
obligations where human rights are concerned irrespective of issues relating to territorial 
borders or control. This is based on the argument that states have control and ultimate 
authority over and responsibility for their own agents.716 They are therefore in a position 
to ensure that these agents do not breach human rights generally and the right to life 
specifically. However, as Da Costa argues, the omission of an obligation on states to 
prevent the commission of human rights by third parties, even where it lacks territorial 
control, is a potential shortcoming of this model.717 Therefore, states should respect the 
right to life regardless of issues of territorial jurisdiction specific to each situation. 
 
The Human Rights Committee circulated these recommendations regarding state 
responsibility for upholding Article 6 within its area of territorial jurisdiction to all 172 
states for their perusal and comments. A few states raised issues regarding the use of the 
term “impacted.” This relates to the wording in paragraph 63 of General Comment No. 
36 by the Human Rights Committee which states:  
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“In light of Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, a State party 
has an obligation to respect and to ensure the rights under article 
6 of all persons who are within its territory and all persons subject 
to its jurisdiction, that is, all persons over whose enjoyment of the 
right to life it exercises power or effective control. This includes 
persons located outside any territory effectively controlled by the 
State, whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by its military 
or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable 
manner.”718  
 
Opposition to the term “impacted” was based on a perception that it was too broad a term 
in comparison to previous practices and interpretations. 719  However, such relatively 
broad obligations have been established for some time. One prime example is the case of 
Lopez Burgos v Uruguay 1981,720 which involved the abduction of Uruguayan citizens 
living abroad by Uruguayan state agents alongside their forcible return to Uruguay. The 
Court ruled that “the State party is under an obligation, pursuant to article 2 (3) of the 
Covenant, to provide effective remedies to Lopez Burgos, including immediate release, 
permission to leave Uruguay and compensation for the violations which he has suffered, 
and to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future.”721 
 
The problem with the breadth and vagueness of the term impacted is located within the 
wider problem of when extraterritorial actions can be brought within the purview of the 
	
718 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the Right to Life (2018) 15 
719 Sarah Miller, ‘Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention’ European Journal of International 
Law, vol.20, no.4 (2009) 1223-1246 
720 Delia Saldias de Lopez v Uruguay, CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, UN Human Rights Committee 
(29 July 1981) 
721 ibid 
	 194	
European Court of Human Rights. The Court has switched between adopting both narrow 
and broad views of what constitutes extraterritorial jurisdiction. This has been in response 
to arguments that human rights should be as universal in nature as possible. However, 
Miller has argued that, “properly understood, extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
European Convention is and should be limited to such situations to maintain a workable 
balance between the Convention’s regional identity and its universalist aspirations.”722 
Within this context, the term “impacted” is too general; a state may not be directly 
responsible for the actions of their soldiers in the territory of another state where they are 




4.3.1.3 Extraterritorial applications of the right to life 
In order to further explore the ability of the right to life to regulate or limit the use of 
drones as a military tactic, the discussion will now focus on the extraterritorial application 
of the right to life, given that drones will for the most part involve extraterritorial military 
operations. This differs substantially from typical discussions pertaining to the right to 
life often concentrating on domestic issues. This is evident from the main grounds for 
derogating from this right, which were stated earlier. These include such instances as the 
defence of a person from unlawful violence, the effecting of a lawful arrest or to prevent 
the escape of a person lawfully detained, or to the taking of action for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection. These all relate to domestic issues. However, the protection 
of this fundamental right becomes much more complicated in issues of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.  
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The biggest issue from a human rights perspective posed by the use of drones as a military 
tactic is whether states can be held accountable for their use when they are deployed 
outside of the state’s territorial jurisdiction.723 The above discussion on the right to life 
noted that this right as part of customary international law exists in a negative form, 
enjoining on states a minimum negative obligation to at least refrain from taking life.724  
The UN Declaration expresses that “everyone has the right to life” in general terms, a 
statement not limited by jurisdiction.725 However, the UN Declaration’s non-binding 
nature poses a particular problem of holding states accountable in respect of an 
enforceable right. The discussion in the previous section demonstrated that states could 
be held accountable for human rights obligation on an extraterritorial basis.  However, 
the use of drones, or UAVs in general, as a military tactic poses a particular challenge for 
the extraterritoriality of human rights treaty law.726  
 
Addressing this question therefore requires an understanding of how the 
internationalisation of human rights can best be achieved in a globalised world in a 
manner that does not impinge unnecessarily on state sovereignty. The interdependent 
nature of the global system means that it is far easier for a state to transcend or penetrate 
the borders of other states through a process termed “stretched social relations.”727 This 
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refers to a characteristic of globalisation whereby events in one part of the world have 
impacts elsewhere. Territorial sovereignty is often insufficient to insulate nation states 
from these effects. This is facilitated by an international economic system that requires 
the free movement of finance, goods, capital, people, and services. Globalisation has 
therefore engendered complications for the post-Westphalian state’s ability to exercise 
absolute and indivisible power and sovereignty within its borders.728 It has also been 
criticised for the way it has been managed and the negative effects it has had on 
developing states in particular,729 generating a worldwide anti-globalist movement.730 
 
Technological advancements in weapons systems have also allowed states to project their 
power anywhere in the world. The use of drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles is 
simply the latest manifestation of this ability to respond to perceived threats wherever 
they might be. This increases the vulnerability of civilian populations and raises the need 
for extraterritorial obligations to be placed on governments. As Isa and Feyter argue, the 
international human rights regime has been good on instituting a division of labour 
between states whereby governments are primarily responsible for those living within 
their territorial jurisdiction.731 The transnational applicability of IHRL to nation states, 
however, is governed by factual circumstances rather than a blanket form of coverage. 
This is leading to a subtle shift in thinking, as Kanalan argues, from a mere “responsibility 
to respect and prevent human rights violations that endanger the right to life, but also a 
positive obligation to protect and fulfil human rights.”732 
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4.3.1.4 The right to life and complicity: issues of state responsibility 
The issue of complicity is important as it deals with instances where a state, while not 
necessarily committing an act, nevertheless has knowledge of or indirect participation in 
said act, and thus may have a duty to prevent the act.733 The concept of state responsibility 
derives from its legal personality and the obligations that ensue under international law.734 
It applies to both wrongful actions and omissions, and “functions as a general law of 
wrongs that governs when an international obligation is breached, the consequences that 
flow from a breach, and who can invoke those consequences (and how). As a 
consequence, the law of state responsibility is multifaceted and covers a veritable 
multitude of issues.”735 The term “attribution” refers to the responsibility of a state for 
breaches in international norms committed by one of its agents in the territory of another 
state.736  
 
The UN’s principles governing state responsibility are codified within the Draft Articles 
of Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts.737 The articles essentially 
articulate the rules governing a state’s responsibility for a breach of its international 
obligations. The articles establish the basic point that “conduct not in conformity with an 
international obligation and attributable to a state equals an internationally wrongful act 
resulting in state responsibility.”738 They outline that an intentionally wrongful act must 
be attributable to a state under international law and constitute a breach of an international 
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obligation of the state. They also stipulate that international law is distinct from what is 
considered unlawful action under domestic law. Therefore, a state cannot evade its 
international obligations by stating that a specific act is in accordance with its internal 
laws. The Draft Articles do not outline any specific obligations. Instead they simply 
articulate the circumstances under which obligations are breached and their legal 
consequences. The concept of state responsibility is laid out in IHL with specific 
reference to the Geneva Conventions, which mandates that both states and individuals are 
responsible for their actions. 739   This is particularly significant for issues such as 
extrajudicial and targeted killings. 
 
The extrajudicial jurisdictional responsibility has been divided into two tests termed the 
“strict control” and “agency” tests.740 The former is further sub-divided into two subtests: 
the “effective control” and “overall control” tests. Effective control occurs where a state 
gives instruction or direction to its agents or otherwise exercises control over them. 
Overall control occurs when a state assists in areas such as equipping, financing, or 
training a group without directly controlling their actions.741 The latter refers to where a 
person acts as an agent of a state where those actions can also be attributed to the state in 
question. The ECtHR has also added an additional test termed the “overall control” test.742 
The issue of complicity, or collusion (terms that are used interchangeably in this research 
notwithstanding any potential political connotations of the latter), becomes pertinent in 
instances where there is overall control, and the state has knowledge of the intended use 
of its support but still fails to take preventative action. 
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In the Nicaragua case, the Court established two forms of individuals acting as de jure 
(legally recognised) organs of a state: those who were directly paid, equipped, and 
supported by a state; and those who while being financed, equipped, and supported were 
nevertheless acting independently of the supporting state.743 In this case, the first set of 
actions with regard to supporting the Contras in Nicaragua was attributable to the US, 
while the second set was not. The reasoning was that the US did not exercise effective 
control over the Contras’ actions that contravened IHRL, such as the indiscriminate 
killing of civilians. The usage of this test has however been criticised on the grounds that 
it set an unduly high threshold for attribution and responsibility and that the overall 
control test would have been more equitable.  
 
In the similar circumstances of the destruction of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 in 2014 
by pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, it would be difficult to attribute responsibility to 
Russia on the grounds of exercising effective control. However, their role in supplying, 
financing, and training these groups in the use of anti-aircraft missiles would arguably be 
grounds for attributing overall control.744 Other relevant examples include Behrami and 
Behrami v France.745 This case dealt with the French government’s responsibility for the 
deaths of Kosovar Albanians by undetonated cluster bombs. The French government 
argued that KFOR held effective control in Kosovo while UN forces under the UN 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was responsible for bomb clearance. The Court duly held 
that the UN held ultimate authority rather than the French government.746  
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A contemporary and on-going example of collusion can be found in the mass killings 
carried out in Yemen by Saudi Arabia with the support of the United States.747 As with 
the Nicaragua case, the United States may have exercised effective control in terms of 
the supply and training of Saudi forces, but it does not exercise overall control. However, 
collusion is still applicable as it does have knowledge of what the Saudi government is 
doing with the weapons and training provided, and has to date failed to take sufficiently 
preventative action. This is despite the fact that the Senate has voted to end military 
support for Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Yemen.748  
 
This is quite apart from the US’ own use of drone strikes in the country. This has been 
termed a “yellow light” approach to Saudi actions in Yemen in reference to the 
ambivalence of the US government to the multiple deaths of innocent Yemeni citizens 
through the indiscriminate use of weapons provided by the US.749 In this respect an 
important ruling took place in the case of R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary 
of State for International Trade. It involved a public law challenge to the UK 
government’s practice of granting export licences for the sale and export of arms to Saudi 
Arabia on the grounds that there is no ground to suspect that these weapons are being 
used to violate IHL, especially with respect to Yemen. The High Court duly upheld the 
granting of these export licences. In reaching its decision, the Court ruled that: 
 
“The fact that civilian casualties have occurred does not mean that 
a breach of International Humanitarian Law has taken place, still 
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less a serious breach. Customary international law and 
International Humanitarian Law have long recognised that 
civilian casualties in military conflicts occur. The Principle of 
Distinction prohibits intentional attacks against civilians.”750  
 
Green and Hamer criticised this as being an error in reasoning, as IHL prohibits attacks 
on civilians even if they were unintentional.751    
 
The export of weapons has added to a humanitarian crisis in Yemen. US overall 
involvement has not only consisted of the provision of smart bombs, aircraft, and other 
advanced weaponry, but also intelligence briefings, in-flight refueling, and other vital 
forms of logistical support. While the US does not exercise overall control over the 
actions of the Saudi government, it can be argued that it is colluding with the breaches of 
the right to life being committed as it is failing to take adequate action to prevent such 
atrocities. This obligation was laid out in cases such as Loizidou v Turkey,752 where the 
Court ruled that a state’s obligations with regard to jurisdiction were not confined to its 
national territory. It could also arise in circumstances where it exercised effective control 
over an area outside its national territory. Therefore, “States’ obligation to secure in such 
areas the Convention rights and freedoms derived from the fact that they exercised 
effective control there, whether that was done directly, through the State’s armed forces, 
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or through a subordinate local administration.” 753  In this respect, Byman echoes 
Republican Senator Mike Lee of Utah in saying, “the ‘yellow light’ policy – coupled with 
the Trump administration’s strong embrace – empowers Saudi Arabia and the UAE to 
take self-defeating steps.”754  
 
Finally, it must be noted that there may be a distinction between jurisdiction and 
attribution. In this respect, Milanovic makes the following point: 
 
“When the state obtains power over a territory and its inhabitants 
it must, with due diligence, fulfil its obligation to secure or ensure 
the human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction. This power 
is a question in fact, of actual authority and control. Despite its 
name, it is not a legal competence, and it has absolutely nothing 
to do with that notion of jurisdiction in international law which 
delimits the municipal legal systems of states.  However, 
jurisdiction does not imply attribution in the sense that anything 
that occurs within a state’s jurisdiction is attributable to it. In such 
situations, state responsibility may arise for the state’s failure to 
implement positive obligations under human rights treaties.”755 
 
	
753 ECHR, ‘Extra-territorial Jurisdiction of States Parties to the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (July 2018) available at <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Extra-
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Attribution is therefore concerned with assigning responsibility for prohibited acts that 
violate rights under international law with respect to the effective control test rather than 
the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR. This usually occurs where there are a 
number of participants and there is uncertainty over who should be held responsible for 
any violations of rights. In such a scenario, attribution tests may be applied to determine 
responsibility. This is distinct from jurisdictional issues, which may be regarding what 
constitutes territory for the purpose of the Convention, or what type of control was 
exercised at the time.756 Under normal circumstances, the use of force by drone strikes 
against the territorial integrity of another state would constitute a violation of Article 2(4) 
UN Charter. However, Article 20 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
allow such territorial breaches to occur once the consent of the government of that state 
has been obtained. That being said, any resulting actions must both within the boundaries 
of the consent given as well as those of both IHL and IHRL.  
 
An important consideration is that IHL provides protections, while IHRL provides rights. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, protections are given under IHL to everyone, although these 
may differ depending on the circumstances and their status. These can include the 
distinction between whether they are a civilian or a combatant, and whether they are part 
of ongoing hostilities, in detention, or part of a civilian population. There is an obligation 
on all parties in a conflict to adhere to the provisions of IHL. When these are impinged 
there is likewise a duty to investigate such breaches. Enforcement also takes place through 
the provisions of Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, placing a 
responsibility on third states to ensure that the protections of IHL are respected and 
observed by the parties of a conflict.  
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IHRL, on the other hand, confers rights that are contained in a range of treaties, 
conventions, and inter-state agreements. Certain derogations from these rights are 
allowed under emergency situations that threaten life and the security of the country, but 
these must be proportionate to the threat being faced. They are also forbidden from being 
carried out in a discriminatory manner, and they cannot breach the provisions of IHL. 
Enforcement of IHRL is carried out by the supervisory systems such as the UN’s 
Commission in Human Rights, while at a regional level institutions such as the European 
Court of Human Rights performs this function.    
 
While IHRL remains applicable in conjunction with IHL during periods of armed 
conflicts, unlike IHL it also remains applicable outside of periods of armed conflict. The 
obligation to abide by IHRL commitments in the fight against terrorism has been 
specifically upheld by the relevant courts and the international community. For example, 
the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy states that all efforts to combat terrorism 
must comply with their obligations under IHRL.757 Establishing jurisdiction is the first 
requirement in establishing obligations under IHRL. As aforementioned, the issue of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is problematic as Article 2 of the ICCPR restricts state 
intervention to its own territory or territory over which it has jurisdiction while 
prohibiting intervention in the territory of another state. However, while the use of such 
extraterritorial force has been considered applicable, the use of drones remains 
problematic due to the remoteness of terror groups and the separate geographic locality 
of drone operators.  
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Finally, the core provisions of IHRL remain applicable and enforceable at all times and 
states cannot derogate from these responsibilities under any circumstances. Ultimately, 
the primary point regarding the applicability of IHL is the existence of an armed conflict 
between states or between a state and a non-state actor. The legitimacy of drone strike 
will depend on a range of factors dealing with self-defence, sovereignty, jurisdiction, the 
intensity, and duration of violence and the ability to distinguish between terrorist fighters 
and non-combatant civilians. IHRL, however, determines that the use of lethal force (such 
as targeted killings by drones) outside of an armed conflict is only applicable under the 
principle of imminence. Therefore, such lethal force is only justifiable when there is an 
imminent threat to life. Otherwise, law enforcement standards must apply. 
 
4.3.1.5 The right to life and targeted killings 
A targeted killing is when the target is not a combatant and is not at the time of the act 
engaged in hostile activities, but is nevertheless considered a threat to the state.758 Under 
IHL it may be lawful although highly circumscribed. 759  It has been defined as the 
deliberate killing of a specific individual by a state.760 It should be noted that this is not a 
recent phenomenon; it has been occurred throughout history, since military and political 
leaders in other states have always been targeted and killed to further one’s own interests. 
For example, Teergarden refers to the practice in ancient Greek city-states of killing 
authoritarian leaders of other city-states to “preserve democracy.” 761  The practice 
continues today, predominantly in the form of drone strikes around the world.762  
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While there is no internationally agreed definition of targeted killings, the definition 
provided by the United Nations is “the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of 
lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed 
group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody 
of the perpetrator.”763 The legality of the practice is being developed to accommodate 
changes in the nature of contemporary conflict. The legality of targeted killings depends 
on its conformity with important principles of IHL such as distinction, proportionality, 
and necessity elaborated upon in Chapter 3. As MacDonald argues, “where one stands on 
the controversial issue frequently informs the terminology used (and by extension its 
legitimacy). Those opposed to targeted killings commonly use terms such as extra-
judicial execution or assassination. Those in favour of the tactic use terms as preventive 
strike.”764  
 
The Human Rights Committee has listed five key considerations with regard to the 
relationship between targeted killings and the right to life. The first is that in cases where 
a state conducts a targeted killing of a person who is not located on its territory, Article 6 
will apply if the state exercises jurisdiction or effective control of the area where the target 
is located. It is noteworthy that Article 6 guarantees the right to life of all human beings 
without exception or distinction. This applies universally irrespective of the serious 
nature of the crimes or offences committed by a person. No one should be arbitrarily 
deprived of life.765 The second point is that Article 6 is violated by a state if a targeted 
killing is arbitrary, even if the killing complies with international and domestic law. 
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However, the determination of the arbitrary nature of the killing will need to be 
determined by the precise facts of the case.  
 
The next point is the obligation of every state to ensure that another state is not 
contravening the ICCPR Article 6 or ECHR Art. 2 right to life on its territory or area over 
which it has jurisdiction. This is especially relevant when there is a specific threat to an 
individual who is especially vulnerable. This means that there are differing areas of 
liability under Article 6 applying to both the state committing the targeted killing and the 
state in whose territory the killing is being committed. Further, when there are 
deprivations of life arising from exceptional measures, usually associated with law 
enforcement, there must be appropriate safeguards in form of effective investigations, 
prosecution, and punishment, and where relevant the payment of reparations. Where life 
has been lost through targeted killings, it is incumbent on state authorities to fully 
investigate the circumstances and establish the legal justifications for such action. Such 
requirements are contained within the Minnesota Protocols, 766  which require post 
operation assessments when there is the likelihood of violations of Article 6 during armed 
conflicts. The Protocol also applies to all potentially unlawful deaths and: 
  
“…aims to protect the right to life and advance justice, 
accountability and the right to a remedy, by promoting the 
effective investigation of potentially unlawful death or suspected 
enforced disappearance. The Protocol sets a common standard of 
performance in investigating potentially unlawful death or 
suspected enforced disappearance and a shared set of principles 
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and guidelines for States, as well as for institutions and 
individuals who play a role in the investigation.”767  
 
The final requirement is transparency. This means that the results of post operation 
assessments must be made public unless there are compelling reasons for not doing 
so, such as a public interest justification, the requirements of privacy, or the 
protection intelligence and security sources. These exceptions where applicable do 
not however obviate the obligation to carry out full and precise investigations.768 
  
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has long argued against the use of targeted 
killings as a form of punishment or a deterrent. They further argue that such use against 
terror targets should be both proportional, subject to strict guidelines, and be part of an 
overall policy that places emphasis on capturing suspects and targeted killings as a last 
resort. These stipulations run counter to the practice of the United States of considering 
all military-age males within a strike zone as potential terrorists and therefore subject to 
targeted killings by drones.769 This is part of the “two-track approach” to targeted strikes 
as detailed in Subchapter 2.6. The question of extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
responsibility becomes of particular concern when the country being targeted objects to 
the use of drone strikes within its territory. This especially applies to Pakistan, which has 
publicly opposed such attacks as a breach of its territorial sovereignty although there have 
been instances where it has given its tacit approval. It can, however, be argued that no 
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permission has been given for the use of drone attacks in other countries such as Somalia 
and Yemen.770  
 
There is an issue as to whether states should be forced into recognising their obligation 
on fundamental human rights by reference to specific obligations found in international 
human rights treaty law. Specifically, it may be argued that the very nature of human 
rights being inherent to individuals means that individual human rights should not 
necessarily be dependent on artificial constructions of human rights treaties.771  This 
means that there are core ranges of minimum human rights expectations that are capable 
of being derived by being human.772 
 
However, states are reluctant to accept this understanding of human rights, and as a result 
are generally only willing to be bound by those rights expressly contained within human 
rights treaties to which they are a party. This may apply where they are required to take 
humanitarian action for peace keeping or the protection of life under the United Nation’s 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) programme.773 Given that the right to life is one of the 
most fundamental human rights, it is a common right across numerous human rights 
treaties and the UN Declaration on Human Rights.774 It is also important to recognise that 
the right to life forms an important part of customary international law, which 
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demonstrates its centrality as a human right obligation.775 Furthermore, in Mrksic et al. it 
was identified that certain breaches of the right to life can be considered crimes against 
humanity.776  
 
A common requirement in the construction of the right to life is that the deprivation of 
life can only be considered lawful if it is non-arbitrarily deprived. For example, Article 
6(1) of the ICCPR states that: “every human being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”777   The 
inclusion of the word “inherent” is often taken as being an indicator of the importance of 
this right within the ICCPR, which is common in other human rights treaties such as the 
ECHR and the ACHR.778 
 
This non-arbitrary deprivation in in other words explained as states only being allowed 
to take life as the last resort when all other options fail, and that taking life is necessary 
to protect life.779 Soft law standards, such as Principle 9 in the ‘UN Basic Principles on 
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’, expressly state that 
“intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order 
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to protect life.”780 Additionally, some human rights treaties such as the ECHR expressly 
provide an exhaustive list of circumstances where a state may lawfully deprive an 
individual of their life.781 The three common permissible exceptions to the right to life 
include the imposition of the death penalty, killings in the context of armed conflicts, and 
such actions that are considered to be “necessary and proportionate” in individual uses of 
lethal force.782 
 
There are two common requirements in IHRL that bind states. First, the protection of the 
right to life in IHRL commonly requires that any use of force by the state must be 
“necessary”. 783  This commonly means that states can only use force if it can be 
considered as having some legitimate purpose, such as protecting life. This part of the 
requirement requires a factual assessment to determine whether the use of force can be 
considered as necessary to protect life.784 Second, there is a further common requirement 
that any use of force must be “proportionate”.785  The proportionality requirement is 
tantamount to a value judgement where it is necessary to examine whether the use of 
force can be said to outweigh the legitimate goal being pursued by the action taken in the 
first instance.786 It is important to note here that this proportionality test uses similar 
language to the test examined in Chapter 3 pertaining to IHL. However, proportionality 
tests in IHRL differ significantly from those in IHL by stipulating that force is only 
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considered lawful when it is “strictly necessary” to protect life in immediate or imminent 
danger.787 Therefore, any reference to proportionality in this chapter requires a different 
set of considerations to those already expressed in Chapter 3. 
 
There have been some determinations in the context of the ECHR as to the types of 
precautions a state must take in order to protect life before a decision is taken to use lethal 
force. In McCann,788 the ECtHR determined that the use of lethal force by the UK’s 
security agencies was unlawful given that the alleged suspects could have easily been 
arrested instead of killed. In applying this standard to drones, it can be argued that each 
case would require an individual assessment to determine whether other alternative less 
lethal uses of force could have deployed. Furthermore, on the basis of IHRL, it would 
seem that a state could only use drones to target individuals who pose an immediate or 
imminent threat to life. 
 
The lawfulness of using drones and UAVs to target individuals is not yet settled in 
international human rights jurisprudence. Some commentators such as Alston begin from 
the premise that almost all instances of targeted killing will be unlawful.789However, other 
commentators such as Paust790 and Orr791 suggest that so long as targeted killings are 
justifiable, then killing in this instance may be lawful. Those commentators who tend to 
support the lawfulness contention of targeted killing draw upon the necessity to engage 
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in efficient counterterrorism operations.792 Previously, countries such as the US have 
sought to argue that targeted killing operations were lawful on the basis of self-defence 
and the need for the US to respond in ongoing armed conflicts with the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda.793 However, official justifications in favour of the use of force do not commonly 
reference human rights standards as the basis to offer a legal justification for military 
action.  
 
The need for both openness and accountability is clear as governments involved in 
targeted killings have been secretive in their activities, and as a consequence it has been 
difficult to access information in these cases. One relevant example was the attempt to 
access information on the targeted killing by the British government of Reyaad Khan and 
Rahul Amin in Syria, both of whom were British citizens. The UK Upper Tribunal 
rejected appeals for the release of information although it did curtail the government’s 
power to withhold such information on national security grounds.794  Eshaghian also 
argues for some form of judicial oversight of the targeted killings of US citizens. He notes 
that the Supreme court has also made the ruling that US citizens can be categorised as 
enemy combatants. He therefore advocates that the judiciary be involved in determining 
whether someone should be placed on a kill list. This however needs to be limited to the 
analysis of whether a person is sufficiently linked to a terror group. However, judicial 
participation should not impinge on issues that are intelligence related or linked to 
executive decision-making. This includes assessing the extent to which the target poses 
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an imminent threat, or whether it is more feasible to attempt to capture or apprehend the 
target.795   
  
O’Connell identifies that IHRL can only legitimise the use of lethal force where states 
genuinely limit their use of force to circumstances of “absolute necessity.” 796  This 
standard is high given that human rights should be applicable to all circumstances 
including those of emergency situations. Circumstances of absolute necessity are when 




4.3.2 Due process 
The concept of due process is of prime importance when considering legality under the 
international law of targeted killings, especially given the speed and nature by which said 
killings take place.797 The rights to due process through a fair trial is found in Article 14 
ICCPR, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, (right to a fair trial), 
Article 7 of the ECHR (no punishment without law) and Protocol No.7 (rights of accused 
persons), and Article 8 of the ACHR (fair trial right). This section examines the relevance 
of due process under IHRL and its applicability to drone warfare and targeted killings. 
 
The right to due process is accepted by all legal systems around the world, but the concept 
is neither universal nor accepted in the same manner by all judicial systems.798 It is 
	
795 Michael Eshaghian, ‘Are Drone Courts Necessary? An Analysis of Targeted Killings of US 
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International Law and Policy, vol.39, no.4 (2011) 599 
797 Devika Hovell, The Power of Process (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 
798 Carol Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’, European 
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essentially the legal obligation of the government to recognise and respect the legal rights 
of every individual. In the UK, due process is applicable within the context that before 
depriving a citizen of life, liberty, or property, the government must follow fair 
procedures. The right to due process can be traced back to Clause 39 of the Magna Carta, 
the development of rights and civil liberties in common law and statutes and the Bill of 
Rights 1689. It is a principle of the British constitution and means that the law applies 
equally to everyone and that the government is required to operate within its powers. It 
has three main facets: legal certainty, that all laws must be applied in precise and exact 
ways; equality, which requires that cases that are alike must be treated the same and every 
individual has the right to be treated fairly under the law, with no one being above it; and 
fairness, which requires that all laws and procedures must be freely available to every 
individual. Due process deals with the administration of justice, and its applicability for 
the US is contained in specific clauses within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Its 
core goals and requirements centre on the principle that: 
  
“Due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the 
deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property. Thus, the required elements of due 
process are those that ‘minimize substantively unfair or mistaken 
deprivations’ by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which 
a state proposes to deprive them of protected interests. The core 
of these requirements is notice and a hearing before an impartial 
tribunal. Due process may also require an opportunity for 
confrontation and cross-examination, and for discovery; that a 
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decision be made based on the record, and that a party be allowed 
to be represented by counsel.”799   
 
The basis of due process is therefore fairness and it acts as a bulwark against 
arbitrary state power. It acts to prohibit the ability state of the state to rake a person’s 
life or liberty, or to appropriate their property without the individual having the 
opportunity to defend his or her position in a court of law. In this respect, its 
application is often termed substantive due process through which courts determine 
whether a law or state action unreasonably infringes on the rights of an individual 
or group. The application of due process however can be flexible and dependent on 
a range of different factors such as legal systems, rules of evidence and judicial 
procedures such as precedent. Benjamin McKelvey argues that presidential power 
to order extrajudicial killings (of Americans) by drone strikes is unconstitutional, 
as it denies due process to American citizens. He therefore advocates that targeted 
killings by executive order should be controlled by Congress through the passage 
of legislation similar to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),800 which 
enables federal judicial oversight of wiretapping.801  
 
There are three models of due process,802 and the model chosen can indeed impact the 
type of due process rights and procedures employed. The first is instrumentalist due 
process, which is based on the desire to achieve accuracy by reducing the propensity for 
	
799 Justia, Procedural Due Process (2005) available at 
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802 Richard B. Saphire, ‘Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach 
to Procedural Protection’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1978) 127 
	 217	
error through the accurate application of substantive law to the decision-making process. 
This is usually achieved through the use of clear decision making rules and processes as 
well as a judiciary that has the power to review the accuracy of decisions.803 The second 
model is predicated on the need to recognise and enable dignity, humanity, and autonomy 
of the individual in the process, as well as the requirement that the individual be kept 
informed is consulted and treated with the required respect.804 It has been argued that this 
concept is grounded in either the liberal democratic tradition of the inherent rights of the 
individual, or a pluralistic approach in which the interests of the individual or group is 
involved in the decision making process. 805  The third model is the public interest 
approach, which aims to achieve accountability through encouraging popular consent in 
decision-making based on greater public participation as opposed to self-interest.806  
 
These distinctions can affect the procedure and implementation of said due process. For 
example, an emphasis on the instrumentalist approach ensures that the letter of the law is 
followed in terms of accuracy of decision-making. However, such an emphasis on its own 
may fail to adequately humanise the individual in a way commensurate with the IHRL 
objective of protecting their right to a fair trial as a basic human right. Likewise, an 
overemphasis on the third model’s aim of accountability through popular consent may 
negatively impact the ability of an individual to access their full range of due process 
rights. This last point has especially been obvious in populist driven policies in the war 
on terror that have removed the right of due process from some suspects.    
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The concept of due process involves access to a number of areas and provisions in the 
way justice is administered. These include the independence of the judiciary, impartiality, 
competence of stature law, equal treatment, the presumption of innocence, public 
hearings and that notion that hearings are heard within a reasonable time frame.807 One 
of the main elements of any system of due process is the right to a fair trial. This right is 
enshrined in all human rights agreement and conventions.808 The right to a fair trial is 
contained within a range of international laws and conventions.809 For example, Article 
14 of the ICCPR outlines the rights to due process. They include: the equality of everyone 
before courts and tribunals; the right to a fair and public hearing by competent and 
impartial judicial authorities conducted in a timely manner; the right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty; and the right to be informed of the reason for apprehension 
and charge and to defend oneself either individually or through legal representation.810 
The right to a fair trial is also contained within the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.811 Articles 9 and 10 state respectively, “No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, and everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights 
and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.” 812  Similar guarantees are 
contained within the American Convention, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and 
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to a lesser extent, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Finally, Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights states: 
 
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be 
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded 
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order 
or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of 
juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so 
require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the 
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice 
the interests of justice.”813 
 
Article 6 goes in to provide a list of additional rights. These are as follows: 
 
 “To be presumed innocent until found guilty (Article 6(2)); to be 
informed promptly in a language understandable to the suspect of 
the detail of ‘the nature and cause of the accusation against them’ 
(Article 6(3)(a)); to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a 
defence (Article 6(3)(b)); to defend yourself in person or through 
legal assistance of your own choosing or, if you cannot afford it, 
‘to be given it free where the interests of justice so require’ 
	
813 ECHR, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention in Human Rights (April 2018) 6, 
available at <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf> on 16 March 2019 
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(Article 6(3)(c)); to examine, or have examined, witnesses and to 
obtain their attendance and examination (Article 6(3)(d)); to have 
the free assistance of an interpreter if you cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court (Article 6(3)(e)).”814 
 
Due process must be seen to take place, which is why there is a general requirement that 
trials be open to the public and the media. The only exceptions are allowed in instances 
relating to the interests of national security in a democratic society, public order, and the 
maintenance of morals.815 Also, trials may be held in secret in cases involving juveniles 
where the court deems that it necessary for the purposes of justice or to protect the private 
life of the juvenile.816 
 
A significant number of cases dealt with by the UN Human Rights Committee and the 
European Court of Human Rights pertains to due process with specific reference to the 
right to a fair trial in the context of armed force. For example, in the case of Cyprus v 
Turkey817 the Court ruled that the trial of Cypriot civilians in Northern Cyprus by a 
Turkish military tribunal would constitute a breach in the right to a fair trial.818 In other 
instances such as the case of Markovic v Italy819 the Court has chosen to only concentrate 
on the issue of the fairness of the trial, rather than the substantive circumstances of the 
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case itself.820 The use of targeted killings in the war on terror requires a more nuanced 
approach. Members of terror groups often cannot be distinguished from ordinary 
members of society, as they do not wear a uniform or insignia that identifies them as part 
of an armed force.  
 
There is also the problem that there is no universal, standardised definition of terrorism. 
Cassese does argue that such a definition does exist and has evolved in the international 
community at the level of customary international law.821 Others like Ambos take a 
different view in asserting that “at best, that terrorism is a particularly serious 
transnational, treaty-based crime that comes close to a ‘true’ international crime but has 
not yet reached this status.”822 The European Court of Human Rights in the case of 
Brogan v UK823 did take into account the extent, vehemence, and persistence of the 
terrorism in Northern Ireland since 1969 in determining whether the UK, in keeping terror 
suspects in extended periods of detention without charge, had overstepped the margin of 
appreciation it is entitled to under Article 5. In reaching a ruling, the Court also accepted 
the definition of terrorism contained in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1984, which viewed terrorism as the use of violence for political 
purposes, such as to influence the government or intimidate the public.824 
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The lack of a standardised definition can result in interpretations being exceptionally 
broad leading to an infringement of liberty.825 It has in turn led to the argument that 
definitions of terrorism are social constructs specifically designed to fit the subjective 
requirements of those defining the term.826 For example, terrorism is described by the US 
State Department as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to 
influence an audience” while the FBI defines it as “the unlawful use of force or violence 
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, 
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”827 
 
4.3.3 Terrorism and jus cogens 
It has been argued that the prohibition of terrorism as a rule of CIL has acquired the status 
of jus cogens (peremptory norm). The principle of jus cogens is a peremptory norm of 
general international law from which no derogation is permitted except under 
circumstances that is itself permissible under general international law, and which may 
be changed by a subsequent norm of general international law. The principle of jus cogens 
protects fundamental values of the international community. It is relevant to the way 
terrorism is countered, for example through targeted killings; it is a universally applicable 
norm from which no derogation is possible.  
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Aniel Cardo de Beer traces the development of jus cogens as rules of international law 
that are mandatory and imperative in any circumstances as opposed to the rules of jus 
dispositivum in respect of which variation by states is possible (Fitzmaurice).828 The 
principle of jus cogens contains elements of natural law and is not dependent on 
acceptance by states for its relevance or legitimacy. Therefore, the fact that a state does 
not recognise or accept certain action such as torture or slavery to be jus cogens does not 
invalidate its applicability. Aniel Cardo de Beer also argues that jus cogens possesses a 
hierarchical superiority to other norms of international law that places it outside the 
normal sources of such laws to the extent that it represents a form of super norm or super 
law that applies regardless of where it has originated or the extent to which it is accepted 
by states.829 This has been affirmed in rulings such as in Siderman de Blake v Republic of 
Argentina in which the US Court of Appeal ruled that jus cogens held supremacy over all 
rules of international law.830  
 
Aniel Cardo de Beer goes on to argue that while there is currently no international 
juridical ruling that affirms terrorism as being jus cogens, the more important issue is the 
extent to which states perceive and accept it as such. The determination of a norm having 
the status of jus cogens is based on its status as a norm of general international law. 
Therefore, de Beer argues that terrorism fits this criterion as its prohibition is widely 
accepted and practiced in a variety of laws and treaties. Its prohibition is both a rule of 
CIL and has been generally accepted by states as a norm from which there is no permitted 
derogation. Further, it enjoys virtually universal condemnation and when consideration 
is given to the rights that it prospects such as the right to life, its prohibition can be 
considered to be hierarchically superior to other legal international norms. She therefore 
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concludes that the prohibition against terrorism has become the jus cogens norm of our 
times.831 
 
Within the context of this research, this reasoning has been used to justify the use of 
targeted killings in enforcing the universal prohibition against terrorism. However, it does 
not address the situation when the means used in the form of targeted killings become a 
form of state-sponsored terrorism. For example, commentators such as Blakely address 
this issue by: 
 
 “…conceptualising the targeted killings programme as a form of 
state terrorism, which provides a critical analysis of the drones 
programme within the context of a long history of violence and 
terrorism which has underpinned the imperial and neo-imperial 
projects of the UK and US and the important similarities between 
the targeted killings programme, and previous UK and US 
counterinsurgency operations, including prior uses of air power, 
and operations involving the internment of terror suspects, and 
the targeting of specific individuals for interrogation and torture 
or disappearance.”832  
 
Questions regarding dehumanisation cannot therefore be limited to terrorism by non-state 
actors. Instead, there is a justifiable case to be made for state terrorism being in breach of 
jus cogens.   
 
	
831 Aniel Cardo de Beer, Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens) and the 
Prohibition of Terrorism (Brill, Nijhoff, 2019) 11 
832 Ruth Blakeley, ‘Drones, State Terrorism and International Law’, Critical Studies in 
Terrorism, vol.11, no.2 (2018) 321 
	 225	
4.4 Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter was to examine the capability of IHRL in regulating drone 
warfare, and whether IHRL provides additional rights not provided by the obligations of 
IHL. This chapter addressed the research objective of assessing whether contemporary 
warfare and technology pertaining to war are in line with the existing legal principles of 
IHRL and the values that are meant to govern them. The chapter examined the different 
forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction a state can exercise, namely the spatial and personal 
models of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The importance of these concepts is that they 
establish a state’s positive obligation in protecting the right to life. Therefore, while states 
have negative obligations in the form of preventing the taking of life, there is also the 
notion that it is required to protect the lives of its citizens.  
 
The chapter demonstrated how the use of drone strikes in the territory of another state 
could constitute a breach of Article 2(4) UN Charter. Such strikes are however 
permissible under Article 20 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility once the 
state where the drones are being deployed gives permission for their use, and the resulting 
action is within the confines of IHRL. That being said, the data also shows how the US 
has even breached Article 20 in that drone strikes in Pakistan have continued after the 
Pakistani government withdrew approval for their use in 2011 after a drone strike killed 
a number of civilians.833 Ultimately, the permissibility of drone strikes in armed conflict 
is determined by a limited range of factors including the duration and intensity of a 
conflict, the issue of jurisdiction, and the ability to correctly distinguish legitimate targets 
from innocent civilians. The use of such attacks in peacetime, however, is determined 
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primarily by the imminence of a planned attack. This more restrictive criterion for attack 
is what IHRL offers individuals beyond the scope of IHL. 
 
IHRL prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life. Life can only be taken as a last resort and 
when it is necessary to protect life. Drone warfare arguably violates this prohibition, as a 
state cannot guarantee that such strikes are not arbitrary or that the threats posed by the 
targets are sufficiently real and immediate to represent to protect life. It is notable that the 
ECHR does provide a list of exceptions when the state can take life. These include during 
armed conflict, capital punishment, law enforcement, and self-defence as a last resort.  
 
The chapter examines the premise of whether IHRL can apply to armed conflict. The 
military has argued that IHRL places an undue restriction on restraint on military 
operations. However, the chapter outlines the flexibility of IHRL in this respect. Factors 
such as the margin of appreciation and the permissible derogations allow a measure of 
flexibility. The chapter argues that IHRL is indeed applicable to armed conflicts. 
However, there are often issues with enforcing IHRL, such as conflicts in a jurisdiction 
that is not party to IHRL. This, in turn, makes enforceability problematic. Examples 
include when a state that is a party to IHRL is conducting military operations in an area 
outside its jurisdictional competence.  
 
4.4.1 Proposals 
The central conundrum of this chapter is finding the right balance between maintaining 
the integrity of IHRL by sticking to its core values, and increasing its applicability in real-
life scenarios. The more stringent and holistic the requirements of IHRL, the less likely 
states are to adhere to them. For example, in the discussion regarding extraterritorial 
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control834 and the application of IHRL, Milanovic proposes a concept that states should 
be bound by negative obligations to uphold human rights regardless of territorial borders 
or control.835 Milanovic is appealing to the inherence of human rights and its attribution 
to all people. While aiming to further purify the aims of IHRL, this concept would only 
increase the restrictions on states in a situation where states are already taking active 
measures to avoid IHRL obligations.  
 
As previously mentioned, the UK government has even challenged the extension of IHRL 
into armed conflict. In its attempt to curb applicability of IHRL to armed conflict, the UK 
government cites derogation amongst other techniques. It has argued that the Court in 
Strasbourg has misinterpreted the ECHR and improperly extended it to apply to military 
action that is conducted outside a member state’s territory. The UK government has 
considered derogating from the ECHR on the grounds that the actions of its military 
abroad should only be covered by IHL, which was specifically designed for this purpose. 
It has considered invoking its right under Article 15 to derogate from the ECHR in times 
of war, on the argument that the term ‘war’ should not be understood as applying only to 
circumstances in which the national survival of the UK is at stake.836 While this thesis 
has argued the case as to why IHRL is indeed applicable in armed conflict, its utility can 
be mitigated by states derogating whenever those rules may apply. The Joint Committee 
on Human Rights recently made the point that for rights to be effective, they have to be 
capable of being enforced.837 
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A solution to this conundrum could pertain to the practicality of IHRL and how 
realistically it can be used as a remedy for victims who are at risk or have been victimised 
by UAVs. For example, the case of Rahmatullah v Ministry of Defence838 has fizzled out; 
individual litigation relies on individual litigants who are often far away, in conflict zones, 
and do not have enough funds. One suggestion has been to set up a tribunal akin to those 
investigating atrocities and human rights abuses in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra 
Leone.839 One step in this direction has been UNSC Resolution 2379 in 2017 in which 
the Security Council requested the creation of an independent investigative team to hold 
ISIS responsible for atrocities committed in Iraq. In May 2018, the UN appointed Karim 
Asad Ahmad as the Special Advisor and Head of the Investigative Team. In like manner, 
the UN passed Resolution 71/248 establishing an international, impartial, and 
independent mechanism to assist with holding accountable the perpetrators of mass 
atrocities in Syria. The UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al 
Hussein stated: 
 
 “Lack of accountability at the national and international levels 
has clearly encouraged the commission of severe human rights 
violations and abuses, and repeated violations of international 
humanitarian law. The Mechanism will collect, consolidate, 
preserve and analyse evidence; and prepare files on individual 
suspects, in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent 
criminal proceedings in national, regional or international courts, 
in accordance with international law.”840  
	
838 Rahmatullah (No 2) (Respondent) v Ministry of Defence and another [2017] UKSC 1 
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A potential issue with this project is that it only addresses violations of IHL carried out 
by ISIS, while many major state powers were also involved in breaches of both IHL and 
IHRL. The case of Rahmatullah, however, involved claims of wrongful detention and 
mistreatment of the respondents by British and US military personnel in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 
 
In closing, the data presented in this chapter shows that an underlying and recurring issue 
lies in the uncertain relationship between IHL and IHRL, specifically the boundaries 
between the two. It is not yet clear which framework applies when lethal force is used 
outside official armed conflicts. Chapter 3 proposed that drones ought to be limited to 
official armed conflicts, and this chapter seeks to ascertain which set of rules apply when 
drones are deployed outside armed conflicts. As a result, the chapter proposes that further 
clarification and international agreement is required regarding the law that applies to 
drone usage outside armed conflicts. 
 
On its policy on the use of drones for targeted killing, the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights states, “We recommend that the Government, in its response to our Report, 
clarifies its position as to the law which applies when it uses lethal force outside of armed 
conflict.” 841  While the JCHR is a domestic UK review body, its idea pertains to 
international law and human rights law in general, and so this chapter forwards this 
recommendation and urges an international consensus in order to prevent the exploitation 
of the ambiguity surrounding IHL and IHRL. The policy rejected the Government’s 
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attempt to derogate from the right to life in Article 2 where it uses lethal force abroad 
outside of armed conflict. It denied the claim that such deaths are the results of acts of 
war, and as a result, the right to life in Article 2 ECHR “inescapably applies to uses of 
lethal force abroad outside of armed conflict.”842 These recommendations are taken up 










While Chapters 3 and 4 analysed International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law respectively, this chapter turns to the domestic governance of topics 
that may impact the use of UAVs in armed conflict, such as the use of lethal force, the 
arms trade, and counter-terrorism. While international sources are also used, the focus 
turns to domestic law, primarily UK domestic law with brief comparisons made with US 
law. UK law has been chosen as the focus, as it is most relevant, practical, and accessible 
considering the researcher’s UK background as well as US adherence to the ‘state secrets 
privilege’843 doctrine, which arguably causes the US courts to be more deferential, thus 
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making UK governance more likely to be impactful in this research. Finally, US domestic 
law on the above topics have been more extensively researched,844 and so highlighting 
UK governance contributes to the originality of the thesis.  
 
This chapter continues to address the research objective of whether contemporary armed 
conflict and technology pertaining to war are in line with existing legal principles and the 
values that lie behind them. Like IHL and IHRL, UK domestic law is premised on the 
notion of safeguarding its citizens. This chapter therefore assesses whether UK law is 
sufficiently effective and fair to safeguard its citizens with specific regards to 
contemporary armed conflict and the use of drones. The focus is on the decision-making 
processes in terms of responsibility, the decision to use lethal force, and accountability 
and oversight. Other potential mechanisms of governance, such as arms controls over 
hardware, will not be addressed.845  
 
5.2 Responsibility 
5.2.1 State responsibility 
Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Responsibility) dictates that a state 
is responsible if its agents violate IHL or IHRL. A state is deemed to be complicit when 
	
Schwinn, ‘The State Secrets Privilege in the Post-9/11 Era’, Pace Law Review, vol.30, no.2 
(2010) 778-831; Robert M. Chesney, ‘State Secrets and the Limits of National Security 
Litigation’, George Washington Law Review, vol.75 (2007) 1249-1332 
844 For example see Michael Eshaghian, ‘Are Drone Courts Necessary - An Analysis of Targeted 
Killings of U.S. Citizens Abroad Through a Procedural Due Process Lens’, Texas Review of Law 
and Politics, vol.18 (2013) 169-198 
845 See Rachel Stohl and Shannon Dick, The Arms Trade Treaty and Drones (The Stimson 
Centre, Washington DC, 2018); Department of International Trade, Notice to Exporters 
2019/10: Export Control Order 2008 Amended and Control List Updated (2019); R (on the 
application of Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for International Trade 
(Amnesty International and others intervening) (2017) EWHC 1726 (Admin) and (2019) 
EWCA Civ 1020; Wassenaar Agreement, What is the Wassenaar Agreement? (2018) available 
at <https://www.wassenaar.org/the-wassenaar-arrangement/> on 25 June 2019. 
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it “aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act […if] 
that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances and the act is such that would 
have been wrongful had it been committed by the assisting State itself.” 846  This 
responsibility extends to any state that allows its territory to be used to launch 
extraterritorial drone strikes. The UK has therefore had to consider whether its assistance 
to the US – by allowing its territory to be used to launch lethal drone strikes on another 
country – is consistent with national and international law.  
 
An All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Drones was assembled to carry out an 
independent inquiry into the way the UK worked with its partners in the extraterritorial 
use of armed drones. It aimed to build on the report by the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights on the Government’s policy on the use of drones for targeted killing. This report 
argued that the Secretary of State had misapplied the legal frameworks that apply outside 
of armed conflict when holding the position that using lethal force outside armed conflicts 
is in compliance with the LOAC and satisfies the obligations of IHRL.847 The APPG cast 
doubt on the way UK drone partnerships are conducted, especially as British support and 
intelligence may have been used in targeted killings carried out in countries that the UK 
is not at war with, such as Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. The UK is therefore at risk of 
breaching both domestic and international law, while in the absence of any clear legal 
basis also risks being complicit in the illegal inflicting of harm on civilians and exposing 
military personnel to criminal prosecution.848  
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(Oxford Human Rights Hub, 2019) available at <https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-american-drone-
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847 House of Commons and House of Lords, ‘The Government’s Policy on the use of Drones for 
Targeted Killing: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015–
16’, Joint Committee on Human Rights, HL 141, HC 574, (2016-2017) 83 
848 All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones Inquiry Report, The UK’s use of Armed Drones: 
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The UK also risks being complicit in the legally dubious and internationally rejected view 
held by the US that the War on Terror is a single, global NIAC. As mentioned in 
Subchapter 2.4, most countries and international agencies view the Global War on Terror 
as in breach of international law and would thus not qualify as an official armed 
conflict. 849  Bachman and Holland assert, “The Obama administration attempted to 
unilaterally rewrite the law of armed conflict to permit the killing of ‘terrorist suspects’ 
and ‘suspected terrorists’ outside of an active battlefield.” 850  Historically, acts of 
terrorism were treated as criminal acts as opposed to acts of war,851 and so Bush’s War 
on Terror and Obama’s drone campaigns are both guilty under Alston’s assessment, 
worth relaying: “In the legitimate struggle against terrorism, too many criminal acts have 
been re-categorized so as to justify addressing them within to framework of the law of 
armed conflict.”852 The International Committee of the Red Cross adds that the US view 
risks turning the world into a global battlefield “in which the lower protection of the Law 
of War is the norm rather than the exception, so that the permissive rules of the Law of 
War, rather than the stricter rules of human rights law, apply to the use of lethal force 
against members of Al Qaida wherever in the world they may be found.”853   
 
The ability to hold the British government responsible and accountable is made difficult 
by the secrecy laws that allow the state to conceal information on the grounds of national 
security. One example is the challenge brought by Human Rights Watch into the targeted 
killings of Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin in 2015. The organisation first submitted a 
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request for details on the legal advice justifying the attacks under the freedom of 
information law. The Attorney General and the Cabinet Office rejected it, and the 
Information Commissioner’s Office upheld the refusal. A subsequent legal tribunal 
rejected the Government’s claim that section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
provided a blanket exemption on disseminating information provided by the security 
services, and that part of the government’s legal advice, such as the interpretation of 
international law in justifying the killings should be subject to the public interest test.854   
 
State responsibility addresses the issue of how practices that were once illegal or 
forbidden become the norm and a legitimate, sometimes even routine, course of action. 
Finnemore and Sikkink describe this process of norm establishment as follows: first, a 
norm is proposed; it then seeks acceptance from a significant mass of actors; before 
finally gaining wider internalisation. Conformance “is almost automatic”.855 The type of 
behaviour exhibited by the UK government, whereby it selectively disseminates some 
information in targeted killings while keeping much of the detail secret has been termed 
‘quasi secrecy’ which involves combining official secrecy and de facto public disclosure 
to provide an effective mechanism for normalising a controversial practice.856 The aim is 
to legitimise actions that are legally dubious while making a distinction between 
permissible targeted killings and prohibited assassinations. The issue of responsibility to 
the judiciary is discussed further in Subchapter 5.4.3 with an analysis of the case of R 
(Gentle) v Prime Minister.857 
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5.2.2 Individual responsibility 
Individual criminal responsibility for members of the armed services can be found under 
military criminal law. The Armed Forces Act 2006 contains the main offences against 
military law in the UK. These can include a range of offences which carry different terms 
of imprisonment, such as misconduct on operations, mutiny, desertion, making false 
records, disgraceful conduct of a cruel or indecent kind, disclosing information useful to 
an enemy, and failing to attend or perform a duty. Cases may be heard in the Service 
Civilian Court, which is similar to a Magistrates Court and applies to civilians who are 
subject to service discipline, a Summary Appeals Court, a Court Martial, which is the 
service equivalent of a Crown Court, and a Court Martial Appeal Court. Prosecutions are 
brought by the Service Prosecuting Authority.  
 
One area of controversy has been the applicability of the ECHR to UK military personnel, 
and the government’s contention that the HRA was never intended to affect UK military 
personnel serving abroad. However it is made clear in Section 6 of the HRA that it is 
“unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a Convention 
right”, unless required by an Act of Parliament. While Parliament is exempted from 
falling under a ‘public authority’, the Ministry of Defence or armed forces are not.858 In 
other words, while the public authorities alone are accountable for breaches of human 
rights, individuals may be liable under criminal law.  
 
The HRA, however, also acts to protect British military personnel. A key case was Smith 
and others v Ministry of Defence859 in which the Supreme Court ruled that the right to life 
under Article 2 ECHR could apply to the deaths of two British soldiers in Iraq, and that 
	
858 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Human Rights and the Military (London, 2016) 
859 Supreme Court, Judgment: Smith and others v. Ministry of Defence (Respondent) (2013) 
available at <https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2012-0249-judgment.pdf> on 4 
September 2019 
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the government was obliged to investigate their deaths. The Supreme Court did 
emphasise, however, that human rights laws and standards should not be applied to the 
military in such a way as to hamper their operational effectiveness. The effect of the ruling 
was nevertheless to enhance the protections afforded under the HRA to military personnel 
such as the right to life.  
 
HRA also impacts the way military criminal law is conducted as well. A prime example 
of this was the ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in 2003 that required the 
Royal Navy to suspend all courts martial due to cases where defendants lacked oversight 
by independent and impartial adjudicators. This led to all courts martial cases in the Royal 
Navy since the passage of the HRA 1998 being temporarily suspended.860 The same did 
not apply to other services as they already had civilian judge advocates appointed by the 
Lord Chancellor’s office. However, this example demonstrated the impact of the HRA 
on the application of military criminal law.  
 
HRA has also had an impact on the way detainee abuse has been dealt with. A prime 
example is the inquiry into the treatment and death of Baha Mousa while in the custody 
of the British Army. The Chairman of the inquiry into his death ruled that there had been 
corporate failure on the part of the Ministry of Defence in allowing the use of prohibited 
interrogation methods in Iraq that had led to Baha Mousa suffering 93 injuries prior to 
his death in British custody.861 This led to the trial of Corporal Donald Payne, who 
became the first British soldier to be convicted of the war crime of inhumane treatment 
of person protected under the Geneva Convention, although he was cleared of 
manslaughter.  
	
860 Michael Smith, ‘Navy Suspends all Courts Martial’ (The Telegraph, 2003) available at 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1449621/Navy-suspends-all-courts-martial.html> 
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5.3 Domestic legal powers to use lethal force 
Fikfak and Hooper argue that the Government decides on whether to initiate armed 
conflict with the power derived from the Royal Prerogative.862 However in recent years, 
the view that the House of Commons should be allowed the opportunity to debate any 
decision to use military force abroad, except in the case of emergencies, has gained 
traction. This has developed into calls for the government to enshrine the right of 
parliamentary approval in law.863 This development occurred in the run up to both Libyan 
and Syrian conflicts when parliamentary debates demonstrated that there were differing 
views regarding the continued sole power of the government to decide on engaging in 
foreign conflicts.864 In particular, Mello notes that there were disagreements in three main 
areas: first, the type of operations that should be exempt; second, parliamentary 
procedures that favour the executive; and importantly, the proper timing of substantive 
votes.865  
 
The convention about the use of war powers is a purely political innovation that has been 
almost universally welcomed.866 This requires that the House of Commons be allowed to 
debate the deployment of armed forces abroad before such deployment takes place. It is 
meant to counter unilateral decisions by the Prime Minister to use force abroad with a 
mere semblance of parliamentary accountability. This remains a controversial area, 
however, as the right to exercise exceptional powers in times of emergency has always 
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Military Action Taken Against Libya (22 March 2011); Claire Mills, House of Commons, 
Parliamentary Approval for Military Action, CBP 7166 (8 May 2018) 
865 Patrick Mello, ‘Curbing the Royal Prerogative to use Military Force: the British House of 
Commons and the Conflicts in Libya and Syria’, West European Politics, vol.40, no.1 (2017) 
80-100 
866 Veronika Fikfak and Hayley Hooper, Parliament’s Secret War, Hart’s Publishing (2018) 
	 238	
been a common feature of the executive. The House of Lords Constitution Committee 
essentially confirmed this in 2013, concurring with the view that the full cabinet should 
be the ultimate decision maker regarding the decision to use force.867  
 
However, as Blick notes, in recent decades there has been an erosion of the Royal 
Prerogative with regard to emergency powers, with particular reference to accountability. 
This has been exacerbated by growing global security matters and events such as the 
decision to be involved in the invasion of Iraq. Consequently, there has been some 
transformation of the prerogative, partly through some of it being placed on a statutory 
basis and partly through enhanced legal and political constraints. 868  A more recent 
example has been the decision of Prime Minister Boris Johnson to prorogue Parliament 
from 9 September to 14 October 2019. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the 
advice given to the Queen and the prorogation that followed were unlawful. This has been 
seen as potentially damaging to the Royal Prerogative, as leader of the opposition Jeremy 
Corbyn asserted, “There was a danger of the royal prerogative being set directly against 
the wishes of the majority of the House of Commons.”869   
 
In the United Kingdom, the use of force is based on both common law and statutory 
provisions. Under common law, the use of force is permissible in preventing a crime or 
apprehending or assisting in the apprehension of a person reasonably suspected of 
committing a crime. The use of force is also permitted under the Criminal Law Act 1967. 
Other relevant statutes include Section 117 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 
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which provides the authority for the use of force when exercising powers conferred under 
the Act, and Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, which provides 




5.3.1 Use of force provisions 
This section will examine the provisions governing the use of force for both individuals 
and states. This is relevant for both military and security personnel who are required to 
commit targeted killings abroad, and the protections they are entitled to in domestic 
courts. It also has ramifications for those who are seeking redress in domestic courts for 
loved ones and family members who have may have been the subjects of extraterritorial 
and/or extrajudicial killings.  
 
Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 states that, “A person may use such force as is 
reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in the effecting or assisting 
in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders, or of persons unlawfully at large.” 
The term “reasonable” was further clarified in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008, which stated, “The question whether the degree of force used by D (the person 
charged with the offence) was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by the 
reference to the circumstance as D believed them to be…if it is determined that D did 
genuinely hold it, D is entitled to rely on it whether or not (a) it was mistaken, or (b) if it 
was mistaken, the mistake was a reasonable on to have made.” Section 76(7) of this Act 
also outlines the required considerations for determining whether force that has been used 
was reasonable. They are: (a) “that a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be 
able to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action, and (b) that evidence 
	 240	
of a person’s having only done what the person honestly and instinctively thought was 
necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes strong evidence that only reasonable action 
was taken by that person for that purpose.” 
Provisions covering the domestic use of force have also been important with regard to the 
military. This is most applicable to the conduct of the military during the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland, with particular reference to Bloody Sunday.870  This importance is 
exemplified by the Inquiry by Lord Saville into the Bloody Sunday killings, which found 
that the people killed that day by 1 Para did not pose a threat to them, and that the 
company was ultimately responsible for the unjustifiable shooting that caused the deaths 
and injuries.871 Section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 states, “a 
person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of 
crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders 
or of persons unlawfully at large.”  
Common law also provides the individual the right to use as much reasonable force 
necessary for the purposes of self-defence, as well as to prevent crime or to impact a 
lawful arrest. The issue of reasonable use of force is especially relevant when excessive 
force results in the killing of an individual. UK courts have consistently been against the 
practice of lowering a charge of murder to manslaughter when the offender holds an 
honest yet unreasonable belief in the use of lethal force. A prime example of this argument 
was the case of R. v Clegg872 involving a British soldier shooting a killing a joyrider that 
failed to stop at a military checkpoint in Northern Ireland.873  
	
870 Mark Saville, Hoyt William, and John Toohey, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Her 
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An especially controversial case was the killing of Patrick McElhone in 1974 by a British 
soldier in County Tyrone. At the trial, Justice McDermott found that the soldier had been 
justified in the killing even though he acknowledged that the soldier did not have the 
required belief that the victim had been involved in acts of terrorism or posed an 
immediate threat to his life or safety. Despite this, Justice McDermott still ruled that the 
soldier’s use of force was reasonable, given the fact that the killing occurred in an area 
where soldiers had previously been attacked and killed. This was despite the fact that the 
victim was an unarmed member of the public, not associated with any paramilitary 
organisation or posing a threat.  
Walsh argues that this case went far beyond the understood legal principles that govern 
the use of force in preventing crime. Justice McDermott’s interpretation would allow the 
army or police to use lethal force when apprehending someone, with legitimacy, if they 
were suspected of terrorism and did not obey the officer’s or soldier’s commands, even 
if they were unarmed.874 This has left Northern Ireland in what has been termed a “legal 
limbo”.875 The Attorney General subsequently exercised his powers under section 48A of 
the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1968 and referred the case to the Court of 
Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland on two points of law that had arisen in the case.876 
The Court of Criminal Appeal gave its opinion and then referred the case to the House of 
Lords, who upheld the rule that only a charge of murder can be brought in the killing by 
security forces.877 
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In the subsequent and broader Stalker Inquiry, the findings of which have never been 
published, the head of the inquiry Deputy Chief constable John Stalker did admit that 
although he never found written evidence of a shoot to kill policy, there was clear 
evidence that officers were expected to act accordingly. 878  In 1991, Amnesty 
International noted prosecutions of 21 members of the security force for using firearms 
while on duty in Northern Ireland since 1969, not including killings of sectarian nature.879 
13 were found to be not guilty, one person received a suspended sentence for 
manslaughter, and only one soldier was convicted of murder. That one soldier was 
released after serving 27 months and was subsequently reinstated into the army.880 From 
1969-1991, 339 were killed by security forces, most of whom were Catholic, unarmed, 
and were killed in dubious circumstances.”881 
Of those killed by the security forces, a significant number were joyriders. John Stalker 
went on to question why judges were overly sympathetic to British soldiers charged with 
murder. He concluded that it had become virtually impossible to convict a British soldier 
of murder in the courts of Northern Ireland. This has serious implications for the rule of 
law, especially as the reverse cases of people charged with the murder of British soldier 
have witnessed a series of dubious convictions. In 2013, the ECHR was critical of the 
UK’s investigations into the use of lethal force in Northern Ireland and ruled that the 
delays could not be seen as compatible with the obligation of the state as per Article 2 – 
the right to life – in ensuring the efficacy of investigations regarding suspicious deaths.882 
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The Bloody Sunday Inquiry883 was finally set up in 1998 for the purpose of re-examining 
the Widgery Report on the shooting of 13 people in Londonderry in 1972.884 As Walker 
states, the Inquiry was reported in 2010 and was accompanied by a fulsome Prime 
Ministerial apology for the loss of life, but “the costs and delays of the Bloody Sunday 
Inquiry have deterred the government from promising any further grand inquiry.”885 
 
5.3.2 Self-defence of individual criminal responsibility 
The principle of reasonable force is a key element in using self-defence as a defence 
against the use of force. The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 outlines that the 
acceptable degree of reasonable force is determined by the circumstances as the defendant 
believed them to be. If the belief is genuinely held, then it applies regardless of whether 
the defendant was mistaken, with the exception of mistakes made while voluntarily 
intoxicated. Self-defence is permissible as a defence to crimes committed through the use 
of force. The basic principle governing the use of forces was laid out in the case of Palmer 
v R, which limited the use of force in self-defence to only what was reasonably 
necessary.886 For example, in the case of R v Williams (Gladstone),887 the court ruled that 
an honest mistake in self-defence or prevention of a crime may be a defence even where 
the mistake was unreasonable. Therefore, the defendant must be judged against the facts 
as s/he believes them to be. In like manner, it was established in the case of R v Bird888 
that there is no duty to retreat in self-defence. In stating that the defendant could only rely 
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on self-defence if they show that their actions showed that they did not wish to fight, Lord 
Lane stated: 
 
“If the defendant is proved to have been attacking or retaliating 
or revenging himself, then he was not truly acting in self-defence. 
Evidence that the defendant tried to retreat or tried to call off the 
fight may be a cast-iron method of casting doubt on the 
suggestion that he was the attacker or retaliator or the person 
trying to revenge himself. But it is not by any means the only 
method of doing that.”889  
 
Automatism may also be a defence against the use of force where violent actions may be 
attributed to involuntary action or a lack of capability in maintaining self-control of one’s 
actions. However, the incapacitation must be involuntary and not attributable to 
recklessness. For example, in the case of R v Bailey890 where the defendant’s violent 
action was attributed to his failure to take insulin medication, the court ruled that unless 
the failure to take his medication was due to recklessness, hypoglycaemia may be found 
as an automatism defence.891  
 
5.3.3 Necessity 
Necessity is another potential defence to the use of force, in both domestic and 
international criminal law, especially as it involves the compromising of individual 
autonomy. It also can apply to military necessity within IHL. A prime example is the case 
of Erdemovic892 who had been ordered to kill prisoners in Serbia and was told that should 
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he refuse the order, he would also be killed. At his trial he used the defence of necessity 
and duress. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ruled 
that while the duress was a mitigating factor, it did not absolve him of the crime and he 
was sentenced to ten years in prison, later commuted to five.  
 
A similar example can be found in the cases of Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan 
Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić, and Berislav Pušić, who were indicted by the 
ICTY for breaching the Geneva Conventions, violating the laws and customs of war, and 
crimes against humanity.893 Their appeals were partially based on the non-disclosure of 
the Mladic diaries, which demonstrated the level of command and control that he 
exercised over those under him.894 These could theoretically be used to attempt to justify 
their crimes by the use of duress. However, it is often difficult to make a distinction 
between necessity and duress by threats.895 In addressing the laws of war, it is often also 
problematic when formulating treaties to strike the right balance between military 
necessity and humanitarian interests. 896  There is also controversy over whether the 
principle can be considered a general or specific defence. It has been defined as: 
  
“A defence which involves a claim by a defendant that he or she 
broke the law in order to secure some higher value or because of 
some external circumstances. The defendant argues that although 
the crime was committed with the required actus reus and mens 
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rea, the crime committed was a necessary action: it was a 
situation of emergency (involving perceived danger).”897 
 
The concept often applies to situations where an individual has two unpalatable choices 
between committing a crime and leaving oneself open to some form of harm or 
misfortune. The main difference between necessity and duress is that in the latter, the 
individual is compelled action by threats, whereas for the former, the compulsion to act 
comes from the circumstances involved.898  This issue is especially relevant in cases 
where a soldier is ordered by a superior officer to carry out a potentially unlawful act. An 
example of this can be found in the Baha Mousa killing by British soldiers in which a 
subsequent inquiry found that the Ministry of Defence was responsible for a corporate 
failure in providing guidance on the use of banned interrogation methods.899  At an 
operational level, soldiers were required to carry out illegal activities by their superiors 
such as Corporal Donald Payne who was described as “orchestrating a sickening ‘choir’ 
in which hooded detainees were punched in succession so their cries and moans created a 
grotesque chorus”.900 Gaeta comments on the defence of superior orders by stating: 
  
“The conditional liability approach, generally accepted by national 
legal systems, admits the plea as a complete defence, unless the 
subordinate knew or should have known the illegality of the order 
or unless the order was manifestly illegal. By contrast, relevant 
international instruments prior to the Rome Statute have invariably 
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taken the absolute liability approach, according to which obedience 
to orders is never a defence.”901   
 
Duress of circumstances, as opposed to duress of threats, has also become a more 
recognised defence in English law within recent times. The distinction between the two 
is that duress is where the defendant has been threatened, whereas duress of circumstances 
does not necessarily require an actual threat; it is enough that the circumstances dictate 
that if the defendant does not commit the crime, someone will be killed or suffer a serious 
injury.902 In order to use duress of circumstance as a defence, the defendant must face an 
imminent threat of death or serious injury, have reasonable grounds for believing in the 
threat, be reasonably steadfast in withholding the threat, and have no prior fault pertaining 
to the threat.903 
  
The courts have been arguably circumspect in their acceptance of necessity as a defence 
due to the risk of its abuse to hide true criminal intentions. Indeed, in the case of People 
(DPP) v Kelly,904 Judge Moran stated his concerns regarding the danger of social anarchy 
through the use or overuse of necessity as a defence to the use of force.905 The legal 
position based on case law regarding the applicability of necessity as a defence to murder 
is based on the ruling in R v Dudley906 in which the defendants who were castaways at 
sea committed murder and cannibalism on a crewmember in order to survive. The court 
adopted a nuanced if not confusing approach by at once stating categorically that 
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necessity can never be a defence to murder, but then sentencing the defendants to six 
months imprisonment instead of the norm of capital punishment.  
 
However, the definitiveness of this approach was reduced with the ruling in the case of 
Re A (Children)907 where the decision was made to terminate the life of a non-viable 
conjoined twin to enable the survival of the other twin. Without such an intervention, both 
twins would have died. In invoking the defence of necessity, the court outlined the three 
requirements that must be in place to justify its use: 1) the act must avoid inevitable and/or 
irreparable evil, 2) the act must stop at that which is reasonably necessary to achieve its 
purpose, and no more, and 3) the evil inflicted must be proportionate to the evil 
avoided.908 However, this ruling must be tempered by the fact that these were exceptional 
circumstances, which imply that it cannot be generally relied on as a defence to murder. 
Its conclusiveness as a ruling is lessened by the extenuating circumstances surrounding 
the case.  
 
There is also a distinction between a justification and excuse. In the former, the 
responsibility for a wrongful act is accepted without the acceptance that the act itself was 
necessarily wrong or bad. In the latter, there is an acceptance of the wrongful nature of 
the act, but no acceptance of responsibility. With the former, while an act may be 
wrongful, the law can allow some justification for the act irrespective of its wrongful 
nature. In the case of the latter, however, the act remains wrong notwithstanding the 
defendant’s exemption of guilt. Lowe gives the example of emergency drivers breaking 
the speed limit on the way to the hospital.909 A defence can be found in two ways: to 
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explicitly authorise emergency drivers to speed, or to acknowledge the breach in law but 
ensure that emergency drivers are not prosecuted for it. The first defence may relax 
adherence to the law whereas the second upholds the law while exempting the 
understandable breach of law.910    
  
This has relevance in both domestic and international law. In domestic law, the emphasis 
is on defence. Criminal law thus provides definitions of both offences and defences. A 
defence informs us of the circumstances wherein an act normally considered a crime is 
otherwise justified or excused.911 At an international level, the UN Charter not only 
outlines the general prohibition against the use of force (Art 2(4)) but also the exceptions 
(Articles 42 and 51). Vidmar cites Article 2(4), which determines that “the use of force 
is prima facie wrongful under international law yet using force pursuant to Articles 42 
and 51 is legally warranted”912 and as such preclude international wrongfulness. Vidmar 
adds that the use of force under such circumstances therefore does not constitute an 
internationally wrongful act.913  
 
Glanville Williams elaborated on the difficulties in relying on the defence of necessity by 
stating, “the peculiarity of necessity as a doctrine of law is the difficulty or impossibility 
of formulating it with any approach to precision…it is in reality a dispensing power 
exercised by the judges where they are brought to feel that obedience to the law would 
have endangered some higher value.”914 It is axiomatic that the rule of law requires the 
government to act legally in the way it conducts international relations. This includes the 
counter-terrorism policies it pursues extraterritorially. It is therefore of prime importance 
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that there is a sound legal basis for such actions, especially where force is to be used 
outside the boundaries of conventional armed conflict. In like manner, the legal basis the 
government uses to pursue these policies will determine the applicable legal standards. 
Should the government pursue a course of action that is not in accordance with domestic 
and international law, it runs the risk of not just failing to adhere to international norms, 
but theoretically of ministers facing criminal prosecution.  
 
5.3.4 Defence for the use of force by the state  
The government has cited the right of self-defence as justification for targeted killings915 
whereby the right to act in preventative self-defence is partly based on the imminence of 
an attack.916 This is regarding the self defence of a state as opposed to individual self 
defence such as the case of Clegg917 discussed in Subchapter 5.3.1. Under the long-
established aforementioned ‘Caroline test’ for imminence (so-called after a 19th-century 
case on the use of force), the need to use force in self-defence must be 1) instant, 2) 
overwhelming, 3) leaving no choice of means, and 4) no moment for deliberation.918 The 
government has argued that the concept of imminence needs to be updated to take into 
account modern realities and threats. The Attorney General emphasised the changing 
circumstances and context in society compared to that of the 19th century, which is when 
the Caroline case occurred.919 Imminence defined in the context of a terrorist threat 
cannot be equated to the context of troops marching on the horizon in a battle in the 
1890s.920 
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The argument was countered with the danger of expanding the definition of imminence. 
An important factor to consider is the degree of proximity required threatened acts and 
preparatory attacks in order for something to be considered imminent. 921  It is also 
necessary to outline the relationship between the notion of imminence and time and space; 
for how long is a threat considered to be imminent after the initial event has passed? A 
note was made of a UK drone strike in Syria whereby the use of force was authorised by 
the National Security Council up to three months before it was actually carried out.922 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights policy did however request that the government 
clarifies the definition of imminence, recognising its ambiguity: 
 
“We therefore recommend that the Government provides, in its 
response to our Report, clarification of its understanding of the 
meaning of “imminence” in the international law of self-defence. 
In particular, we ask the Government to clarify whether it agrees 
with our understanding of the legal position, that while 
international law permits the use of force in self-defence against 
an imminent attack, it does not authorise the use of force pre-
emptively against a threat which is too remote, such as attacks 
which have been discussed or planned but which remain at a very 
preparatory stage.”923   
 
The same policy, however, was used to justify the government’s claim to anticipatory 
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authorisation was given three months before the actual operation. This thesis seeks to 
highlight the importance of consistency in adhering to such key terms and calls for 
uniformity in defining said terms.  
 
The issue of imminence also comes into question with regard to the existence of 
government ‘kill lists’.925 While the government has not confirmed whether such lists 
exist, the very existence of such a list is contrary to the principle of imminence, in that a 
potential threat that is on a list for a protracted period of time cannot be construed as 
constituting an imminent threat to the UK. Therefore if such a list exists, there is clearly 
a lack of transparency regarding the process by which a name gets added to the list, 
whether these names are or should be [independently] reviewed over a period of time, 
and whether there is a need for some form of judicial oversight of the process.  
 
It should also be noted that the guidelines for the terminology, tasking, and employment 
of unmanned aircraft systems is contained in the Joint Doctrine Publication (JPD) 0-30.2. 
As well as updating the previous Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/11, it also “describes, from 
a joint perspective, the use of UAS at the operational level and includes new detail on the 
UAS tasking process and explains the need to consider not only the ‘collect’ task, but also 
the process, exploit and disseminate (PED) functions.”926   
 
The issue of imminence has ramifications for domestic law with regard to individuals 
seeking liability for actions carried out by the state or its agents. R (Hassan) v Secretary 
of State for Defence927 involved the apprehension of the deceased by British soldiers in 
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Iraq. Hassan was the taken to a US military facility at Camp Bucca and was transferred 
to the custody of US military personnel. Upon release, his body was found with eight 
gunshot wounds and covered in bruises. The deceased’s brother made a claim that 
Hassan’s arrest and detention had been arbitrary and unlawful, lacking in procedural 
safeguards guaranteed under Articles 2, 3, and 5 ECHR. He further claimed that the UK 
had failed to carry out an adequate and proper investigation into the circumstances of his 
death. The Court eventually ruled that “the powers of internment under the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions, relied on by the Government as a permitted ground for the 
capture and detention of Tarek Hassan, are in direct conflict with Article 5.1 of the 
Convention.”928 Duxbury and Groves argue that the ruling affirms the right to liberty in 
an IAC as the underlying relationship between IHRL and IHL.929 
 
The case of Rahmatullah v Ministry of Defence involved claims of wrongful detention 
and mistreatment of the respondents by British and US military personnel in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Mr Ramatullah was a Pakistani national who was apprehended in Iraq by British 
forces in 2004 and was transferred to the custody of the US military in Afghanistan where 
he was detained until 2014. Upon his release, he sued both the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence on the grounds of his mistreatment 
at the hands of British military personnel as well the complicity of the British government 
in his ten-year detention without charge or trial by US authorities. His was one in a large 
number of similar claims made by Iraqis. 
 
The High Court held that the claims made by the respondents were justiciable and 
therefore subject to trial in a court of law. This is important as the concept of imminence 
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has ramifications for individuals who seek liability under domestic law for actions carried 
out by the state or its agents. The relevance of this in cases of targeted killings is that it is 
often difficult for a state to justify a targeted killing in another country on the grounds 
that the target posed an imminent threat to the targeting state. However, it went on to 
declare that the Crown act of state doctrine provided a defence to the tort claims. “The 
Court of Appeal allowed the respondents’ appeals. It held that the doctrine provided a tort 
defence as well as a non-justiciability rule, but that the defence would only apply when 
the Government could establish that there were compelling grounds of public policy to 
refuse to give effect to the local tort law.”930 In 2017, the Supreme Court rejected the 
government’s use of state immunity and foreign act of state as a means of preventing an 
English court from adjudicating in the government’s complicity in “serious tortious 
wrongdoing”.931  
 
Another example can be found in the case of Belhaj and another (Appellants) v Director 
of Public Prosecutions and another (Respondents),932  which involved the appellants 
being captured and rendered to the authorities in Libya with the assistance of the British 
Secret Intelligence Service. They were subsequently imprisoned and tortured while in 
Libyan custody.933 While the metropolitan Police initially investigated their allegations, 
the Director of Public Prosecution declined to bring any prosecutions on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence.934 A review by the Crown Prosecution Service also arrived at the 
same conclusion. However, neither body revealed what evidence was available and why 
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this was insufficient to bring a prosecution on the grounds of compromising security. The 
appellants duly sought a judicial review in the High Court. The case was eventually 
argued before the Supreme Court, which decided to allow the appeal by a majority of 
three to two.935 The Court based its decision on the fact that: 
  
“The adoption of closed material procedure requires specific 
statutory authority. The Justice and Security Act 2013 gave the 
High Court a general statutory power, in certain circumstances, 
to receive “closed material” which is disclosed only to the court 
and to a special advocate. As explained in the 2011 Justice and 
Security Green Paper, the Act was a response to a growing 
number of civil claims for damages against which the government 
was unable to defend at trial except through the unacceptably 
damaging disclosure of secret material. Those claims instead had 
to be settled.”936   
 
The UK outlined the procedures of the tasking and use of unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS) in the Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-302.937 The report outlines the systems 
approved by the National Security Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015 used 
by the varying arms of the armed forces. The army employs Desert Hawk III and 
Watchkeeper unmanned craft, while the Royal Airforce uses the Reaper, soon to be 
replaced by Protector in 2020. The Royal Navy tended its use of the ScanEagle system in 
2017 and at the time of the report alternative systems were being considered. Article 36 
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of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions governs the use of these systems 
before entering service and operating under the same political authority, command chain 
supervision, IHL and rules of engagement as manned aircraft.  
5.4 National mechanisms of governance  
The legislature and judiciary have a role to play in holding the executive accountable with 
regard to its legislation and policies. Parliament can only play a limited role in this regard 
due to the way the UK breaches the separation of powers principle, which mandates that 
no one person should be in more than one of the three organs of the state at a time. 
Members of Parliament are also members of the executive, therefore a government with 
a sufficient majority can force through any legislation. The House of Lords, not being 
elected, can only delay legislation; it cannot overturn it. Another contributing factor is 
that in the British political system, a Member of Parliament’s prime allegiance is to the 
party before his or her constituency. This means that MPs are always under pressure to 
vote in favour of the government’s laws and policies in the interests of party unity and 
the continuity of governance. The consequence of this though is that the legislature is not 
able to hold the executive fully accountable. This results in many of the UK’s recent anti-
terrorism statutes being passed without proper scrutiny. This especially applies to the 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which was “rushed through Parliament with no pre-
legislative scrutiny or public consultation on most of its provisions – a speed justified by 
the increased terror threat posed by the return of young Muslims from Syria and Iraq.”938  
 
There have been other similar instances where domestic legislation has been fast-tracked 
through Parliament without proper debate or scrutiny. A prime example was the Anti-
Terrorism and Security Act 2001 rushed through Parliament only two months after the 
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9/11 attacks. In 2004 however, the House of Lords ruled that the Act’s right to indefinitely 
detain foreign nationals without charge was incompatible with the Human Rights Act 
1998, stating that the Government Order exempting the UK from the right to liberty was 
unlawful.939 It went on to note that the fact that only foreign nationals were being detained 
was discriminatory and unnecessary. It subsequently made a declaration of 
incompatibility, arguing that the legislation was not compatible with the right to liberty 
under the Human Rights Act.940 The government rushed through its replacement in the 
form of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Such actions are not consistent with a 
general responsibility by the government to protect the rights of British citizens and 
foreign nationals within its jurisdiction.941 Instead, it constituted precipitate action that 
was only concerned with security issues.  
 
5.4.1 Accountability to parliament 
The UK government has been reluctant to admit to or give details of its involvement in 
targeted killings by UAVs. Where figures have been released, they have been met with 
scepticism. For example, the Secretary of Defence gave a written statement to Parliament 
in 2018 stating that there was only one civilian killed in airstrikes over Iraq and Syria. 
This was despite government figures stating that the RAF had dropped more than 3,400 
bombs and missiles in Syria and Iraq. While these have been responsible for killing 4,315 




939 Liberty, Detention Without Charge (2019) available at 
<https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/human-rights/countering-terrorism/detention-without-
charge> on 11 July 2019 
940 ibid 
941 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Fast-track Legislation: Constitutional Implications 
and Safeguards, HL 116–I (2008–09) 
942 James Kearney, ‘RAF Airstrikes in Iraq and Syrian: an Assessment’, Action on Armed 




5.4.1.1 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament report: UK lethal drone 
strikes in Syria 
 
The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament report in April 2017, UK Lethal 
Drone Strikes in Syria,943 is an apt example of insufficient government accountability to 
Parliament. The Report was about UK lethal drone strikes in Syria, with a focus on the 
killing of British citizen Reyaad Khan in August 2015. Khan had appeared in an ISIS 
recruitment video and was suspected of being involved in the planning and execution of 
terror attacks.944 The purpose of the Report was to comment on the veracity and diligence 
of the decisions surrounding the strikes. The Report concluded that the Committee was 
unable to offer assurances as to the above due to insufficient information provided. The 
Report describes this failure to provide necessary documentation or witness testimony as 
“profoundly disappointing”.945  
 
The Report investigated the Government’s justification for the strike on Khan, assessing 
the four requirements of self-defence, namely: severity, imminence, necessity, and 
proportionality. Regarding the key requirement of imminence, the Report conceded that 
“‘imminence’ may mean different things to different people” 946  and that without 
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Ministerial submissions, they were “not in a position to comment”947 on the process by 
which Ministers considered the question of imminence. The Committee requested further 
intelligence reports but were denied by the National Security Secretariat.948 
 
While the Committee acknowledged the seriousness of Khan’s threat, they were also 
unable to assess the process by which the Ministers determined the threat to be severe 
enough to equate to an armed attack.949 As for proportionality, the Committee bemoaned 
the lack of information given to properly assess the risk of collateral damage, warning 
that the matter may go unscrutinised.950 The Committee concluded that oversight and 
scrutiny depends on primary evidence – which was not provided sufficiently – and so 
they could not provide assurance to endorse the authorisation process for the lethal 
strike.951   
 
The Report consistently demonstrated the Government’s lack of accountability to 
Parliament in such key matters. The fact that the situation was nevertheless deemed 
sufficient to warrant extrajudicial killing is a testament to how the practice of targeted 
killings is impinging on centuries-old rights such as habeas corpus, the principle of being 
innocent until proven guilty, and the right to a fair trial. Force was used for the imposition 
of a death sentence on minimally disclosed evidence that would not be sufficient to 
prosecute a person in a court of law. 
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The use of drones in the killing of Reyaad Khan raises the possibility that the continued 
use of drone strikes in the future in this way will lead to accountability and oversight 
gaps. As the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones Inquiry Report argues, “When UK 
personnel are embedded with allies, they remain subject to UK disciplinary regulations 
and ultimate control over their actions remains with the UK. Therefore, the UK will not 
escape state responsibility for their actions, and lack of parliamentary oversight could 
leave the UK vulnerable to implication in unlawful actions.”952 
 
Another key issue with the use of drone strikes is that their increased use has been 
described as mission creep. Parliament had originally only given permission for 
surveillance flights over Syria; any expansion of the use of strikes would be without 
parliamentary authority. Michael Clarke, the Director-General of the Royal United 
Services Institute, addressed the killing of Reyaad Khan, making note of the 
inconsistencies between the government’s pledges and action on the ground. In October 
2014, it was pledged that no military operations would be conducted in Syria. It was also 
pledged that, unlike CIA drones, UK drones would never be used for targeted 
assassinations in areas considered outside the UK’s legal jurisdiction, namely in areas 
where the UK or NATO forces were militarily engaged and faced physical threat on the 
ground.953 Nevertheless, the strike was made “in an area that the UK does not currently 
regard, legally, as an operational theatre of war for UK forces.”954 
 
This further raises the question of the extent to which Parliament can hold the executive 
to account in the UK. The British judiciary, prior to the era of transnational terrorism, 
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essentially took a back seat in upholding the rights of the individual in the face of state 
power where national security was concerned. A prime example was the case of 
Liversidge v Anderson955 in which the courts failed to hold the executive accountable for 
the act of executive detention without trial. Lord Diplock highlighted this principle of 
executive prerogative, stating that the executive government is responsible for national 
security, not the courts of justice. As such, “It is par excellence a non-justiciable question. 
The judicial process is totally inept to deal with the sort of problem which it involves.”956 
In 1995, Lord Justice Simon Brown described the notion of national security as an almost 
mystical entity, whereby its invocation “instantly discourages the court from satisfactorily 
fulfilling its normal role of deciding where the balance of public interest lies.”957 
 
5.4.2 Accountability to the judiciary 
While individual cases have been noted throughout the chapter, this subchapter considers 
the judiciary as a mechanism for accountability in an effort to analyse the overarching 
view of the role of the judiciary. Davis and de Londras define counter terrorism judicial 
review as “the use of judicialized processes to challenge state behaviours that fall into the 
broad category of counter terrorism.”958 The judiciary has been accused in the past of 
taking a conciliatory approach to the executive prerogative in the use of force. It has 
consequently often been reluctant to hold the government accountable for its actions in 
case such actions inhibit its ability to protect the national interest.  
 
A prime example is the case of R v Jones in 2006.959 The defendants broke into and 
committed acts of criminal damage to the UK airbase at RAF Fairford and other military 
	
955 Liversidge v Anderson [1941] UKHL 1 
956 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] UKHL 9 
957 ibid 
958 Fergal F. Davies and Fiona de Londras, Critical Debates on Counter Terrorist Judicial 
Review (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 10 
959 R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16 
	 262	
targets shortly before the commencement of the Iraq invasion in 2003. Their intention 
was to disrupt the preparations for the upcoming invasion, which they believed to be 
unlawful under international law. They were all charged with a range of offences such as 
criminal damage, attempted arson, and aggravated trespass. Their defence at the trial was 
predicated on acts being undertaken to prevent the commission of the crime of 
international aggression. However, it was questionable whether the act of aggression 
constituted a crime in international law, and whether such a crime was applicable under 
English law. This led to the need for clarification in the House of Lords prior to the 
defendants being tried.   
 
Another example is the case of R (Gentle) v Foreign Secretary,960 where the mothers of 
two British servicemen killed in Iraq requested judicial review on whether the 
government had taken reasonable steps to ensure that the invasion of Iraq complied with 
international law. The legal question was whether the incorporation of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 placed an obligation on the British government to take reasonable steps to 
ensure such actions were lawful. The court held that such a question regarding the 
lawfulness of the Iraq invasion was not justiciable on the grounds that ECHR applied to 
domestic rights and “the principles of international law were not imported wholesale into 
the Convention.”961  
 
However, this deference to executive power changed with the ruling in the case of A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department962 in which the House of Lords ruled that the 
conditions of prisoners being held indefinitely at Belmarsh prison were incompatible with 
	
960 R (Gentle) v Prime Minister [2006] EWCA Civ 1690 
961 Henrietta Hill and Stephen Cragg, ‘The Lawfulness of War’, New Law Journal, no.7260 
(2007) available at <https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/public-law-update-4> on 10 
January 2020 
962 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 
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the provisions of Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This 
represented a shift in the judiciary automatically accepting the removal of rights of the 
individual by the executive on the grounds of national security. In like manner, the House 
of Lords ruled in the case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and 
Others 963  that the conditions attached to control orders, especially with regard to 
disclosure of material, did not afford defendants a fair trial. 
 
These rulings have re-asserted the independence of the judiciary and the key role it plays 
in, for example, protecting the Human Rights Act 1998 from executive overreach. A 
suggestion for overcoming such differences in interpretation may be the use of judicial 
pre-legislative scrutiny, possibly by a committee of the Supreme Court. Such a system 
could address the problems of controversial legislation being passed without sufficient 
legislative scrutiny. A prime example of this was the control orders legislation, which 
was rushed through Parliament in only 19 days.  
 
5.5 Counter terrorism 
The barring of British citizens from returning to the United Kingdom may have direct 
consequences to both counterterrorism as a whole, and the use of UAVs to combat 
perceived threats in particular. Drones may be seen as the only solution to deal with 
individuals that are barred from returning to the UK through terrorism exclusion orders 
but continue to engage in terrorist activities from abroad. This could in turn lead to an 
escalation of the use of drones. The related question remains as to the extent to which 
such exiled individuals pose a sufficient [imminent] risk to the UK to justify such actions. 
The UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) requires states to “prevent, disrupt, prosecute, 
rehabilitate, and reintegrate foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). While states have an 
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obligation to prevent and counter terrorism, including terrorism-related acts committed 
by FTFs, measures should be carefully designed to ensure that they are human rights-
compliant and do not undermine the global human rights and the rule of law framework 
while countering terrorism.” 964  This requirement is at odds with the government’s 
decision to bar the return of such fighters. The government’s powers to prosecute 
returnees have been enhanced with the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act 2019. However, there is a risk that refusing FTFs to return to the UK may either 
further radicalise them or leave them trapped in the country where they have been 
operating. This leaves them in a situation where they are still posing a potential threat to 
the UK, thereby remaining as candidates for targeted killing by drone strikes. A current 
prime example is the case of Shamima Begum who, though born British citizen, has been 
refused the right to return to the UK and stripped of her citizenship.965  
 
The situation becomes even more complicated in the case of children. An example is the 
case of Sally Jones, also known as the “white widow”, who fled the UK to join ISIS.  She, 
along with her young son, were targeted and killed by a US drone strike in 2017 while 
fleeing from Raqqa. The refusal of a potential request to return in these circumstances 
would leave someone like this stranded in Syria or some other area of conflict. They 
would therefore continue to be deemed a threat and subject to targeted killings, which 
would in turn proliferate drone strikes.966   
 
5.6 Balancing security and liberty 
	
964 OSCE, Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and challenges of Foreign Terrorist Fighters 
within a Human Rights Framework (OSCE 2018) 5-6; Christophe Paulussen and Kate Pitcher, 
‘Prosecuting (Potential) Foreign Fighters: Legislative and Practical Challenges’, International 
Centre for Counter Terrorism, (The Hague, 2018) 
965 Begum v Secretary of State for the Home Department SC/163/2019, 7 February 2020 
(Special Immigration Appeal Tribunal). 
966 Katherine Brown, ‘White Widows: the Myth of the Deadliest Jihadi Women’, (Tony Blair 
Institute for Global Change, 2018) 
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This chapter deals with the problems of balancing the requirements of security and liberty 
in domestic law within the overall context of the transfer and use of high technology 
weapons, namely UAVs. The country’s security needs are based on countering the threats 
posed by local and transnational terrorism. At the same time, this has to be undertaken in 
conjunction with respecting the individual’s rights to freedom and procedural fairness. 
The data presented in the chapter indicates that the British state is prioritising security 
over liberty.  
 
One such example is the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Emwazi, or Jihadi John, in 
which the government justified the attack on the grounds that the circumstances 
constituted an emergency and therefore did not require parliamentary oversight. Clarke 
argues that using extrajudicial killing to counter an unspecified or even non-urgent threat 
where the UK is not engaged in an armed conflict sets a dangerous precedent for other 
states to follow suit. Legal justification on these grounds “is thin and may be damaging 
to the international norms the UK seeks to strengthen.”967 
 
The government’s justification of granting licences authorising the sale of arms to Saudi 
Arabia was that there was not a clear risk that the weapons sold would be used in the 
commission of breaches of IHL in accordance with Criterion 2 of the Common Rules 
Governing the Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment (European 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, December 2008). The High Court initially 
accepted this justification as an adequate response. This was based on its acceptance of 
the Government’s assertion that “Criterion 2c is focused on a prospective assessment 
based on an overall judgment of all the information and materials which [the Defendant] 
	
967 Michael Clarke, ‘Killing Jihadi John: Significance and Implications’ (RUSI, 2015) available 
at <https://rusi.org/commentary/killing-%E2%80%98jihadi-john%E2%80%99-significance-
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considers appropriate and has available to it. Past and present conduct is one indicator as 
to future behaviour and attitude towards international law.”968  
 
This was a deferential approach to executive power; the Court noted that when the Court 
lacks the particular expertise of a subject, it should be made especially cautious “before 
interfering with a finely balanced decisions reached after careful and anxious 
consideration by those who do have the relevant expertise to make the necessary 
judgments.” 969  This was an extraordinary declaration to make, considering this is 
precisely what courts do on a routine basis where there are legal conflicts. Judges usually 
do not possess the institutional expertise in other areas of law such as contracts, 
competition, and trusts law. However, they make assessments based on compliance with 
the law rather than the carefully balanced decisions that have been reached between two 
competing or opposing parties. 
 
While this process may be described as a dichotomy between security and liberty, there 
is also a third factor at work in the form of an economic argument. It is often argued that 
the export of arms is significantly profitable to the United Kingdom’s economy. As of 
2018, the number of approved arms export licenses was valued at £6.6 billion, which 
represents an 83% increase over 2017, allowing the UK to compete with Russia for the 
position of the world’s second largest arms exporter. While this is proving lucrative for 
UK arms sales, the UK has also been accused of fuelling conflicts and instability in 
different parts of the world. These weapons are also being used to commit human rights 
	
968 Laura Green and David Hamer, ‘The Legality of the UK/Saudi Arms Trade: A Case Study’ 
(European Journal of international Law, 2017) available at <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
legality-of-the-uk-saudi-arabia-arms-trade-a-case-study/> on 9 July 2019 
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atrocities,970 such as the way Saudi Arabia has used British weapons to commit human 
rights offences in Yemen.  
 
Another example can be found in the case of arms sold to Egypt and Bahrain. This sale 
was blocked during the attempts to stamp out the Arab Spring uprisings. By then, 
however, “it was too late for the Arab citizens being tracked with UK surveillance 
equipment, bundled into UK armoured vehicles and killed and tortured by a military with 
access to all manner of UK weaponry.”971 Arms sold to European and US companies are 
also being diverted to local factions and groups in the Middle East for a lucrative profit. 




The aim of this chapter was to assess UK domestic law in regulating drone warfare as 
well as the topics that impact on the use of drones, such as the use of lethal force, counter 
terrorism, and the arms trade. The chapter found that underlying themes of security and 
trade have impacted the UK’s ability to regulate drone warfare. In particular, the UK’s 
arms trade activity and political ties have put into question the UK’s position on drone 
warfare. The chapter also continued from previous chapters in arguing the inadequacy of 
popular application of the concepts of self-defence, imminence, and necessity. The case 
	
970 Cahal Milmo, ‘Britain’s Arms Exports grow by Billions – as it Sells More Bombs to Drop on 
Yemen’ (The Essential Daily Briefing, 2018) available at <https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/uk-
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of Reyaad Khan was analysed in detail to reveal the shortcomings of these applications 
and the need to reform them in light of the technologies of drone warfare. Finally, the 
chapter highlighted the issue of accountability, calling for more accountability and 
transparency from government, especially in the current era of advanced technology in 
armed conflict.   
 
5.7.1 Proposals 
The thesis echoes the advice of Parliament that the Government ought to establish clear 
and independent accountability mechanisms regarding the use of lethal force outside 
instances of armed conflict, with particular regards to drones. Parliament specifically 
recommends: 
 
1) “Automatic referral to the ISC of any such use of lethal force; 
2) A revised Memorandum of Understanding between the Prime 
Minister and the ISC making clear that the Government 
accepts that the ISC has the power to consider intelligence-
based military operations, and that the MoD must provide the 
ISC with all the relevant information about such an operation 
that the ISC needs to make its investigation effective; and 
3) Access to independent legal advice rather than legal advice 
from the Government’s lawyers.”973 
  
This advice is in line with the ECtHR ruling in McCann, as outlined in Subchapter 4.3.1.5 
on IHRL. This thesis calls for more uniformity between legal frameworks. Applicability 
	
973 House of Commons and House of Lords, ‘The Government’s Policy on the use of Drones for 
Targeted Killing: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015–
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– and even enforceability – can increase if key procedures, rulings, and concepts are 
aligned. In this vein, the chapter calls for further clarification on the definition of 
imminence, its application to drones, and its relationship with necessity and self-defence. 
It also calls for further clarification on the threshold required for a terrorist attack or 
threatened attack to constitute an “armed attack”.974 
 
With regards to accountability, a potentially key solution to executive overreach has been 
the convention on the use of war powers, which is a recent and provisional, if not 
tentative, convention requiring the Government to first seek the approval of Parliament 
before engaging in the use of force abroad. It has the advantage of requiring parliamentary 
scrutiny of any decision to go to war. However, this convention is being undermined by 
the Government’s use of remote warfare, which consists of the use of Special Forces and 
drones. This process has been described as working “by, with, and through local and/or 
regional forces who do the bulk of the frontline fighting while the UK and its Western 
allies provide support through capacity building, equipment, air support, or the 
deployment of special forces.”975 This thesis calls for further work on this convention 
with specific mention of UAVs in armed attacks.  
 
The Government has stated that certain areas, such as the use of Special Forces, will be 
exempt from the convention, ostensibly on the grounds that such operations require 
stealth and secrecy. This statement, however, has been complicated by government 
assertions that Special Forces were not used in Libya and Syria, which turned out to be 
false claims. Parliament has largely accepted the argument that Special Forces and 
intelligence operations need to be conducted without prior public scrutiny. The situation 
	
974 ibid para 3.29 
975 Liam Walpole and Megan Karlshoej-Pedersen, Remote Warfare and the Practical 
Challenges for the Protection of Civilians Strategy (Oxford Research Group, Oxford, 2019) 1 
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with the extraterritorial use of drones in targeted killings is more complicated. The 
convention only covers military operations that involve the use of force where there is a 
risk to the life of UK armed forces or the military and civilians of other countries. It does 
not apply to non-combat operations such as surveillance and intelligence gathering. The 
thesis calls for further clarification in this regard. 
 
More broadly, an underlying issue is how to ensure security in a manner that is 
accountable and that does not undermine liberty and human rights in an era when counter-
terrorism has become a near-permanent mode of governance. These problems are 
partially constitutional in nature, and any solution would necessarily involve 
constitutional change, which is difficult to achieve. At present, there are policies in place, 
such as the gathering of statistics on the use of counter-terrorism powers and the 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, which works independently of the 
Government to inform the public and political debate on anti-terrorism laws. However, 
accountability and knowledge gaps still exist and need to be addressed, including the 
impact on counter-terror laws on affected communities. 976  Other potential solutions 
include preventative measures such as the dissemination of counter-narratives, 
investment in community police officers, and the development of inter-religious 
dialogues. These solutions require the British government to re-commit itself to the idea 
that sacrificing liberty for security in domestic law and policy is a counter-productive 
strategy that causes the type of social disruption that terrorists aim to achieve, in turn 
leading to the increased dehumanisation of armed conflict outlined throughout the thesis. 
 
	
976 Alexander Horne and Clive Walker, ‘Lessons Learned From Political Constitutionalism? 
Comparing the Enactment of Control Orders and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation by the 
UK Parliament’ Public Law (2014) 267; Alexander Horne and Clive Walker, ‘Parliament and 
National Security’ in Alexander Horne and Andrew Le Sueur (eds.), Parliament: Legislation 






6.1 Research findings  
This thesis examined the dehumanisation of drone warfare, scrutinising the legal response 
to the proliferation of UAVs in armed conflict. It found that the increasing physical 
distance between combatants created by drone technology has led to psychological 
distancing and detachment. The enemy is anonymised and partially dehumanised, 
reducing natural and innate human inhibitions towards killing. Smart weapons have 
reduced human presence on the battlefield – at least on one side – thereby diminishing 
the perceived consequences of armed conflict. As a result, armed conflict is growing 
increasingly unilateral, at times reduced to preventative manhunting. The thesis further 
found that the drone phenomenon is changing the landscape of contemporary armed 
conflict. The unprecedented ease with which individual drone operations can be deployed 
has significantly bridged the gap between war and peace. Extensive mobilisation or 
commitment to armed conflict is not required to execute specific military operations. The 
threshold of armed aggression is greatly diminished, transforming armed attack from the 
last resort to the first option.  
 
Finally, the thesis found that the abovementioned developments in armed conflict 
undermine the normative ability of IHL and IHRL. Individual drone operations do not 
currently require the existence of a recognised armed conflict, and as a result are 
exploiting the conventional frameworks upon which the laws are based as well as the 
tentative relationship between the two. The current premise upon which the law operates 
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is not sufficient to adequately regulate drone warfare. International law is premised on 
traditional modes of combat and therefore does not instruct with enough detail the 
abilities of more advanced technologies in armed conflict. 
 
6.2 Chapter findings 
6.2.1 Chapter 2: dehumanisation 
Chapter 2 found a direct relationship between physical distance and psychological 
distance and detachment. The greater the distance between an act and its consequences, 
the less attachment there is towards the consequences. This translates into armed conflict; 
the further the combatants are from one another, the weaker the inhibitions are towards 
killing. Technology in warfare, in the form of UAVs, has exacerbated the issue, as they 
create a situation where drone operators are not in any direct line of fire but retain the 
ability to attack.  
 
The chapter found that the above developments have led to an increasingly unilateral 
form of armed conflict. Drones transcend borders with relative ease, facilitating targeted 
killings. This facilitation in turn has grown increasingly preventative, and operations are 
conducted based on patterns of analysis derived from drone surveillance. The chapter 
questions the veracity of the accuracy and decision-making process behind these attacks 
as well as the overarching development of drone warfare. 
 
6.2.2 Chapter 3: The Law of Armed Conflict 
Chapter 3 found weaknesses in IHL in its ability to regulate drone warfare. IHL is largely 
premised on warfare being fought between states in defined locations and periods of high-
intensity battles. The rapid development of technologically advanced weapons has led to 
two situations in which IHL is not currently equipped to govern: prolonged periods of 
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low-intensity conflict, and the rise and significance of non-state actors. First, NIACs are 
not sufficiently defined,977 which indulges states’ decision to resort to drones. Second, 
there are issues regarding the threshold of a minimum level of organisation and a 
sufficient degree of intensity before IHL can apply.978 Finally, IHL fails to define with 
necessary clarity whether a terrorist is considered to be a combatant or a civilian.979 These 
discrepancies help create a situation where armed attacks take place but without the 
necessary regulations.  
 
6.2.3 Chapter 4: International Human Rights Law 
This chapter found that IHRL serves as a useful outlet to govern matters where IHL may 
fall short, but has problems with enforceability. While the chapter maintains that IHRL 
does indeed apply to armed conflicts, there are uncertainties as to whether IHRL applies 
to a particular conflict, whether it applies to jurisdictions not party to IHRL, and to what 
extent it applies responsibility to allies of those involved in conflicts. In other words, 
IHRL applies to armed conflicts, but its enforceability and application are problematic. 
One particular issue in IHRL is the extent to which states can be held accountable for the 
use of drones outside the state’s jurisdiction. The chapter has found that case law upholds 
a state’s extraterritorial responsibility in certain circumstances.  
 
The chapter also found that there is sufficient argument to posit that many drone strikes 
violate IHRL. The arbitrary deprivation of life is prohibited under IHRL, and states are 
only allowed a small window through which derogations are possible. A state cannot 
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always guarantee that strikes are not arbitrary or that threats posed by the targets are 
sufficiently real and immediate to represent a threat to life. 
 
6.2.4 Chapter 5: national governance 
This chapter found that prioritising security and trade has compromised the UK’s ability 
to safeguard its citizens. Dangerous precedents were set when parliamentary oversight 
was bypassed on grounds of emergency for an unspecified or even non-urgent threat, such 
as the case of the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Emwazi. The chapter highlighted 
the discrepancies in the Government’s application of imminence in relation to drone 
warfare. As per the Caroline test,980 imminence as a self-defence can only be used for 
preventative self-defence when the threat is immediate, and the use of such force is 
necessary for its prevention. 
 
Lucy Fisher summarises the relationship between the unique capabilities of drone warfare 
and Britain’s responsibility to ensure the rule of law, tying together the key notions of 
this thesis:  
 
“Herein lies a key tension at the heart of Britain’s drone use. 
While the capability obviates any need to put troops in harm’s 
way on the ground, that lack of physical personnel means strikes 
are often undertaken without full intelligence and are concluded 
without sufficient investigation into the outcome. The UK is 
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This thesis has outlined the consequences of drone warfare and the potential implications 
of its unrestricted deployment. Rather than favouring an exclusionary approach to ban 
armed UAVs, this thesis calls for the development of regulations specific to their 
capabilities. Legal frameworks premised on conventional methods of warfare are not 
currently sufficient to adequately regulate ‘smart’ weapons that are unprecedented in their 
speed of deployment, distance, and precision. Rather than seeking to develop new 
frameworks, the thesis calls for existing frameworks to be updated and evolved in line 
with these new technologies. In an increasingly globalised world, this thesis also calls for 
further uniformity and clarity between different international and national legal 
frameworks. It specifically calls on the UK to take the initiative as an international leader 
to implement or at least forward the proposed changes. Recommendations are made for 
IHL, IHRL, and UK domestic law as follows. 
 
6.3.1 Proposals for IHL  
Rather than an overhaul, the most pragmatic solution would be to update and evolve IHL. 
This thesis proposes the Tallinn Manual982 as a model to emulate and apply to drone 
warfare. Such an approach is proposed as a stepping-stone towards formalising laws and 
policies. Two particular aspects of IHL that require further detail and clarification are: 1) 
the definition of a direct participant in a conflict, especially with regards to terrorists, who 
	
981 Lucy Fisher, ‘Civilians Need Protection From British Drones’, (The Times, 2019) available 
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more often than not fall neither within the categories of combatant nor civilian under IHL, 
and 2) the definition of an NIAC in an increasingly globalised world where non-state 
actors have the ability to cross borders. The dehumanisation and detachment outlined 
throughout the thesis are to serve as reference points for adjustments in IHL.  
 
Regarding the deployment of drones, the thesis proposes that the use of drones be limited 
to instances of legally recognised armed conflicts. Such a qualifier would assist in 
deterring the unrestricted use of drones as a first resort in cases of pre-emptive attack. 
Mary O’Connell testified that “drones are not lawful for use outside combat zones”.983 
Special Rapporteur Philip Alston adds that “outside the context of armed conflict, the use 
of drones for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal.”984 Bachman and Holland 
comment that in spaces outside a legally recognised battlefield, killing individuals 
suspected of planning or participating in political violence without first attempting to 
detail them constitutes a violation of both IHL and IHRL.985 Shiri Krebs concludes her 
article Rethinking Targeted Killing Policy by recommending targeted killings be used as 
a last resort, only after capture and detention are unavailable, thus respecting and 
protecting civilian lives on both sides equally. 986  As explained in Chapter 5, most 
countries and international agencies view the Global War on Terror as in breach of 
international law and would thus not qualify as an official armed conflict.987  
 
6.3.2 Proposals for IHRL 
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(2019) 1029; Jeffrey Bachman, ‘The Lawfulness of Targeted Killing Operations Outside 
Afghanistan’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol.38, no.11 (2015) 899-918 
986 Shiri Krebs, “Rethinking Targeted Killing Policy: Reducing Uncertainty, Protecting 
Civilians From the Ravages of Both Terrorism and Counterterrorism”, Florida State University 
Law Review, vol.44 (2017) 1-53 
987 UN ECOSOC, 62nd Sess, Future E/CN.4/2006/120 (15 February 2006) 
	 277	
This thesis calls for clarification on the legal framework(s) that would apply when drone 
strikes are conducted outside instances of official armed conflict. This necessitates clearer 
boundaries to be drawn between IHL and IHRL, and further research to be conducted on 
their relationship. The Joint Committee on Human Rights called on the UK government 
to “avoid conflating the Law of War and the ECHR and to remove the scope for such 
legal confusion by setting out the Government’s understanding of how the legal 
frameworks are to be interpreted and applied in the new situation in which we find 
ourselves.”988 The “new situation” is referring to the unprecedented capabilities of drone 
technology. This thesis echoes these recommendations and forwards the idea that 
clarifying the relationship between legal frameworks is key to combating the effects of 
drone warfare.  
 
As mentioned throughout the thesis, applying laws designed for conventional uses of 
lethal force to advanced technologies in war may create insufficiencies in their 
application. The above-mentioned committee continues to note: “the decision-making 
process for more conventional uses of lethal force in armed conflict may not be sufficient 
to ensure compliance with the relevant standards on the use of lethal force. The 
Government should consider whether any changes to the process are required…”989 This 
shows that adjustments to law must be comprehensive with consideration of decision-
making and procedure. 
 
There are also calls to revise IHRL to renew official commitment to human rights. For 
example, there are arguments to extend the notion of inalienable human rights based on 
	
988 House of Commons and House of Lords, ‘The Government’s Policy on the use of Drones for 
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the understanding that all human rights are inherent to every human.990 However, the 
thesis concedes the extremely delicate balance between maintaining the current integrity 
of IHRL and increasing its applicability. Finding the right balance is very difficult to 
achieve. The thesis makes suggestions related to the protection of life, such as extending 
the definition of a hostage to those civilian populations infiltrated by terrorists who hide 
within them. It also suggests updating the ICCPR to clarify that drone strikes should only 
be used where there is “clear evidence of a threat to life”.   
 
IHRL is valuable in its offer to provide an outlet to victimised individuals that have not 
found the opportunity to do so under IHL. The key focus moving forward should therefore 
pertain to the practicality of IHRL and how to increase its enforceability, perhaps through 
independent tribunals.  
 
6.3.3 Proposals for domestic law 
The thesis proposes that more government accountability will help facilitate the 
regulation of armed drones. The thesis relies upon Parliament’s recommendations that 
the Government is to automatically refer to the ISC when using armed drones, that the 
MoD must provide the ISC with the relevant intelligence pertaining to said operations, 
and that the Government is to seek independent legal advice on those matters instead of 
government lawyers.991 The thesis recommends a restatement to the convention about the 
use of war powers, but with particular reference to drone warfare. The convention should 
be bolstered to become less tentative or speculative and it should address the unique 
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nature of drone warfare in detail. The thesis also recommends a reconsideration of the 
exception given to Special Forces operations. 
 
More broadly, the thesis urges the British government to re-commit itself to the notion 
that maintaining individual liberty of its citizens and ensuring their security go hand in 
hand. This is ensured through maintaining high levels of government accountability in an 
era of an ever-increasing narrative of counter-terrorism. 
 
6.4 Contribution to originality  
This thesis contributes to existing literature, primarily in the form of linking the topics of 
dehumanisation, detachment, drone warfare, and law. While each topic has been 
previously researched independently, this thesis creates a coherent stream of thought: 
dehumanisation removes inhibitions towards killing, and physical distance has a direct 
correlation with psychological distance and detachment; drone warfare facilitates this 
dehumanisation through its unique capabilities. Armed conflict is growing increasingly 
unilateral and preventative as a result, and the law is not currently equipped to sufficiently 
regulate this rapidly adapting form of combat.  
 
The thesis built on Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to Authority experiments.992 While 
most analyses pertain to the psychology behind obedience to authority, this thesis 
analysed the same experiment but from the perspective of detachment. The thesis made 
note of the varying levels of detachment correlating with the extent to which the subjects 
were physically distanced from their victim. As a result, the thesis introduced a third 
notion of dehumanisation applicable to drone warfare – partial dehumanisation – adding 
to the two established forms of dehumanisation, namely animalistic dehumanisation and 
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mechanistic dehumanisation.993 Partial dehumanisation is where the humanity of the 
person is masked, blurred, or faded, as in the case of drone warfare. The thesis also 
provided a comprehensive evaluation of different methods of dehumanisation, analysing 
the role of distance, technology, and even language.  
 
This thesis is original in its consideration of dehumanisation as a cause for creating greater 
human insecurity towards life or an increased willingness to kill in armed conflict. 
Currently, the law does not acknowledge the dehumanising aspect of drone warfare. This 
thesis consistently advises that detachment and dehumanisation are considered as 
reference points when updating legal frameworks or policies. It is also original in 
examining both domestic law and international law in conjunction, providing in-depth 
analysis on IHL, IHRL, and domestic UK governance. This thesis can serve as a reference 
point for policy makers to apply, for academics to expound upon, and for NGOs and 
activists to utilise. 
 
6.5 Future research 
This research is limited in its scope by the nature of the PhD format, and so there remain 
a number of important avenues that can be subsequently explored. The most pertinent of 
these is perhaps automation and the vast implications it holds in armed conflict. In the 
near future, targeted killings may possibly evolve into the use of autonomous weapons 
that possess artificial intelligence and can independently make the decision of who to 
target and when. 994  The Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine Publication makes a 
distinction between automated and autonomous systems.995 The former refers to systems 
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that are programmed to follow predefined rules in response to sensor inputs, while the 
latter is capable of choosing from a range of alternative actions without the need for 
human input or control. The distinction is important as automated systems, despite being 
useful for reducing operator workload and speeding up decision-making, still remain 
within the oversight and control of humans. Indeed, there are already semi-autonomous 
weapons in use that pose limited autonomy in areas such as intelligence gathering, 
surveillance, target acquisition, and engagement. However, these still remain under the 
overall control of human beings.  
 
There is doubt as to whether these systems can ever exercise appropriate distinction 
between legitimate targets and illegitimate ones. Machines, however intelligent and 
autonomous, have a proven track record of obeying orders; there is no track record of 
their being able to creatively give orders. While a lack of emotion is often given as an 
advantage, the realities of war are never black and white. A rational response to a situation 
may not be the correct moral, ethical, practical, or legal choice. There is no evidence to 
currently suggest that laws of war, including the plethora of nuances involved, can be 
programmed into a robot.996 This underscores the discussion in Subchapter 3.4.5 on 
‘command responsibility’, where responsibility is placed on a superior officer if they have 
sufficient knowledge of the subordinate’s act, or intended act, and fail to take reasonable 
measures to prevent or punish them. The above-mentioned technological shortcoming 
creates a host of legal issues pertaining to proportionality and responsibility. Will these 
autonomous systems – which will be deployed in the not-too-distant future – absolve 
commanding officers from responsibility? Will they accept responsibility themselves? If 
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so, how can a robot receive punishment? Such legal predicaments must be considered and 
discussed in anticipation of these technologies, not after their deployment. 
 
Judicial independence will become even more important in the future with the 
introduction and use of autonomous weapons. There will ultimately need to be human 
accountability for any erroneous decisions made by autonomous weapons that result in 
the unnecessary or unlawful loss of life. An independent Supreme Court will have an 
important role to play in both deciding on cases arising out of the use of autonomous 
weapons and possibly being involved in judicial pre-legislative scrutiny on their 
implementation. At present, the international community is divided on how to ensure the 
compliance of autonomous weapon systems with IHL. “Article 36 of Additional Protocol 
I to the Geneva Conventions requires states parties to ensure in the ‘study, development, 
acquisition, or adoption of a new weapon’ that it would not, ‘in some or all 
circumstances’, be prohibited by the Protocol or any other rule of in.”997 The Human 
Rights Committee in October 2018 made the strong recommendation that such weapons, 
which lack the capacity for human emotion and judgment, should not be developed, as 
their use would have serious implications for the principle of the right to life under 
international law.998 While this thesis does not necessarily make such recommendations, 
it certainly concedes that further research is required on the matter. This imminent 
progression in artificial intelligence and its application to drone warfare conveys a very 
literal form of dehumanisation – the actual removal of human beings – not only from the 
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6.6 Concluding remarks 
Drones are here to stay.999 Their use has grown exponentially; 2004-2007 saw ten attacks 
in Pakistani territory compared to 36 in 2008, 54 in 2009, 122 in 2010, and so on.1000 Ten 
months into Nobel Peace Prize winner President Obama’s tenure, more drone attacks 
were authorised than in the entirety of President Bush’s eight years in office.1001 There 
are no signs of slowing down, with plans to expand drone operations into more “high-
threat” countries.1002 In fact, reliance on drones is increasing over time;1003 since 2011 the 
U.S. Air Force has trained more drone pilots than bomber pilots and fighter pilots 
combined.1004 That is apparently not enough, with a reported “crisis” in finding enough 
pilots for the required missions to come.1005 Pragmatically, this thesis does not call for a 
ban on drones. 
 
Ethically, this thesis does not argue that drones are inherently wrong. Former U.N. 
Special Rapporteur Professor Philip Alston acknowledges that drone missiles are “no 
different from any other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a 
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helicopter or gunship that fires missiles.”1006 Inherently, the mechanism of a drone strike 
cannot be said to be less favourable morally than a gunshot or aerial bomb. In fact, an 
argument can be made for its moral superiority; the ‘old way of war’ sought to destroy or 
annihilate the enemy, which would entail amassing forces to crush the enemy, and 
oftentimes civilians too.1007 Drones are designed to be quicker, more decisive, and with 
less risk to civilians.1008 Some commentators describe them as “the most humane form of 
warfare.”1009 
 
The thesis does not argue for the inherent illegality of drones either. The overarching 
principle that governs the regulation of weaponry in armed conflict is the prohibition of 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering,1010 such as with poisoned bullets or blinding 
lasers. 1011  Drones, in and of themselves, do not contravene this principle. Instead, 
criticism is directed at the manner in which they are used as well as the frequency and 
permissibility of their use. Attention is focused on whether specific use of drones (like 
any other weapon) complies with the LOAC and its fundamental principles, namely that 
of proportionality, necessity, distinction, precaution, and most importantly, humanity. 
This applies to each specific drone operation as well as the consequences of drone warfare 
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as a phenomenon and culture, namely that of detachment and dehumanisation, blurring 
the lines of peace and war. While isolated use of UAVs may potentially be legal, the 
international culture surrounding armed aggression created as a result may contravene the 
above-mentioned underlying principles of the LOAC.  
 
In the wake of the USA’s first targeted killing by a drone outside an active battlefield in 
2002, Special Rapporteur Asma Jahangir expressed that “an alarming precedent might 
have been set for extrajudicial execution by consent of Government.”1012 She was indeed 
correct; it set a precedent for a rapid rise in drones being used for targeted assassinations 
in the decade to come. By 2017, the Obama administration authorised 563 drone strikes 
in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia – over ten times more than were authorised under the 
Bush administration.1013 Many of these strikes crossed legal boundaries. Mary O’Connell 
concluded that there is “no legal right to resort to drone attacks in Pakistan.”1014 Her 
discussions largely revolved around jurisdictional issues stemming from a lack of consent 
elaborated upon in great detail in Subchapter 3.2.2. 
 
Quite remarkably, President Obama himself warned of the “limits” of drone use, noting 
in 2013: “We will not be safer if people abroad believe we strike within their countries 
without regard for the consequence.”1015 Obama encapsulated the underlying criticisms 
of the culture drone warfare outlined throughout this thesis, as laid out in Research 
Objective 2. Ignatieff describes the bombing of Baghdad as the first war where “the 
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electorate discovered the intoxicating reality of risk-free warfare.”1016 While all wars 
have a degree of risk and consequence, the flexibility, anonymity, and distance at which 
drones operate must be met with regulations specific to its characteristics. With fewer 
incentives to terminate the violence, the lower cost of war may result in countries 
resorting to force as a measure equivalent to nonviolent alternatives such as economic 
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